In Defense of Kant's Religion

4. Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered—Again

103 ∂ Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered—Again In part 1, Perspectives on Kant’s Religion, we surveyed six basic approaches to Kant’s Religion in the literature, taking account of both the metaphysical motives behind Religion and the philosophical character of Religion. Regarding the motives behind Religion, Vincent McCarthy presented the text as caught in a tension between Enlightenment rationalism and Pietistic Christianity . He argued that Kant could not escape the web of conceptual conflict created when rational autonomy meets religious piety in Kant’s philosophy of religion. Stephen Palmquist served as rebuttal witness. Palmquist testified that Religion has strong critical roots, which can be traced all the way back to the first Critique; and yet, it also has strong mystic roots. While these two sets of roots may seem to drink from different (and even opposing) streams, we must recognize, argued Palmquist, that Kant did not dismiss mysticism categorically , but only uncritical forms of mysticism. Keith Ward then testified in affirmation of much of what Palmquist utilized in defense of Kant; yet, Ward argued that Kant runs into the insurmountable problem of precisely how to ground religion in reason, given the sharp and very decisive divide between phenomena and noumena in the transcendental philosophy. In response to Ward, we heard the testimony of the early Allen Wood. Wood also testified to the critical foundation of Religion, but, unlike Palmquist, Wood found this ground in the necessary postulates of practical reason and the pursuit of the highest good. Wood testified that Religion offers a solution to Kant’s absurdum practicum argument by introducing the notion of the moral disposition and the postulate of divine grace. When combined, these two developments in The Defense of Kant’s Religion 104 Kant’s thinking offer much-needed stability to Kant’s philosophical paradigm. In the end, it seemed that, while Kant’s motives in Religion certainly give reason to take pause and lead us to wonder what Kant’s true intentions are, reasons exist for construing Religion as a possible (and very serious) candidate for inclusion in Kant’s critical program. The testimony concerning Kant’s motivations cleared the way for once again reconsidering Kant’s philosophy of religion. As far as the philosophical character of Religion is concerned, however, the case against Religion presented some significant obstacles. Philip Quinn and Nicolas Wolterstorff used Kant’s phenomenal-noumenal divide and moral formalism to develop a full set of conundrums emerging out of the specific arguments in Religion. This dual testimony showed that the phenomenalnoumenal ‘‘boundary line’’ and the strict moral terrain of ‘‘rights and obligations ’’ in Kant’s philosophy make all talk of human depravity and divine assistance problematic from the outset. Ronald Green and Adina Davidovich each attempted to offer ways of overcoming these problems based on the second and third Critique, respectively. In the end, however, both witnesses underdetermined the specifics of the text and left us without a clear way of overcoming the accusations of Quinn and Wolterstorff. Bernard Reardon and John Hare offered a third way forward by employing the Religion-as-Translation thesis. Attempting to utilize Kant’s Pietistic roots and apparent Christian imagery as a positive foundation for understanding Kant’s project, Hare and Reardon characterized Religion as a philosophical experiment, where Kant examines a religious sphere from within the sphere of practical reason in order to see the degree to which the two spheres cohere. While the Religion-asTranslation thesis was helpful in explaining the conflicts that emerge in Religion , ultimately this testimony did less in the way of solving the texts’ conundrums , and more in the way of seeing Religion as a failed experiment once attempted by Kant. In the absence of clear rejoinders to the convicting testimony of Quinn and Wolterstorff, we found the philosophical character of Religion (that is, its argumentative details and their consonance with the critical philosophy) to be the most potent feature of the case against Religion. Having identified this philosophical character as the Achilles’ heel of the aforementioned defenses, we heard from Gordon Michalson, the star witness for the prosecution. He presented the full indictment of the philosophical character of Religion. In addition to the difficulties identified by Quinn and Wolterstorff, Michalson drew out seven rather pointed conundrums in the argumentative specifics of Religion. These conundrums brought into sharp relief debilitating conflicts in Kant’s notion of moral depravity, idea of the moral...