Imagination in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason

One: Principles of Pure Practical Reason: Imagination and Moral “Derivation”

o n e Principles of Pure Practical Reason Imagination and Moral “Derivation” The use of pure reason, if it is shown that there is such a reason [i.e., a use that can determine the will] is constituted such that it is alone immanent ; the empirically contingent use of reason, which presumed to be sovereign, is, on the contrary, transcendent, expressing itself in demands and precepts that go far beyond its own sphere. This is precisely the opposite situation from that of pure reason in its speculative use. (V, 16) In his brief but crucial introduction, Kant goes on to say that his treatment in the Doctrine of Elements will re®ect this reversal. It will proceed from principles, to concepts, and only then to sensations, because the concern here is reason’s relation to the will and not to objects . Objects must have a sensible component. This sensible component was treated at the outset of the Critique of Pure Reason in the Transcendental Aesthetic, but here the concern is the will’s relation to an intelligible law. The ¤rst critique, then, presented reason in its ascent from intuitions , to imagination, then to apperception as the elements of synthesis and unity. The principles of the pure understanding, in which pure intuition, pure schema, and pure concept converge, represent the apex of this ascent. The “I think” of apperception ultimately means “I think the principles of the pure understanding.” But given that the purely formal “I think” requires an act of synthesis in order to make experience possible, productive imagination already dwells at the heart of the “I think.” Why, then, not begin from principles in the critique of speculative reason? Because speculative reason, in seeking the unconditioned, transcends its own apex and in so doing threatens reason’s entire enterprise with sham principles that are nevertheless rooted in its nature. The restriction of knowledge to appearances serves as a warning against the hubris to which reason is subject in its quest for knowledge of original being and so prevents the Nemesis of dialectical illusion.1 Principles are located in the middle of the Critique of Pure Reason, imaging reason’s holding itself within proper measure. Again and again, Kant reiterates practical reason’s renunciation of any claim to knowledge beyond that measure established by the ¤rst critique. The modesty of his claim for the real cognition of practical principles is similarly well-known, and was discussed above.2 Further , practical principles differ in form from theoretical principles. “Practical principles (Grundsätze) are propositions that contain a universal determination of the will which has more practical rules under it” (V, 19). Those rules regarded as valid for a subject’s own will are subjective and are called maxims. Those rules that are valid for the will of all rational beings are called laws. Practical laws always include an “ought,” because the subject may always choose not to follow the rule in question. Kant attributes this to our having a faculty of desire such that reason “is not the sole determinant of the will” (V, 20). In terms of imagination and the depth of the Kantian text, this “ought” can be presented otherwise: the descent from the law of reason to the faculty of desire is mediated by imagination in a different way than theoretical laws under their principles are mediated to intuition. Given the spontaneity of synthesis in the principles of theoretical reason and their application by means of the “smart” schemata to our receptive intuition, it is impossible to be “transcendentally stupid,” although one can surely miscalculate, misread causes, etc. This is because the ¤eld of determinable experience is synthesized in advance. By contrast, the principles of practical reason direct themselves not to given appearances, but ¤rst to a bifurcated will, and only then to the material served up by sensibility. Just as one can misread appear50 Analytic of Pure Practical Reason ances presented to the understanding in its theoretical capacity, one can misread moral phenomena. For example, I may keep a promise merely as a means to preserve a reputation I plan to exploit at a later date, while others might read this promise-keeping as occurring entirely from duty (or vice versa). Unlike the ¤eld of appearances, the moral ¤eld is a bifurcated ¤eld by its very nature, the contours of which can shift with the shifting in®uences that constitute the struggle to which we...