Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972

4. Creating a Special Channel: The Ambassadorial Talks,1955–60

76 chapter four Creating a Special Channel The Ambassadorial Talks, 1955–60 In the immediate aftermath of the Korean armistice, both Beijing and Washington seemed inclined to further ease tensions between them. On 7 July 1954, at an enlarged meeting of the CCP Politburo, Mao Zedong observed that “the general international trend reveals that America is quite isolated ,” and faced dif¤culties both at home and abroad. “We are no longer able,” he added, “to shut our door against outsiders even if we wanted to. Now, things are moving in our favor. We must reach out [to the international arena].”1 Although de¤ning China as a “major threat” to U.S. security interests in East and Southeast Asia, Washington was under pressure to get U.S. strategic priorities straight by focusing more on Europe, its vital interest. Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration felt compelled to deal with Communist China in a de facto diplomatic arrangement in order to have unresolved disputes settled, including getting back U.S. citizens detained in China. Without formal diplomatic relations, the two countries agreed to maintain communications through a special mechanism, Sino-American “ambassadorial talks.” From 1955 to 1960, the Chinese and American ambassadors held 102 diplomatic talks, ¤rst in Geneva and then in Warsaw. Despite the impasse over the major issue—Taiwan—the ambassadorial talks played an important role in de¶ecting confrontations and providing a channel for the transmission of information between the two antagonists during those dif¤cult years. Why did creating a special channel 77 these two nations decide to talk after the Korean War? How did the two sides differ in terms of their expectations about and positions on the major issues? Why did the ambassadorial talks fail to lead to more constructive, high-level contacts between Washington and Beijing? Did these talks play any role in managing the confrontational relations? I In the spring of 1952, the CCP declared the end of the transitional stage in the economic rebuilding in China and the beginning of a new period of economic expansion.2 The CCP Central Committee promulgation of the ¤rst Five-Year Plan in 1953 amounted to recognition that China needed to avoid armed con¶icts such as the Korean War. The CCP policy reorientation brought about a period of intensive internal economic development. During this period, the Chinese leadership adopted a long-term perspective on the country’s interests and threats, and focused its resources on the rapid establishment of the socialist system. Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, a new foreign policy was in the making. The changed approach to international relations, developed in 1952 and implemented in 1953, was called “the policy of a peaceful united front,” taking as its central tenets the ¤ve principles of peaceful coexistence.3 The primary goal of this policy was the creation of a peaceful environment conducive to China’s domestic economic development.4 Within this context, the Chinese leaders became more interested in renewing contacts with the West. They came to believe that the threat from the United States was no longer imminent and that Washington had dif¤culty in reconciling its interests with those of its allies, offering China opportunities for diplomatic maneuvering. Just before the end of the Korean War, speaking at a foreign affairs conference in Beijing on 5 June 1953, Zhou Enlai had pointed out that “the most outstanding international con¶ict today is that between peace and war” and that Chinese policy was based on “the courage to put into practice peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition among countries with different systems.” He added “the U.S. threat of war may . . . deepen its rift with Western Europe and no country in Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa wants to follow it.”5 The Chinese leaders believed it might even be possible to ease tensions with the United States over many issues. From the Chinese perspective, the existence of the People’s Republic of China was a reality and could not be denied. Whether Washington legally recognized the PRC or not, it had to acknowledge reality, and ultimately had to deal with the leadership in Beijing. The Geneva Conference, held between April and July 1954, provided China with an opportunity to act as a great power in the international community. 78 negotiating with the enemy Prior to the conference, at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on 2 March, Zhou Enlai...