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319 The Tết Offensive ThelastdaysofJanuary1968markedacommunistlarge-scalecampaignagainst South Việt Nam that turned the war in an unexpected direction. The communist supreme command named the campaign “General Offensive and General Uprising.” It was launched on January 29, 1968. It was Tết’s Eve, the first day of the Lunar New Year, the Year of the Monkey. So it was generally known as the “1968 Tết Offensive.” In the last weeks of January 1968, at least ten new defectors in Chiêu Hồi centers reported that communist units had secretly purchased a lot of ARVN camouflaged field dress and field police uniforms to prepare for an offensive. The interrogation section under my command was instructed to pass the information and the sources to the Vietnamese and MACV intelligence services. However, I wasn’t worried. I guessed that what the enemy could do in the cities was some assassinations and bomb attacks. The big party to celebrate Tết for 600 defectors and 300 guests at the National Chiêu Hồi Center went on beautifully. Tết, the Lunar New Year, Year of the Monkey, was welcomed in every family . Traditional firecrackers were permitted after being banned for many years as the security situation was enhanced. As in previous years, the two sides officially agreed upon a three-day cease-fire. On Tết, January 30, the first day of the Year of the Monkey, the ARVN JGS alerted military units and installations to possible sapper attacks after the communistunitsbrokethebilateralthree -daytruceagreement.AtnightonJanuary 29,communistunitslaunchedattacksatĐàNẵng,severalcitiesinthehighlands andcoastalareas.Buttherewerenosignofanationwideoffensive.Iorderedthe armed propaganda troops in charge of security of the National Chiêu Hồi Center to strengthen the guards and security measures. twenty • 320 · Victory or Defeat At about 3 am, January 31, the Sài Gòn Radio station a mile from my center was attacked. Minutes later, gunshots were heard from the U.S. embassy, about 1.2 miles from us. I had just told my men to be ready for fighting, when we spotted about twenty communist soldiers in ARVN field dress with rubber-tired sandals moving through the Sài Gòn Zoo, only 200 yards from us on the other side of the Thị Nghè Arroyo. They were on their way to attack the RVN Navy headquarters. With a pair of binoculars, we could easily detect their disguise. We were unable to do anything against them with our .30 cal. M1 carbines. We also heard guns in downtown Sài Gòn. Our telephone lines were inoperable. I had only twelve riflemen—one ARVN soldier and eleven armed propaganda troops. The other sixty troops were on leave for Tết. So I could have fought the enemymerelyasasquadleader.Wehadthoughtthatthecommunistsidewould respect the truce agreement as in previous years. The ARVN Marine Support Battalion next to the center had only 80 of its 250 soldiers on hand. Captain Trần Văn Thăng, commander of the Marine Transportation Company and in charge of the battalion barracks, discussed withmeourjointdefensesystemandstayedalertwaitingforthepossibleattack. Thăng agreed with me that in case I couldn’t withstand the enemy firepower, the entire group in the center would be evacuated to his barracks under protection from his Marines. At the time, there were about 300 defectors and more than 50 unarmed employees with about 150 of their wives and children. Thăng said to me, “I’m afraid that should they overrun your center, they would kill your family members as they have often done. So I’ll send two of my best Marines to protect your family until you have consolidated your defense.” And so he did. I gave my sister my .25 caliber pistol and told her to take care of my children andmyauntalongwiththetwoMarines.Mymotherandmywife,bothofwhom couldusetheM-1carbine,weretohelpmy“squad”withwhateverwasrequired. My wife, other female members of the employees’ families living in the center, and some female defectors began making rounds with coffee pots every five minutes to keep the guards awake. The center was located at a narrow property of about 8,000 square meters or two acres, surrounded by the fences on the three sides and the Thị Nghè arroyo on the back. The fences were flimsy and too close to the surrounding private estates. It would be very difficult to defend. I will never forget the favor Capt. Thăng did for me. What happened later to the family of ARVN Major Nguyễn Văn Tuấn, armored battalion commander in Gò Vấp, a S...

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