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11 First Communions How did humans bridge the tremendous gap between symbolic thought and the nonsymbolic forms of intelligence that still dominate the rest of the animal kingdom? —Donald 1991, 4 The Missing Cognitive Link The existence of chimpanzee ToM abilities was once a very hot topic of debate. As early as 1978 Premack and Woodruff asked, in a paper by the same name, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” Of all the primates , it was initially thought that chimps alone engage in acts of genuine tactical deception.1 It was thought that if this could be established then it would have settled the matter; to deceive with intent apparently involves representing the beliefs, desires, and intentions of others—implying that chimpanzees have the capacity for metarepresentational intentional attribution . For true intentional deception calls on a sophisticated mentalistic understanding not only of states of mind such as desires but, crucially, also beliefs (Hauser 1997). Early assessments, based on anecdotes of the behaviors of individual animals, encouraged a positive answer to the Premack and Woodruff question. There were reported cases of what seemed to be genuine intentional deception (and even counterdeception) on the part of at least some chimpanzees. One such sophisticated interplay took the form of tactical exchanges in the context of food-harboring contests between two chimps, Belle—a female—and Rock—the dominant male. These contests, which were arranged as part of a series of experiments conducted by Menzel, had the virtue of revealing aspects of behavior in what would be relatively ecologically normal settings for these apes (Bryne and Whiten 1991). The setup was such that Belle was privileged by being shown the whereabouts of hidden food by the researchers. However, she soon discovered any attempt on her part to openly alert others to its presence, resulted in Rock’s taking it. This led her to adopt a series of deceptive tactics whenever Rock was nearby. Initially, she would sit on the food—until Rock caught on and began regularly pushing her aside to check beneath her. After this she consistently stopped short of the actual location of the food whenever Rock was in the vicinity. By way of reply, Rock started searching the area around her ever more widely, until he successfully obtained the food. The moves in this dance became increasingly more elaborate, step by step, much to Belle’s frustration no doubt. Chimpanzees learn quickly from trial-and-error experience. There can be no question that these apes closely monitor one another (and even monitor another’s monitoring of them). They are also capable of remembering the past behaviors and attitudes of individuals and the circumstances in which they are likely to be evoked. This would be sufficient to explain how they develop fresh plans of action that are swiftly adjusted and adapted, as need be, on the hoof in light of new developments. But this suggests that their antics can be adequately explained without positing any understanding of other minds at all. For example, Belle and Rock might just be very talented behaviorists. Those who have pushed for the mindreading interpretation have long been aware of this killjoy alternative and its undermining force (see Byrne and Whiten 1997, 9).2 Against the deflationary interpretation, one of Rock’s advanced stratagems was cited as compelling evidence that chimpanzees, as a species, must have mature ToM abilities. In one interaction, Belle employed a new tactic of waiting until Rock was seemingly distracted before moving toward the food. Rock eventually countered this by pretending to look away, and even sometimes by heading off in another direction, apparently to give the impression that his attention was occupied elsewhere. For all intents and purposes, it seemed as if this was done purposefully in order to lull Belle into a false sense of security, for after going a certain distance, Rock would suddenly turn—without warning—to catch her, using her as a guide to the food’s location. Admittedly, this sort of behavior is not the norm in the chimpanzee repertoire but if one animal could achieve it, it must be within the species’ cognitive reach. Most importantly, it seems impossible to make sense of Rock’s pretense—his tactic of feigning disinterest—without attributing to him a capacity for mentalistic attribution. The suggestion was therefore made that this particular chimpanzee must in fact have had a capacity for intentional attribution of a third-order of magnitude: “Rock 200 Chapter 11 [3.17.6...

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