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4 Russia and the Kyoto Protocol: From Hot Air to Implementation? Laura A. Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom Introduction On 5 November 2004, the Russian Federation ratified the Kyoto Protocol . Since the treaty required the participation of states responsible for at least 55 percent of Annex 1 greenhouse gases, Russia’s ratification tipped the scales, and the Protocol went into effect on 15 February 2005. At first glance, it is surprising that Russia turned out to be the key ratifying state of the Kyoto Protocol. The Russian government has spent the last fifteen years focused on economic recovery and development, and environmental regulation and treaties have been low on its list of priorities . Russia has become the world’s largest exporter of natural gas, the second largest oil exporter, and the third largest energy consumer.1 Russia’s continued economic growth significantly depends on the demand for carbon-based fuel. Yet for close analysts of the Kyoto Protocol and Russia, there were clear incentives for Russia’s participation. Russia experienced massive industrial decline in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. Since 1990 is the benchmark year for emissions limits under the Kyoto Protocol, Russia has considerable room to increase emissions prior to 2012 before it will exceed its Kyoto emissions targets. Moreover, Russia can sell its excess credits or attract investment designed to further reduce emissions. The real puzzle is why Russia took so long to ratify the treaty since, to outside observers, its potential for material gains (or at least negligible costs) from ratification seemed clear. In addition , Russia’s initial ambivalence about ratification has led to relatively slow domestic implementation of the Protocol, both in terms of fulfilling its reporting requirements and of developing a strategic climate policy. There were a number of reasons for Russia’s delay. First, there was significant pessimism regarding the consequences of the Kyoto Protocol 106 Laura A. Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom among some prominent Russian scientists, who doubted the link between carbon emissions and climate change, and economists, who argued that Russia would have to limit its economic growth to avoid exceeding Kyoto emissions limits before 2012 and that direct material benefits from the Protocol might not be as great as expected. Second, once the United States announced its decision not to ratify, Russia, responsible for 17.4 percent of 1990 Annex 1 emissions, became the only state with sufficient emissions to bring the Protocol into effect, and it therefore held a crucial diplomatic bargaining chip. As a result of these two factors, President Vladimir Putin had incentives to delay a decision until he had, first, clarified the balance of evidence regarding causes of climate change and economic consequences of ratification and, second, secured significant rewards from international partners on other issues in exchange for ratification, while still elevating Russia’s image as a cooperative partner in international affairs. These international factors explain why Putin, who in Russia’s highly centralized system retained a great degree of autonomy in foreign affairs, made numerous contradictory statements relating to Kyoto prior to ratification and why he allowed Kyoto critics close to his administration to continue their negative public statements for so long. Putin wished to maintain a sense of uncertainty about the likelihood of Russia’s ratification in order to obtain inducements from other Kyoto-ratifying states. In contrast to the significant role of international factors in encouraging Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, implementation of the agreement is a largely domestic process, which generally occurs after the wave of international interest and pressure has subsided. Unlike most other Annex 1 states, Russia needs to do very little to comply with the Protocol given that its emissions are well below 1990 levels. Yet Russia’s active participation in Kyoto’s flexibility mechanisms would contribute to the overall success of the agreement in bringing about emissions reductions and providing a means for other Annex 1 states to meet their emissions targets through flexibility mechanisms. The Russian case indicates that international partners can offer incentives for states to implement the Protocol through financial and technological investments and the environmental benefits that may result, but ultimately implementation depends primarily on buy-in from domestic actors. Implementation of real emissions reduction measures proceeds effectively if government officials and institutions see that implementation enhances their institutional authority and become invested in their [3...

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