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conclusions Rethinking Encounters and Reformist Narratives this book has been about social and economic changes in several african countries that can be traced to economic and political reform programs first introduced in the early 1980s. it has used the twin platforms of neoliberalism, with its emphases on individualism and economic growth, and globalization, with its focus on global flows of goods, technologies, and ideas, to explain a series of ethnographic encounters across a broad set of sectors and issues. The book suggests that these cases represent a more general trend in africa and elsewhere in lowincome countries, as evidenced, for example, by the widespread imposition of such models as contract farming (chapter 1) and community-based conservation (chapter 3). Borrowing from foucault’s concept of governmentality and James scott’s notion of legibility, the book also has highlighted a set of powerful narratives about economy, society, and development that ofen have been hijacked and misrepresented by neoliberal reformists, and thus miss what actually is happening in rural and urban africa, as well as potential opportunities for local development . similar to earlier works by ferguson (1990) in lesotho, mitchell (2002) in Egypt, and li (2009) in indonesia, the book argues that particular development narratives and polices are used to disguise underlying politico-economic agendas that are intended to place greater controls on local populations or, in some cases, transfer lands and other resources to state and/or private investors. it explains how these narratives and reforms ofen discredit local markets, tenure systems , livelihoods, and organizations in favor of a technology of audit, corporate business management, export-based growth, and support for large private companies that ofen are foreign owned. all of these take place under the pretense of increased economic and political freedoms for the individual. With the support of international financial institutions and development agencies, african governments pursued a reform agenda during the past almost three decades that favored export over local markets, large farms and agribusiness firms over small-scale farmers and traders, and external definitions of welfare and poverty over local realities and perceptions. in principle, the state and government regulations assumed smaller roles in the economy and free markets and private investments were encouraged, with minimal protections for lo187 188 | Economic and Political Reform in Africa cal communities or redistributive mechanisms to ensure that local populations also benefited from economic growth. in the meantime the gap between rich and poor and the incidence of poverty in most rural areas of africa has grown (stein 2011). as the book has shown, in reality the state and its donor supporters maintained active roles in providing subsidies, infrastructure, tariff reductions, and security to investors and the private sector, even while insisting that it was privatesector -led development without government assistance. and some governments adopted certain characteristics of neoliberalism, such as expanding markets and increasing food production, in order to increase their controls on local populations , especially those in remote locations. What emerged in this context was a veneer of reforms and official structures that masked the real economy of risktaking herders and farmers, tranborder traders and migrants, and entrepreneurial market women. as the book has shown, the outputs of these economic actors often do not show up in the official statistics of governments and development agencies that are used to inform policy and investment programs. However, in political terms some of the reforms that were initiated clearly opened up spaces for underrepresented groups to improve their rights and, consequently , their share of development resources and benefits. The rolling back of the state and the push for democratic elections ignited an explosion in the number of nGos and civil society organizations, which for some marginal groups provided new opportunities for beneficial alliances, including with international groups. small, indigenous groups, such as the maasai-related il chamus discussed in chapters 3 and 4, drew on democratic discourses and new minority and human rights initiatives to build key alliances with national and international actors that advanced their own political struggles. in a very positive sense, the opening up of a relatively free press in Kenya following the end of the repressive moi era also allowed groups such as il chamus to use the media to publicize their political cause and eventually become “renowned for legal battles in defence of their rights” (Thuku 2012). other marginalized groups have followed similar strategies , even though most of them—including il chamus—have yet to reap significant political and economic dividends. These public tactics, however, would have...

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