Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Responsibility: The New Language of Global Bioethics and Biolaw

3. Reconstructing Human Dignity as a Moral Value

3 Reconstructing Human Dignity as a Moral Value Introduction In this chapter I explicate a philosophical theory of human dignity and offer a descriptive definition of the term. Such a definition lies in between a rigidly logical specification and a looser fanning out of the relevant “language games” and their conceptual ecology. The latter refers to the manner in which the components within the descriptive definition bear on each other and how they interact with other philosophical concepts. Following the historical review of the previous chapter, we may broadly conceptualize the normative value of human dignity as comprised of three categories: the formal elements, the substantial elements, and motivation. The formal elements are universality, equality, primacy, and irrevocability . Altogether, they combine into a “naturalist” conceptualization of human dignity as a universal and eternal value whose authority and content are self-evident—or should be self-evident to all well-intentioned and rational persons. Human dignity is a moral property innate to all humans. Because all humans are equally human, there is no single person whose dignity is superior or inferior to any other. Because humans never metamorphose to something else, there humanness is permanent. Because human dignity is derived only from this humanness, human dignity is irrevocable. All humans are equally expected to respect the human dignity of each other; all people should be treated equally in matters of human dignity. Human dignity should be reconstructed as a de facto universal moral value as well. The task at hand is not only to explicate ethical norms philosophically, but also to remain faithful to the many ethical norms that are already accepted by most of humanity while criticizing and reforming other deeply ingrained norms as necessary. 94 Chapter 3 Clearly, I do not expect every single individual and every culture or sect to endorse every normative observation in this book. De facto universality is only tangentially universal. Conformity with ethical norms is difficult and there are occasional points of dispute. Nonetheless, debates on the exact meaning and application of human dignity are not evidence of its weakness as a moral value. Rather, possibly because most people feel that they have a strong moral commitment to human dignity, disagreements on human dignity’s precise formulation and normative application can be vehement and difficult to resolve. The universality of human dignity also implies that no doctrine or tradition has a higher authority than any other in the arbitration of dignity-related moral issues. After universality and equality, human dignity’s third formal element is primacy. This is the belief that a few fundamental moral values carry normative power; people or institutions of authority, no matter how powerful or legitimate, cannot overrule these values. Hence, these values cannot be derived from recognition by any specific authority. Any specific formulation of human dignity cannot bring its explication into closure. This is because every formulation and canonization will be tainted by local biases and perceptions. Natural Morality One may discern a few meanings of “the natural” within the discourse on natural morality: It is something to be discovered; the psychological and social experience is very similar to that of scientific discovery. Although it is formulated in human language and conceptual tools, it is not man-made, in the sense that is it not a product of deliberate human design (i.e., artifice). It is universal in scope and validity. Observers may find it, at least as a teaching, and often in practice, across numerous and diverse human societies. There is a tendency to account for it by natural paradigms of explanation , such as ethology, evolutionary psychology, and neurobiology. Similar to the laws of nature, human authority cannot alter or cancel it. In one version of naturalism, we are dealing with moral realism to which universal practice provides nonphilosophical, or indirect, support. In another version of naturalism, it is possible to criticize a particular Reconstructing Human Dignity 95 norm or culture only by the invocation of norms and modes of reasoning with broader geographical and historical spans. Hence the latter is perceived as natural relative to the former. Some definitions of the “natural” are contingent on metaphysical assumptions that may not be true, such as the notion that the eternal, universal, and constant are always truthful and dignified. Ample research in moral psychology shows that humans all over the globe, even toddlers, distinguish between “moral” and “conventional” norms (Prinz 2007, 32–47; see Strauss 1953...