Militarism and Israeli Society

15 Military and Society since 9/11: Retrospect and Prospect

346 fifteen Military and Society since 9/11: Retrospect and Prospect Christopher Dandeker 9/11: A Turning Point in War and Conflict? The militant Islamic, terrorist outrage in Mumbai in late November 2008 was immediately referred to by some commentators as “India’s 9/11.” This was because, inter alia, the attacks were on symbols of Indian capitalist cosmopolitanism, such as the Taj Mahal Hotel; there was targeting of Westerners and Jews; a ruthless, violent pursuit of objectives with no moral or humanitarian scruple; and an attempt to leverage regional and global political effects (including a conflict between Pakistan and India) through these acts of “symbolic violence.” Apparently Blackberries were used by some of the terrorists to monitor how successfully their efforts had been in producing spectacular effects via what Martin Shaw has termed “global surveillance.”1 Looking back at September 11, 2001, we can state that the piquancy of that day was rooted in three considerations: first the ways in which real time 24/7 media coverage enabled most of the rest of the world to join the U.S. East Coast morning audiences and become connected with terrorism as a “spectator sport”;2 second, the attacks appeared to provide the clearest empirical demonstration of the predictions and warnings about the risks of “asymmetrical warfare” for contemporary Western liberal capitalist societies (and the potential of the Revolution in Military Affairs [RMA] to counter them);3 and third, the terrorist attacks were focused—deliberately so, and not for the first time, as was evident in the earlier failed attempts to destroy the World Trade Center—on highly military and society since 9/11 · 347 symbolic targets. Their value was to be measured less in U.S. dollars and more in what those buildings—the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and, so it would seem, the White House—signified, not only to U.S. citizens but also to most of the world’s population. September 11 helped to further crystallize already existing debates about the changing nature of war and conflict, and the possible decline of major interstate war. Discussion has focused on the nature of asymmetric threats to contemporary democratic states, including analysis of “wars amongst the people,” “three and four block” war, “hybrid warfare,” and how to respond to the challenges they pose.4 For example, so far as “hybrid warfare” is concerned, Frank Hoffman argues that such contests are likely to involve a “hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution and non-state actors . . . using both simple and innovative tactics in innovative ways.”5 This suggestion is not unrelated to another U.S. naval commentator’s influential concept of “three block warfare.”6 Charles Krulak argues that it would be possible for members of a military unit within one urban setting to be involved simultaneously in different kinds of missions: in one block delivering humanitarian relief, in another, separating conflicting parties and dealing with tactically high-intensity exchanges of fire with insurgents. This rapid tempo of events is likely to be exposed to media scrutiny during which tactical and subtactical decisions can have major operational and even strategic consequences, as when an apparent war crime can damage the mission of an intervening state and its international reputation. Lower-level decisions by junior personnel mean that the “strategic corporal” becomes more significant, with major implications for recruiting and educating these soldiers to deal with this increasingly sensitive political environment. The concept of Three Block War has been extended recently to Four Block War by James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman. They argue that [t]he additional block deals with the psychological or information operations aspects. This fourth block is the area where you may not be physically located but in which we are communicating or broadcasting our message. The Four Block War adds a new but very relevant dimension to situations like the counterinsurgency in Iraq. Insurgencies are wars of ideas, and our ideas need to compete with those of the enemy. Our actions in the three other blocks are important to building up our credibility and 348 · christopher dandeker establishing relationships with the population and their leadership. Thus, there is an information operations aspect within each block. In each of the traditional three blocks our Marines are both “sensors” that collect intelligence , as well as “transmitters.” Everything they do or fail to do sends a message. They need to be trained for...