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Valuation and Experimental Knowledge (1922) 272 Plato long ago called notice to the disadvantage ofwritten discussion as compared with oral. The printed page does not respond to questions addressed it. It will not share in conversation. But there is a disadvantage for the writer as well as for the reader. He is never quite free in discussing the same topic again; he is committed and hence compromised. Even if he can escape the vanity of consistency; it may not be altogether easy to reapproach the subject-matter wholly on its own account. What is written may have called out comments and criticisms which need a reply; thus indirectly one gets called away from the subject to discussion of what one has previously thought and said about it. These remarks are preliminary to a consideration of the relation ofvalue to judgment, or the problem of knowing values. In the embarrassment ofprior committall and ofvarious comments and criticisms, mostly unfavorable, I shall do what I can to stick to the subject on its own merits, inevitably repeating some things which I have said before, while modifying and expanding the discussion so as to give heed to the main contentions of my critics. The consistency of what is said here with what was said in the earlier discussion, I shall for the most part leave to the reader to pass upon, in case he takes an interest in that not very interesting topic. We begin by listing certain commonplaces in order to avoid ambiguity and misconception. (1) The term "value" means very different things, things as different as the intrinsic, immediate good, and that which is good or useful for something else-contributory, instrumental value. In the sequel when value is used without qualification, intrinsic or immediate value is designated. (2) Value, whether immediate or contributory, may be found without judgment, without implying cognition. If immediate , we prize, cherish, esteem, directly appreciate, etc., and these words denote affectional or affecto-motor attitudes, not intellectual ones. So we use objects as means, treat them as useful, without judgment. Thus in writing the previous sentence I have used the typewriter, certain words, without reflecting upon their utility. Typewriter, etc., were instrumental values, but were not judged or known. We may also, however, subject values to knowledge and judgment. Since we have no ordinary language to denote the distinction between non-cognized values and cognized ones, some periphrasis will be employed to mark the difference whenever there is danger of ambiguity: (3) There is a further distinction in values (of both the intrinsic and contributory types) with respect to judgment. (a) In some cases, judgments merely state or record given values and utilities. They are judgments about values and utilities. A theory about value is a judgment of this type in a highly generalized form. (b) In other cases, there is no given or determinate value about which we may judge. We have recourse to estimation, to appraisal with respect to an absent uncertain value. The purpose of judgment in this case is not to state but to en-state a value or utility: Is this man really a friend? Does he have the value which has been found in him? Or, with respect to a utility, there may be intellectual search for a tool. Judgment is employed to decide what is the appropriate, effective word in discourse, as distinct from automatically using a word which directly offers itself. The distinction of these two kinds ofjudgment will occasionally in the sequel be referred to, in order to avoid circumlocution, as case (a) and case (b).2 While the distinction between instrumental and final goods is a necessary intellectual distinction, we must avoid converting it into either a logical disjunction or an existential separation. Existentially, the most immediate good or liking is after all part of a course of events. As such it has consequences for future immediate goods and ills? There is no call for anxious solicitude as to the contributory property of every immediate good. On the contrary, such a preoccupation would obviously interfere with the whole-hearted, integral present good and thus reduce or destroy its intrinsic worth. But there must be readiness to judge a good in its future, or instrumental, capacity whenever conditions indicate a need. Any other position makes it impossible to bring likings within the life of reason, and reduces Valuation and Experimental Knowledge experiences of value to a disjointed series of brute goods of which nothing further can be...

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