The Ethics of Autism: Among Them, but Not of Them

Notes

Notes Introduction 1. The “problem of other minds” can be briefly summed up as the problem that we are unable to determine, with certainty, that other persons have minds. While we have direct access to our own minds, we operate on the mere assumption that other persons have minds. The behaviorist versus functionalist debate is an attempt to address this question. My working assumption throughout this book is that functionalism is true (i.e.,othertypically developedpersonshavemindswhichfunctioninthesamewayasdo our own), and that intentional explanations of human behavior—including good dashes of folk psychology—are also true. See Richard Gipps (2004) for a rejection of some of these psychological and philosophical assumptions. 2. See, for example, a discussion of this quotation’s disputed provenance at the Gallaudet University website, http://library.gallaudet.edu/deaf-faq-helen-keller.shtml (accessedJanuary4,2008).LibrariansatGallaudethavenotbeenabletofindtheoriginal source of the quotation, although they have twice located the same sentiment in Keller’s writings. 3. See the discussion in chapter 1 for the ways in which early impediments in language acquisition on the part of deaf children initially impede theory of mind development , and the fact that eventual language competency on the part of deaf persons comes handinhandwithanunderstandingoftheoryofmindthatoutpacesthatofpersonswith autism. 1. A Philosophical Introduction to Autism 1. Anotherthesis,thatpersonswithautismhaveoverselectivevisuospacialattention, has received less attention from philosophers (Plaisted 2000). 2. Hutto refers to the unified consciousness view as one in which a person sees the world “mono-perspectivally” (Hutto 2003); Goldman calls it “egocentric biases” (Goldman 2006). One consequence of the unified consciousness view would be that autistic persons fail to have empathy for others’ troubles. See chapter 3 for further discussion. 3. See Baron-Cohen (2000b) for additional theory of mind tests that do not include false belief attribution. 210 • Notes to pages 26–42 4. This is not to say that theory of mind deficits are themselves diagnostic. They cannotbediagnostic ,becauseiftheywere,thenitwouldbethecasethatpersonswithautism woulduniquelyhavetheoryofminddeficits(thesufficientcondition)andthattheoryof mind deficits would be universal among persons with autism (the necessary condition). Neither of these is the case. See Charman (2000) for a comprehensive discussion of the failure of theory of mind as a diagnostic tool, as well as a theory of precursors to theory of mind that anticipates Gerrans’s (2002) position on the absence of a theory of mind module. 5. Victoria McGeer presents a third possibility which she terms “psycho-practical know-how”or“psycho-practicalexpertise,”inwhichanunderstandingofothersispredicated on “the internalization of normatively guided practices of mind” (McGeer 2001, 111). Shaun Gallagher presents an alternative he calls “interaction theory,” comprised of two elements, primary intersubjectivity, the “embodied, sensory-motor (emotion-informed ) capabilities that enable us to perceive the intentions of others” and secondary intersubjectivity, the “embodied, perceptual, and action capabilities that enable us to understandothersinpragmaticallycontextualizedsituationsofeverydaylife”(Gallagher 2004, 209). 6. See Goldman (2006) for another review of the TT versus ST debate. 7. Havingdefendingtheorytheoryinthepast,NicholsandStichmorerecentlyhave claimed that while theory theory is still preferable to simulation theory, that “productive debatewillrequiremoredetailedproposalsandsharperdistinctions”(NicholsandStich, 2003, 161). For purposes of a book primarily on ethics and autism, the level of debate found here is illuminating. For those further interested in the TT versus ST debate, a more thorough discussion is available. See Stich and Nichols (1997), and Nichols and Stich (1998). 8. Barker holds that philosophical arguments alone may not be sufficient to determine which of these theories is simpler, and attempts to demonstrate the superior simplicity of ST using a computer program. The program attempts to replicate the processes by which both TT and ST would execute. See Barker (2002). 9. See also Erevelles (2002) for a discussion of the challenges “of being required to define the coherence of the ‘deviant’ subject according to positivist rules and humanist rationality” (Erevelles 2002, 25). 10. The question of self-consciousness has significance even if it does not bear on the TT and ST debate. It is at least possible that placing one’s own propositional attitudes off-line is not a conscious endeavor; thus ST may be accomplished even without selfconsciousness .Perhapsthisisdoneautomatically:withoutawarenessofthereplacement of our own propositional attitudes with those of other agents, we effortlessly and unconsciouslysubstituteourownattitudeswiththoseoftheagentswhoseactionsareexplained usingST.Whilethisispossible,itisnotveryplausible,asillustratedbyexamplesinwhich agents simulate intentional states radically different from their own. When we aim to explain another agent’s actions that require us to simulate intentions we find unpleasant or distasteful—If I were John, I would eat three raw eggs for breakfast; if I were John, I would close the gaping wound with my bare hands—we are conscious of swapping our own attitudes with those of someone else. The fact...