Battle of Surigao Strait

3. “We are going to participate in a surface special attack.”

3 “We are going to participate in a surface special attack.” After the Kurita fleet had left the huge bay, Nishimura’s staff summoned the skippers to a conference on Yamashiro. There chief of staff Rear Admiral Norihide Ando and two others passed out Nishimura’s written orders.1 Since Admiral Nishimura and the Batdiv 2 staff all perished, these orders are the best guide to reconstruct Nishimura’s intentions and strategy. Basically the orders followed the directive Kurita had handed down the previous night, with the Third Section departing Brunei at 1500 that afternoon, but they went on to state: “In general, it will penetrate from Surigao Strait into Tacloban Anchorage two hours before sunrise on X-Day [i.e., at 0427] and, in coordination with the Main Body, will attack and destroy the enemy transport group and landing forces before and after sunrise.”2 The 1500 sortie was changed at 1155 when Nishimura transmitted to his ships a slightly modified itinerary. It now specified departure from Brunei as 1530 and a schedule that would reach a point south of Point Binit, Panaon island , at 0100 on October 25 to drive into Leyte Gulf on course 350. According to this schedule Nishimura would reach the south entrance of Surigao Strait at 0100 and thus arrive at Leyte Gulf about three hours later. From there, another half hour would bring him to Tacloban and the target transports. At that same time, Kurita would be arriving east of Leyte Gulf, and would thereafter enter to attack. There is an overlooked and ominous hint hidden in these orders. Nishimura was directed to operate in a way that would lead to penetrating the Tacloban anchorage area a full ninety minutes before Kurita. Nishimura was to attack the beachhead at 0430, and Kurita would join him at 0600. With just two battleships, it is easy to see what this might mean for Nishimura. Kurita in fact confirmed this interpretation in his postwar interrogations when he said that 43 44 · BattleofSurigaoStrait rather than attack simultaneously, they were to attack separately, with the Third Section arriving at Tacloban Anchorage two hours before him, and that the two-hour interval was to avoid the congestion that results when large numbers of ships operate in confined waters. In this same interrogation, he later stated that the Third Section was to arrive at about 0500 and the main body at 0600. “It is not clear where he lost the second hour.”3 What is clear is that whether a two-hour or just a one-hour interval, Kurita never intended to attack at the same time as Nishimura—Nishimura was to strike the first blow with his far weaker force. It is hard to avoid the impression that Nishimura and Batdiv 2 was being set up as bait and diversion, with total sacrifice a result. This would mean Nishimura was given a task echoing Ozawa’s—to draw south and tie down remaining forces in Leyte Gulf. If true, it might explain Nishimura’s seemingly inexplicable—albeit heroic—stoicism in sticking to his orders. It would also perfectly explain the unhelpful, adjusted orders Kurita sent Nishimura at 2145 on October 24, which are discussed in chapter 8. Kurita’s intentions for Nishimura are important. If Third Section was not intended as a sacrificial diversion, then his instructions to Nishimura made little sense and were unrealistic. Kusaka had officially suggested 1YB be divided into a two-pronged assault. If Third Section was to make a viable effort, it needed to be larger. Instead, Nishimura was allowed to proceed with a mere seven ships against the armada sighted in the gulf. If its goal was not diversion and/or attrition, the expectations for it were deeply flawed. The NWC analysis goes so far as to conclude in its professional tone: “Therefore, since the phasing of the operations was unstable and infeasible, the plan was unsound.”4 Did Nishimura already know this? Did he realize he was being given orders that were essentially “unsound”? Impossible to be sure, but the overwhelming probability is yes. If speculation is permissible, does it not seem possible that Kurita was giving a coded set of instructions to save face and that Nishimura, in turn, was expected to read between the lines and in fact did? This seems especially true against the background of the abortive Y-GO in June. Shigure’s Lieutenant Commander Shigeru Nishino’s postwar interview supports such an interpretation: “We thought we would...