Plato's Laws: Force and Truth in Politics

8. On the Human and the Divine: Reading the Prelude in Plato’s Laws 5

8 On the Human and the Divine: Reading the Prelude in Plato’s Laws 5 Robert Metcalf In the opening pages of Plato’s Laws, Cleinias advances the thought that all human beings are “enemies” [πολεµίους] one to another, and each human being to himself, so that, within each of us, there is a war [πόλεµος] being waged of the self against itself [ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡµῶν . . . πρὸς ἡµᾶς αὐτοὺς] (626d–e). ἀ is thought determines the discussion that follows, insofar as ἀρετή is understood in terms of attaining “victory over oneself” [τὸ νικᾷν αὐτὸν αὑτον] (626e) after fighting off [διαµάχη] fears, pains, longings, and pleasures (633c–d), and thus, after “withstanding” [καρτερεῖν] pleasures rather than being enslaved or compelled by what is shameful [τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀναγκάζεσθαι] (635c–d).1 Victory within this πόλεµος of the soul amounts, therefore, to what is superior within us exercising control over what is inferior, and ἀρετή, accordingly, is understood as being able to rule over oneself—the Athenian specifies “those who are good” [οἱ ἀγαθοί] as the ones able to “rule themselves” [ἄρχειν αὑτῶν] (644b). ἀ is polemical orientation toward ἀρετή, and particularly with respect to pleasures and pains, is a theme for which the Athenian has recourse to the lines from Hesiod, quoted also by Adeimantus in Plato’s Republic: “Vice in abundance is easy to get; / ἀ e road is smooth and begins beside you, / But the gods have put sweat between us and ἀρετή.”2 ἀ is polemical orientation toward ἀρετή is philosophically significant in and of itself, but it also has implications for the composition of the prelude in Book 5. First of all, in order to make sense of ἀρετή as a “victory over oneself,” it establishes a hierarchy within the soul of the superior over the inferior, and maps onto this a hierarchy of goods, namely, the “divine” goods over the “human” goods. ἀ e Athenian distinguishes between these two types of goods early in the text and assigns them their relative importance as follows: On the Human and the Divine 119 Now the good things are twofold, some human [ἀνθρώπινα], some divine [θεῖα]. ἀ e former depend on the divine goods, and if a city receives the greater it will also acquire the lesser. If not, it will lack both. Health [ὑγίεια] leads the lesser goods; in the second place is beauty [κάλλος]; third is strength [ἰσχὺς], both in running and in all the other motions of the body; and fourth is wealth [πλοῦτος] . . . Practical wisdom [φρόνησις], in turn, is first and leader among the divine goods. Second after intelligence comes a temperate disposition of the soul [σώφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις], and from these two mixed with courage comes justice [δικαιοσύνη], in the third place. Courage [ἀνδρία] is fourth. All of these last goods are by nature placed prior in rank to the first, and this is the rank they should be placed in by the legislator. (631b–d) ἀ e second, key implication is that this establishment of the higher (the divine ) in relation to the lower (the human) can be articulated mythopoetically, as we find in the myth of Cronus presented in Book 4. ἀ ere, the Athenian says that, in the time of Cronus, human nature was not sufficient by its own power to direct human affairs without becoming filled with hubris and injustice [ἀνθρωπεία φύσις οὐδεµία ἱκανὴ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα διοικοῦσα αὐτοκράτωρ πάνταµὴ οὐχ ὕβρέως τε καὶ ἀδικίας µεστοῦσθαι] (713c).3 Cronus knew this about human beings and carried out a bit of philanthropy, appointing a race of daemons to exercise mastery over us, just as we exercise mastery over sheep, goats, and oxen (713d). ἀ at is to say, Cronus devised a political solution for our all-toohuman incapacity for self-governance, as the daemons were made the kings and rulers of πόλεις in place of humans. ἀ anks to Cronus, the human races were taken care of [ἐπιµελούµεον], provided with peace and a sense of shame, good order and justice plenty [εἰρήνην τε καὶ αἰδῶ καὶ εὐνοµίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν δίκης παρεχόµενον], thus making for happiness without strife (713d–e). ἀ e Athenian then announces the “present-day” moral of this story4 to be the following: What this logos is saying, making use of the truth [ἀληθείᾳ χρώµενος], is that there can be no rest from evils and toils for those cities in which some mortal rules rather than a god. ἀ e logos deems [οἴεται] that we should imitate by every device the way of life that is said to have existed under Cronus; in public life and in private life, in the arrangement of our households and our cities [δηµοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τάς τ’οἰκήσεις καὶ τὰς πόλεις διοικεῖν], we should obey [πειθοµένους] whatever within us partakes of immortality [ἀθανασία], giving the name “law” to the distribution ordained by intelligence. But if there is one human being, or some oligarchy, 120 Robert Metcalf or a democracy, whose soul is yearning for pleasures and desires...