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165 Those who suggest that George Marshall’s June ceasefire cost Chiang the opportunity to recover the entire Northeast base their arguments on assumptions about the aftermath of the Second Battle of Siping. In order to analyze those arguments, we too need to look at what happened in the weeks after the battle, and to answer a series of questions: How badly defeated was Lin Biao? How many casualties had the Communist forces suffered? How did Lin and the Party Center intend to deal with the situation following the defeat at Siping? Could they have survived a Nationalist advance on Harbin? On the Nationalist side, could Du Yuming’s pursuit of Lin’s forces have been handled differently? If they had tried, could the Nationalist forces have utterly destroyed the Communist forces and secured all of Manchuria? When and why did Chiang Kai-shek suspend the pursuit and agree to the ceasefire? In what ways did Marshall, the Soviet Union, and the situation on the ground in the Northeast and in China Proper influence Chiang’s decision to agree to a ceasefire? There are no easy answers to these questions. On the Communist side,memoirs,publiclyreleaseddocuments,andsecondarysourceswritten in the People’s Republic generally tell a single, coherent narrative, although a few sources do present somewhat different interpretations of events. On the Nationalist side, memoirs and biographies of some of the main characters (Du Yuming, Sun Liren, Zheng Dongguo, Chiang Kai-shek) tell quite different stories. Even works attributed to Chiang 7 The Chase and the Ceasefire May–June 1946 166 The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China himself, but written at different times (and perhaps by different ghostwriters ) contradict each other. The best we can do is to look critically at all the available sources and try to put together a reasonable account of the events of May and June 1946. Du Yuming Presses His Advantage On 17 May, Chiang Kai-shek sent Bai Chongxi—one of his top generals —to find out why Du Yuming had still not captured Siping. Bai Chongxi, speaking for the Generalissimo, argued that since the Communist defense had been so effective, Du Yuming should pause after capturing Siping and allow time for the peace talks to go forward. In the meantime, Du could consolidate his position in Siping and South Manchuria and prepare for another offensive if the peace talks failed.1 The position that Bai is reported to have laid out is roughly that which Chiang had expressed in his diary almost a month earlier, on 20 April: that after occupying Sipingjie, his forces should focus on consolidating their positions in South Manchuria and on securing the Bei-Ning railway rather than advancing farther north.2 Du Yuming disagreed. The whole purpose of the offensive against Siping,Duargued,wastowipeouttheNDUA’smainforceandtocapture Changchun and nearby cities, including the Xiaofengman hydroelectric station. If he followed Chiang’s orders and ended the offensive, then the capture of Siping itself would be meaningless. If he pressed on, he could easily capture all the territory south of the Songhua River. As for using a temporary ceasefire to rebuild his strength and prepare for a second offensive, Du suggested that the Communists could recruit and incorporate new troops faster than the Nationalists could—a ceasefire would leave him at a disadvantage. Du sealed his case for continued action by telling Bai Chongxi that he had already issued orders for his armies to pursue the Communists once they had captured Siping. Retracting the orderswouldleadtochaosandleavehisforcesvulnerabletoCommunist attack. Reassured by Du’s expressions of confidence, Bai Chongxi supposedly said to Du, “As I see it, if you do succeed in capturing Changchun, Mr. Chiang will probably not be unhappy!” The next day, after inspect18 .218.38.125] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 18:23 GMT) The Chase and the Ceasefire, May–June 1946 167 ing the front with Du, Bai’s confidence increased, and he told Du, “Well then, you fight according to the original plan. I will go back right away and tell the committee head [i.e., Chiang Kai-shek] to talk to the Communists about a ceasefire after we have recovered Yongji and Changchun .”3 Whatever the truth of these recollections, which were written long after the fact, Du Yuming clearly felt empowered to proceed with his plan, and he acted quickly, pursuing the NDUA northward across a broad front. Aware that Changchun was poorly defended, Du sent part of his force directly on toward the city, capturing it...

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