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Perhaps, at this distance in time, the most interesting aspect of the war of 1898 is American attitudes, and specifically the support afforded revolutionary cause against legally constituted and proper authority by the United States; one wonders how congressional motions of this period would be received in Washington today.1 Moreover, there is the small matter of the commission of inquiry that established, on whatever factual basis has never been determined, that the battleship Maine was sunk in Havana harbor on 15 February 1898 by an external explosion, that is, as a result of Spanish malevolence.2 Iraq, the Hussein regime, and arms procurement programs would seem to have an ancestral pedigree in terms of reports that “situated the appreciation” and which presented as conclusive evidence what authority in the United States deemed essential in the pursuit of national interest. * * * The war of 1898, at least with respect to the war at sea, is a difficult war to summarize because it does not really accord with previous experience or what was to unfold in the first half of the twentieth century. This was not a war that involved genuine naval powers. Spain had long since ceased to be a great power—arguably Trafalgar (21October1805)wasthelasttimeaSpanishfleetsawbattle—andtheUnited States was not yet of such exalted naval status. In light of such facts perhaps the most surprising aspect of the war was that neither side had genuine global reach chapter three The spanish-american War of 1898 38 definitions and terms of reference and capability. Yet even if the two states never took the tide of conflict to the other’s metropolitan homeland, this was a war that reached around the globe. It was a war that did not witness prolonged blockade—there was blockade and it did not accord with the various American-proclaimed rights reference sea-borne trade—there was little blue-water action in terms of a guerre de course, and there were no assault landings. The only military campaign was one that owed more to the American public need for heroes and sensation than to real historical substance. In no small measure, such a state of affairs was the product of the war being one between mismatched opponents, and indeed states as ill-matched as Spain and the United States seldom resolve their differences by war. The outcome of this war was never in any doubt, and indeed it is possible to argue that for all the uncritical acclaim afforded Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919), the Rough Riders, and San Juan and El Caney, the Spanish military most certainly had not been defeated, whether on Cuba or in the Philippines, by the time that national defeat was conceded by Madrid. But the fact was that despite Spain having more troops on Cuba than the U.S. Army could muster, the imbalance of power, when combined with the two overwhelming victories that were won by the U.S. Navy in Manila Bay and Santiago Bay (3 July), ensured comprehensive American victory overall, and one that for the victor left a lingering and increasingly difficult commitment over the next four decades. * * * Concerning the naval dimension of this war there are perhaps five matters worthy of note. These involved the twin battles, and dual American victories, in Manila Bay and off Santiago. These are complemented by the Spanish dispatch of a force from Cádiz under orders to effect the relief of the Philippines . There was in addition the campaign on Cuba of which the battle of Santiago was but one episode, and it is worth noting that this campaign really possessed no joint dimension, for the battles ashore and the naval effort most definitely were not complementary. The last element lay in the post-war disposal of the greater part of the Spanish empire, and with it a redefinition of the balance of power in the western Pacific. Of these five matters, the third, the Spanish dispatch of a force under Rear Admiral Manuel de la Cámara y Libermoore (1836–1920) in an attempt to undo the effect of the defeat in Manila Bay, can be summarized briefly: the attempt was abandoned after the Santiago defeat, and on two counts. With the victory in front of Santiago the American naval forces in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean were freed for offensive operations, and by various means the U.S. naval high command let it be known that a move against Spanish ports was an option that presented itself. Cámara...

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