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c h a p t e r f o u r The Fatal Decision At 0715 on the morning of the battle, Admiral Nagumo made the fatal decision to rearm his torpedo planes with land bombs for a second strike on Midway. It was the ¤rst of three crucial decisions Nagumo made during the three critical hours before most of his carriers were destroyed at 1025. In this chapter I analyze that decision—and the events immediately preceding it—and give a judgment of its reasonableness. Nagumo’s second crucial decision—his decision countermanding the rearming order—will be discussed in chapter 5, along with the controversies surrounding Tone 4’s sighting reports. The third decision by Nagumo—to postpone his attack—made at around 0830 is his most controversial decision; it will be covered in chapter 6. But ¤rst, the events preceding the decision to rearm: the attack on Midway and the search effort. OPENING MOVES The attack on Midway was launched at 0430—just as dawn broke on the morning of June 4. It was still a half-hour before sunrise, but the engine and weapons mechanics of the air groups on the four carriers of Nagumo’s First Air Fleet (Mobile Force) had been up since 0130 preparing the planes for the strike on Midway. The Midway strike force consisted of 108 planes. Launched ¤rst were the fatal decision 105 thirty-six Zero ¤ghters, nine from each carrier. They would take on the Midway -based ¤ghters and strafe the ground defenses. Following them on Hiryu and Soryu were thirty-six Kate torpedo planes (eighteen from each carrier) that had been armed with 805-kilogram instant-detonation fragmentation land bombs. Following the Zeros on Akagi and Kaga were thirty-six Val dive-bombers (eighteen from each carrier) that had been armed with 242-kilogram highexplosive land bombs. The strike force was led by Lt. Joichi Tomonaga of Hiryu, who had replaced Mitsuo Fuchida as strike force commander when Fuchida became disabled from an appendicitis operation. The launch took less than ¤fteen minutes. In addition to the Midway strike force planes, twelve Zeros—three from each carrier—were launched, along with the strike force, for combat air patrol.1 Also, an additional Kate torpedo plane each from Akagi and Kaga was launched as part of the search patrol. Thus, thirty planes each were launched from Hiryu and Soryu, and thirty-one each from Akagi and Kaga, for a total of 122 aircraft. By 0445 the Midway strike force had formed up and headed for Midway—about 210 nautical miles away. (One Kate from Hiryu developed engine trouble and returned—making an emergency landing on Soryu, apparently the closest carrier.) At the same time the carrier planes were being launched, catapult launches of ¶oat planes were taking place on the cruisers Tone and Chikuma and on the battleship Haruna. One plane each from Tone and Chikuma was launched for antisubmarine patrol and ¤ve planes, two each from Tone and Chikuma and one from Haruna, were launched for the surface ship search patrol. At the last moment launch priority had been given to the antisubmarine patrol over the surface ship search (as Nagumo considered American submarines to be the greater threat). Last to be launched was the Tone 4 search plane. It had been scheduled for 0440 after the antisubmarine patrol plane had been launched, but was delayed until 0500.2 (The cause of the delay is disputed—some say engine trouble, others say catapult trouble.) Nagumo had issued his search plan two days earlier. He had not seen ¤t to alter it—even after he learned that the transport group of the Midway Invasion Force had been discovered. This was because, as we have seen, he had been given no reason to suspect that American carriers might be in the area. The search plan consisted of seven lines, six of them extending 300 nautical miles from the Mobile Force, the seventh—to the north—extending 150 miles (it was covered by an older-type ¶oat plane from Haruna and was considered to be a much less likely place to ¤nd American ships). Altogether, the search paths covered an arc from 20º to 180º. At the end of each search line the planes would make a dogleg to the left for 60 miles before returning to their mother ships. After the planes of the Midway strike force had been launched, Nagumo had the following left onboard his carriers, excluding spares and...

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