Battle of Surigao Strait

15. “An awfully gruesome sound, which passed from left to right.”

15 “An awfully gruesome sound, which passed from left to right.” At 0351, when the Allied cruisers opened fire, with Battle Line joining in two minutes later, Nishimura’s column was attempting to re-form with renewed hope. Yamashiro was heading north at 12 knots awaiting word from Nachi and Fuso about their respective situations. Some 10 miles astern, Shima’s 2YB was rushing north at 28 knots. From Mogami the opening appeared as distant flashes like light rows of a switchboard “turning on one after another in a dark room,” then the whistling of incoming shells—“an awfully gruesome sound, which passed from left to right . . . a towering wall of white water suddenly appeared in the darkness” two hundred to three hundred meters to starboard.1 On Shigure Nishino and his officers saw the sky ahead begin to light up, correctly noticing “the first gunfire flashing in from the direction of Hibuson Island on the right.” Shigure was immediately buffeted by near-misses, and tall columns of water began to sprout around the great bulk of Yamashiro. Shigure continued to steam ahead, and began making smoke to confuse the enemy. Nishino realized this was going to be difficult, as it was obvious the Americans were firing by radar. Adding to the macabre menace of it all, no enemy vessels, or even their muzzle flashes themselves, could be seen in the darkness—only the deadly tracers of their incoming shellfire.2 By all indications, Yamashiro was struck by West Virginia’s very opening salvo, and apparently struck near the bridge. However, Admiral Nishimura, Shinoda, paymaster Ezaki, and the others remained safe for the moment. The first cruiser shells to hit rocked the battleship, started fires in the upper mast, and disabled the radar, but spared the compass bridge and failed to penetrate 194 “An awfully gruesome sound,which passed fromleftto right.” · 195 the conning tower’s armor. Hits exploded on the bow, but the four barrels of No. 1 and No. 2 turrets defiantly elevated, and taking aim directly ahead, began to return the enemy’s fire. While Oldendorf had technically “crossed” Nishimura’s “T,” it was of very short duration, and much more has been made of this fact then really mattered . Granted, the achievement itself was splendid and long-coveted. Yet that night it was hardly decisive, and at 0350 circumstances were such to give it only minimal importance in the gun duel that unfolded, for three reasons: (1) with Yamashiro’s No. 5 and No. 6 turret magazines flooded, it made a difference of only four guns; nevertheless, Yamashiro would unmask No. 3 and No. 4 soon enough; (2) all of Mogami’s turrets bore forward, so there it made no difference at all; (3) Shigure’s gunfire was insignificant; that its aft turret did not enter action had no consequence. Since a head-on target is harder to hit, this fact neatly balanced the minor reduction in fire-power the Japanese suffered in the approach. Their real handicap was lack of means to fight past Oldendorf’s barrier to Leyte Gulf. Now only 1,000 meters abeam to starboard, Nishino on Shigure was watching with consternation as the “Fuso” sparked with the flare of impacts, while tall geysers of water erupted around it. Still, he had heard Nishimura’s call for the Fuso, and for the second time in as many minutes, a Japanese commander drew an optimistic conclusion—this time nonetheless correct—from a mistaken query. That voice calling Fuso had been Nishimura himself! The flagship had not sunk! Grabbing the radio phone, Nishino or one of his officers called out to Yamashiro: “Notify your situation.” As he spoke, he watched “Fuso” struggle through the hail of enemy fire, never suspecting that he was looking directly at the flagship he was hailing.3 Three Japanese ships were present, but for nearly seven minutes this firestorm of 16-inch, 14-inch, 8-inch, and 6-inch shells was directed at only one target, hapless Yamashiro! Both Mogami and Shigure were initially ignored. This was a classic example of over-concentration of fire, and a potentially disastrous error on the part of the American forces. “Potentially” because both ships were equipped with the deadly Long Lance torpedoes capable of striking targets 20 miles away. U.S. Navy experience had shown it was unwise to neglect this danger from unscathed vessels while fire was concentrated on a favored target. The ships late to open fire also chose Yamashiro...