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49 6. BEYOND GHANNOUCHI: ISLAMISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN TUNISIA RIKKE HOSTRUP HAUGBØLLE AND FRANCESCO CAVATORTA On October 23, 2011, for the first time since independence in 1956,Tunisians were called to the polls in free and transparent elections. They were to choose 217 members of a Constituent Assembly that for a year would play a double role: drafting a new constitution and governing the country. For many Tunisians,as well as foreigners, the results were something of a surprise.First, the turnout was lower than expected, hovering just over 53 percent, despite serious efforts by the Electoral Commission to get out the vote. Many ordinary Tunisians, it appears, are skeptical of the political transformation in the country since the ouster of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Second, the victory of the Islamist party al-Nahda was much larger than anticipated . Opinion surveys taken beforehand had predicted the party’s first-place finish, but with a vote oscillating between 20 and 28 percent of the total.In the end,al-Nahda obtained 41.7 percent of the vote and, more significantly, won eighty-nine seats in the Constituent Assembly,by far the largest bloc.Third,secular,and leftist parties put in a solid performance (though not up to expectations), but their divisions split the secular electorate. No party except al-Nahda, therefore, garnered more than 8 percent of the ballot. While these results were a bit startling, the subsequent negotiations to form a government were reasonably straightforward. al-Nahda ended up in a three-party coalition with the Congress for the Republic, led by Moncef Marzouki, a left-wing nationalist party that came in second with twenty-nine seats,and Ettakatol,a social democratic party that finished fourth with twenty seats and is helmed by Mostapha Ben Jaafar.Throughout the campaign, al-Nahda maintained it would seek a broad alliance with other political forces to signal Tunisians that partisanship would be put aside. It was the job of all political groups, symbolizing a unified nation, to draft the constitution and usher in the new era, said al-Nahda figures. On December 22, 2011 the new government was approved.The three-party agreement stipulated that Hamadi Jebali, secretary-general of al-Nahda, would be prime minister , Marzouki would be president and Ben Jaafar leader of the Assembly. The agreement also provided for the creation of forty-two senior and junior ministerial posts: nineteen slots would go to al-Nahda, including the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Education, Health, and Foreign Affairs,six to the Congress,six to Ettakatol,and eleven to independents chosen for professional ability in their respective fields.Finally,the coalition partners agreed to go their separate ways in constitutional debates without paralyzing the government. The Assembly 50 quickly adopted a decree, the “small constitution,”that will regulate government operations until a new national charter is drafted. The immediate post-Ben Ali order in Tunisia has no exact parallel anywhere, but the French semi-presidential system was clearly influential on the provisional institutions while the Constituent Assembly debates the form of government to be adopted for the future. In practice, the president, chosen by the Assembly, appoints the prime minister and the two then work together on major policy decisions under the Assembly’s scrutiny.This arrangement might slow deliberations at a time when very important decisions have to be made rapidly in several fields,particularly reform of the security services and the economy,but the advantage is that such major decisions will enjoy a reasonably broad consensus. In any case, the election results and the institutional arrangements that followed leave al-Nahda in position to shape Tunisia’s future. Explaining al-Nahda’s Sweep That fact,combined with al-Nahda’s religious references,makes many secular Tunisians and foreign observers uneasy.Many also wonder where al-Nahda’s sweeping victory came from, given that the party was illegal before March 2011 and had been the target of relentless repression for three decades. A number of explanations have been advanced to account for al-Nahda’s success. First, it is said that al-Nahda was very quick and skilled in reorganizing its structures across the country after Ben Ali fell on January 14, 2011. This view found partial affirmation in a conversation with Abdelhamid Jelassi, a member of al-Nahda’s Executive Committee, who argued: “Given that we are an old party, we have been able to revive our structures immediately after the revolution in January. Militants who were...

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