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Notes Introduction 1. See KrV B xvi. 2. See, for example, Fulda and Horstmann, eds. (1994). 3. See J. G. Herder’s Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft in Herder (1913), vol. 22; and his Kalligone, in vol. 21; also J. G. Hamann’s Aesthetica in nuce in Hamann (1957), vol. 2. A typical example of the charge of rational “purity” in ethics is Max Weber’s influential criticism of Kant’s “ethics of pure conviction” (Gesinnungsethik) as developed in particular in his Politik als Beruf (1919). An interesting critical perspective on the issue is offered by Michel Henry in L’essence de la manifestation (1963). 4. With regard to Kant’s practical philosophy Ricoeur already distinguishes the transcendental Kant from the Kant of the anthropology. See P. Guyer (1996), 335–393. R. Louden focuses exclusively on Kant’s applied (“impure”) practical philosophy: Kant’s Impure Ethics (2000). Important is Susan M. Shell, The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation, and Community (1996): this work centers on Kant’s political theory and issues of community, and does not address the specific transcendental problem posed by the issue of embodiment. N. Sherman (1997) claims that emotions are relevant to Kant’s project as they constitute a moral anthropology; accordingly, she often manifests frustration with the apparently spare remarks on the topic offered by the second Critique. My work is placed in the aftermath of B. Herman’s defense of Kant’s moral philosophy against the traditional charges of rigorism, formalism, and rejection of human affectivity in the practical sphere (charges taken up by feminist interpretations of Kant): see her The Practice of Moral Judgment (1993). The interest in Kant’s anthropology has been enhanced by the recent publication of vol. 25 of the Akademie edition, which is dedicated to Kant’s lectures on anthropology before the 1798/1800 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. 5. See recent attacks on Kant in R. Bernasconi (2001, 2002); followed by D. F. Krell (2000), 103–134, 108–110. A more balanced account is in Hill and Boxill (2001), 448–471, 460, 468. For a feminist critique of Kant’s gendered notion of personality, see R. M. Schott, Cognition and Eros: A Critique of the Kantian Paradigm (1988); the collective volume Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant, ed. R. M. Schott (1997); C. Bat- 324 notes to pages 5–9 tersby, “Stages on Kant’s Way: Aesthetics, Morality, and the Gendered Sublime” (1998); and S. Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory” (1987). Benhabib attacks Kant’s “disembodied and disembedded” noumenal agent in section 3 of her essay. 6. See the literature discussed in chaps. 5–6, below. If it is true, as Mills claims (1997, 70), that Kant’s “philosophical work”—i.e., his critical oeuvre—“has to be read in conjunction” with the lectures on anthropology and physical geography, a previous understanding of (1) Kant’s “philosophical work” and (2) its relation to his applied philosophy is required. In the present volume I aim precisely at providing such an understanding. See the important essay by Adrian M. Piper, “Xenophobia and Kantian Rationalism” (1993). 7. See R. M. Schott (1987), where she reduces Kant’s complex theory of sensibility to space and time as forms of intuition. E. Casey (1997, ch. 10) analyzes the connection between human body and place established by Whitehead, Husserl, and MerleauPonty , and contrasts it to the view developed by Kant’s transcendental philosophy, which is accused of “mentalism in the form of a pure intuitionism” (p. 203). I intend to refute this charge of mentalism. 8. KU §5, 15. 9. Prolegomena A, 207; AA IV, 375n.—my emphasis. 10. See for example KrV B 420–421. 11. Hoke Robinson raises this issue in the opening of “Kant on Embodiment” (1992, 329). The topic is at the center of Shell (1996); however, this excellent study does not relate to pre-Kantian developments of the problem, and does not address the issue of what constitutes Kant’s transcendental perspective on it. 12. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body, Deleuze’s genetic methodology , Foucault’s genealogy are all attempts to overcome Kant’s transcendentalism and yet maintain the perspective on the body disclosed by it. Heidegger’s reading of Kant’s idea of imagination can also be brought back to this picture. 13. In light of my reconstruction, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “corporeal intentionality ,” whereby the lived body gains its fundamental independence...