In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Three Independent Factors in Morals (1930) There is a fact which from all the evidence is an integral part of moral action which has not received the attention it deserves in moral theory: that is the element of uncertainty and of conflict in any situation which can properly be called moral. The conventional attitude sees in that situation only a conflict of good and of evil; in such a conflict, it is asserted, there should not be any uncertaint)Z The moral agent knows good as good and evil as evil and chooses one or the other according to the knowledge he has of it. I will not stop to discuss whether this traditional view can be sustained in certain cases; it is enough to say that it is not right in a great number of cases. The more conscientious the agent is and the more care he expends on the moral quality of his acts, the more he is aware of the complexity of this problem of discovering what is good; he hesitates among ends, all of which are good in some measure, among duties which obligate him for some reason. Only after the event, and then by chance, does one of the alternatives seem simply good morally or bad morally. And if we take the case of a person commonly considered immoral, we know that he does not take the trouble of justifying his acts, even the criminal ones; he makes no effort, to use the psychoanalysts' term, to "rationalize" them. As Ijust proposed, this problematical character of moral situations, this preliminary uncertainty in considering the moral quality of an act to be performed, is not recognized by current moral theory. The reason for that is, it seems to me, quite simple. Whatever may be the differences which separate moral theories, all postulate one single principle as an explanation of moral life. Under such conditions, it is not possible to have either uncertainty or conflict: morally speaking, the conflict is only specious and apparent. Conflict is, in effect, between good and evil, justice and injustice, duty and caprice, virtue and vice, and is not an inherent part of the good, the obligatory, the virtuous. Intellectually and morally, distinctions are given in advance; from such a point of view, conflict is in the nature of things, a hesitation about choice, an anguish of the will divided between good and evil, between appetite and a categorical imperative, between the disposition to virtue or the penchant for vice. 315 That is the necessary logical conclusion if moral action has only one source, if it ranges only within a single category. Obviously in this case the only force which can oppose the moral is the immoral. In the time I have at my disposal I will not attempt to prove that this idea of the nature of conflict is an abstract and arbitrary simplification , so much so that it runs counter to every empirical observation of fact. I can only express, briefly and in passing, the idea that moral progress and the sharpening of character depend on the ability to make delicate distinctions, to perceive aspects of good and of evil not previously noticed, to take into account the fact that doubt and the need for choice impinge at every turn. Moral decline is on a par with the loss of that ability to make delicate distinctions, with the blunting and hardening of the capacity of discrimination. Posing this point without undertaking to prove it, I shall content myself with presenting the hypothesis that there are at least three independent variables in moral action. Each of these variables has a sound basis, but because each has a different origin and mode of operation , they can be at cross purposes and exercise divergent forces in the formation of judgment . From this point ofview; uncertainty and conflict are inherent in morals; it is characteristic ofany situation properly called moral that one is ignorant of the end and of good consequences , of the right and just approach, of the direction of virtuous conduct, and that one must search for them. The essence of the moral situation is an internal and intrinsic conflict; the necessity for judgment and for choice comes from the fact that one has to manage forces with no common denominator. By way of introduction, let us see what is involved. We know that there are two opposing systems of moral theory: the morality of ends and the morality of laws. The dominating...

Share