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106 It was the continued presence of the Soviet Red Army, and not Marshall ’s 10 January ceasefire, that prevented a renewed outbreak of civil war in Manchuria in the first two months of 1946. Just by being there, the Soviet forces had kept the two sides apart, forming a screen behind which the Communists could build their strength, deploy their forces to control small and medium towns and cities, and begin working to establish a presence in the rural areas and to win the support of the masses.1 This constraint was removed in mid-March when the Soviets began to withdraw from the Chinese Northeast. As they withdrew their forces, the Soviets were once again (as they had back in October 1945) urging their Chinese Communist comrades to take a more aggressive stance toward the Kuomintang in Manchuria. That message played well among the leaders of the Northeast Bureau , who had always had a strong interest in capturing the “Three Big Cities” of Shenyang, Changchun, and Harbin.2 After some debate, and Mao Zedong’s return to the leadership after months of illness, the Party leadership in Yan’an, too, came to support a more aggressive strategy in the Northeast.3 As the Soviets withdrew, Communist forces moved into strategicareasfromwhichtheywouldbeabletoattackkeycities,railway junctions, and mining and industrial centers. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek was airlifting troops and officials to set up provincial and municipalgovernmentsandtogarrisonthemajorcitiesastheSovietspulled out.ChiangwasalsoorderinghisarmiesinShenyangtobeginamajorof5 The Second Battle of Siping Phase One—From Outer Defense to Stalemate, March–April 1946 The Second Battle of Siping: Phase One 107 fensiveagainsttheCommunistsinordertoconsolidatehisgovernment’s control over the Northeast. The heightened aggressiveness of both sides ultimately led to the First and then the Second Battle of Siping. The Communist Party Center and the Northeast Bureau Peng Zhen and the other leaders of the Northeast Bureau had been increasinglyfrustratedbythePartyCenter ’spolicyofaccommodationand negotiation with Chiang Kai-shek and George Marshall. The disagreement over this issue was so deep that it threatened to cause a serious rift within the Party.4 But the Party Center, under Liu Shaoqi’s leadership in Yan’an and with Zhou Enlai negotiating in Chongqing, remained committed to its moderate position until the middle of March. Even the still-convalescing Mao Zedong reflected the Center’s position in February and early March when he praised Marshall for his efforts and made optimistic remarks about the prospects for peace.5 The Party Center’s moderation was based partly on the fact that the Soviet Union had been urging caution. But we cannot rule out the possibility that it was also rooted in Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai’s assessment of the military and diplomatic situation. At this point, the Soviets’ attitude had already undergone a fundamental change. The continued American transfer of Nationalist troops to the region, American and British complaints that the Soviets’ economic deals in the area violated the “Open Door Policy,” and perhaps even events in the Middle East, where Turkey and Iran had fallen into the American sphere of influence, madeJosephStalinchangehismindaboutstrategyinManchuria.6 Now, instead of pushing the Chinese Communists to make peace, the Soviets criticized them for having been too weak.7 As described in chapter 4, the Soviets began pulling out of Manchuria in early March, managing their withdrawal in such a way as to facilitate a Communist takeover of key places like Fushun, Tieling, Anshan, and Benxi—all small and medium industrial and mining cities in the vicinity of Shenyang. On 9 March, the Soviets told Peng Zhen that they would leave Shenyang on the thirteenth and advised him to capture the city from the Nationalists immediately afterward.8 3.139.70.131] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 07:22 GMT) 108 The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China This was exactly what Peng Zhen wanted to hear. On 12 March, he and Lin Biao jointly proposed an attack on Shenyang. The next day Liu Shaoqi, writing for the Party Center, told them that their plan was militarily risky and politically disadvantageous: “Not only should we not attack Shenyang, when the Soviets withdraw from the rail line from Shenyang to Harbin, we should not occupy any of it—let the Kuomintang take it. Only if the Nationalist Army attacks our army should we organize a counter-attack from a defensive posture.”9 At this point, the Communist leadership was willing for Zhou Enlai to take a tough line in the negotiations with the Nationalists and Marshall, but this was for bargaining purposes. In...

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