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Judgment has been analyzed to show that it is a continuous process of resolving an indeterminate , unsettled situation into a determinately unified one, through operations which transform subject-matter originally given. Judgment, in distinction from propositions which are singular, plural, generic and universal , is individual, since it is concerned with unique qualitative situations. Comparisoncontrast is, upon this position, the fundamental operation by which re-determination of prior situations is effected; "comparison" being a name for all the processes which institute cumulative continuity of subject-matter in the ongoing course of inquirr Comparison-contrast has been shown to be involved in affirmation -negation, in measurement, whether qualitative or numerical, in description-narration , and in general propositions of the two forms, generic and universal. Moreover, it is a complex of operations by which existential conjunctions and eliminations, in conjugate connection with each other are effected-not a "mental" affair. Propositions are logically distinct from judgment, and yet are the necessary logical instrumentalities of reaching final warranted determination or judgment. Only by means of symbolization (the peculiar differentia of propositions) can direct action be deferred until inquiry into conditions and procedures has been instituted. The overt activity; when it finally occurs, is, accordingly; intelligent instead of blind. Propositions as such are, consequently , provisional, intermediate and instrumental . Since their subject-matter concerns two kinds of means, material and procedural, they are of two main categories: (1) Existential, referring directly to actual conditions as determined by experimental observation, and (2) ideational or conceptual, consisting of interrelated meanings, which are non-existential in content in direct reference but which are applicable to existence through the operations they represent as possibilities. In constituting respectively material and procedural means, the two types of propositions are conjugate, or functionally correspondent. They form the fundamental divisions of labor in inquiry. A contemporary movement in logical theory, known as logical positivism, eschews General Theory of Propositions From Logic: The Theory ofInquiry (1938) 197 the use of "propositions" and "terms," substituting "sentences" and "words." The change is welcome in as far as it fixes attention upon the symbolic structure and content of propositions . For such recognition emancipates logical theory from bondage to preconceived ontological and metaphysical beliefs, permitting the theory to proceed autonomously in terms of the contents and functions of propositions as they actually present themselves to analysis. In emphasizing the symbolic element, it brings propositions into connection with language generically; and language, while about things directly or indirectly, is acknowledged to be of another dimension than that which it is about. Moreover, formulation of logical subject-matter in terms of symbols tends to free theory from dependence upon an alleged subjective realm of "sensations" and "ideas" set over against a realm of objects. For symbols and language are objective events in human experience . A minor objection to the use of "sentences " and "words" to designate what have been called propositions and terms, is that unless carefully interpreted it narrows unduly the scope of symbols and language, since it is not customary to treat gestures and diagrams (maps, blueprints, etc.) as words or sentences. However, this difficulty may be guarded against. A more serious objection is that without careful statement, the new terminology does not discriminate between language that is adapted to the purposes of communication (what Locke called "civil" language) and language that is determined solely by prior inquiries related to the purposes of inquiry-the latter alone being logical in import. This serious difficulty cannot be overcome by considering sentences and words in isolation, for the distinction depends upon an intent which can be adjudged only by means of context. In so far as it is not determined in a given case whether the intent is communication of something already known, or is use of what is already taken as known as means of inquiry into the as yet unknown and problematic, fallacies in logical theory are bound to arise. Take, for example, the matter of subject-predicate . The grammatical subject is the subjectmatter that is taken to be common, agreed 198 upon, "understood" as between the communicator and the one communicated to. The grammatical predicate is that which is taken to be in the knowledge or thought of the one giving information or advice, but not in the knowledge or thought of the receiver. Suppose the sentence to be "The dog is lost." The meaning of "the dog" is, or is supposed to be, common for all parties; that of "is lost" to be in possession of the...

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