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1 introduction randi rashkover and martin Kavka one might suspect that there would be little left to question about Jews’ relation to the political sphere. The stereotype, at least in the united states, that Jews are overwhelmingly liberal was confirmed by the 2008 and 2012 elections, which saw hebrew-language buttons in support of barack obama’s candidacy and greater support for obama among Jews than among any other ethnic group with the exception of african americans.1 nevertheless, this stereotype of a comfortable alliance between Judaism and liberalism should be seen for what it is—something that is askew and calls for a critical eye. For is it indeed the case that Judaism (and/or Jewry) in the modern period has firmly aligned itself with the secular liberal state? it would seem that contemporary Jewish support for the Zionist enterprise—for a Jewish state regardless of demographic realities that might threaten its democratic character—means that Jews cannot be liberals in the way that, say, followers of the political philosophy of John rawls are, under the sway of a type of thinking that assumes that all citizens have the same desires and wants.2 The cracks in the marriage between Judaism and liberalism are apparent from other angles as well; see, for example, the support in contemporary Jewish thought for a multicultural stance critical of the flattening effects of the liberal state.3 The difficult nature of this relationship raises a number of questions. since the relationship is vexed, is it indeed the case that Jewish support for liberalism has been entirely secular? conversely, might the sense of malaise regarding Judaism and liberalism have to do with the potential conflict between Judaism as a religion and the liberal state? These types of questions about political action in general (and not only applicable to Judaism) have been a mainstay of scholarship since the collapse in the 2 | Randi Rashkover and Martin Kavka 1990s of what was called the “secularization thesis.” most notably articulated in works such as Peter L. berger’s The Sacred Canopy, the secularization thesis assumed that modernity was an essentially secularizing force.4 but berger himself left this thesis behind later in his career, and in an article from the mid-1990s wrote that even the most cursory look at the data showed that the secularization thesis was false: “to put it simply, experiments with secularized religion have generally failed; religious movements with beliefs and practices dripping with reactionary supernaturalism (the kind utterly beyond the pale at self-respecting faculty parties) have widely succeeded.”5 and at the same time that the secularization thesis was falling into eclipse, the scholarly world saw a renaissance of interest in the Weimar political theorist carl schmitt, who argued in 1922 that all secular politics of modernity had maintained the theological structure of premodern accounts of sovereignty. (schmitt infamously joined the nazi Party in may 1933.) schmitt’s dictum that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts” is frequently quoted now, as is his analogy between the theological category of the miracle and the political sovereign ’s ability to declare a state of exception to the law.6 yet what drove schmitt in the 1920s was not simply a lust for power or for a dictatorial state, despite his lionization of the theory of dictatorship offered by the spanish catholic political theorist Juan donoso cortés, but his dismay at the increasing depersonalization and depoliticization of the modern liberal state. “The modern state seems to have actually become what max Weber envisioned: a huge industrial plant,” schmitt wrote near the end of Political Theology.7 This alienation could only be conquered by a sovereign political authority who would be able to guarantee the state’s role in securing the existential interests of its constituents. The critique of liberalism found in political theology overlaps awkwardly with the tradition of Jewish political thought, whether Zionist or non-Zionist. a closer look at the discourse of both political theology and Jewish political thought shows that each invokes elements of the other, yet often without justification or reflection. accounts of liberalism and power are thrown around willy-nilly in contemporary Jewish political thinking. conversely, Judaism is invoked in the discourse of political theology from its inception without any nuance. each is limited, although too often representatives of one side or the other write as if they possessed infinite truth—as if the rejection of liberalism and the turn...

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