Been a Heavy Life: Stories of Violent Men

2. Offender Identities, Offender Narratives

2 OFFENDER IDENTITIES, OFFENDER NARRATIVES To just say “Well I’m a criminal,” that’s not a very positive, assertive thing to say about yourself. You know, you start believin’ that stuff, and then the next thing you know you’re doin’ what criminals do. —Tim How do offenders identify themselves to investigators? What immediate , contextual factors affect their claims of being this or that sort of person? And what do sociological and criminological theories predict about offender identities and narratives and contextual effects on them? Sociologists agree on two basic premises concerning offender identities and offender narratives: that is, identities and narratives regarding one’s nonnormative behavior as it is defined in a given society (H. Becker 1963, 9). It is assumed that: 1. Offender identities are socially constructed 2. Offender narratives are socially constructed I myself have built these premises into my working definitions of identities and narratives and I see them as starting points for sociological inquiry about identities and narratives. Empirical work need not and should not test their veracity; they are “true” by our definition. On the other hand, specific processes by which offender identities and narratives are socially constructed can be verified. In fact, such processes demand better clarification: this is my present task. 16 . B E E N A H E AV Y L I F E In addition, criminologists—who are specifically concerned with criminal behavior—advance two theoretical propositions about offender identities and offender narratives. These propositions are the basis for empirical testing: 3. Offender identities promote offending behavior 4. Offender narratives promote offending behavior This chapter provides a review of literature pertaining to these four statements (two premises and two propositions). My research is not a test of propositions 3 and 4, nor is it a test of any other propositions. It is an inductive work. For this study, propositions 3 and 4 are not important to the extent that they are true or “valid.” They are important because they, along with propositions derived from other criminological theories, shape offenders’ self-stories. Theories are embedded in our cultural discourse. The men in my sample used prevailing criminological explanations during the interview to account for their criminal behavior; I did the same. These stories, or propositions, were collaboratively built into our discussions about who the men are. The propositions themselves are social constructs. Offender Identities Are Socially Constructed To speak of the social construction of offender identities implies at least two streams of influence from other people—influence on identity/identification generally, and influence on what we deem to be offending or characteristic of offenders. The dominant sociological perspective known as symbolic interactionism theorized the former, whereas the labeling perspective, inspired by symbolic interactionism, theorized the latter. Symbolic Interactionism Perhaps the core idea of symbolic interactionism is that people act on the basis of the meanings that they assign to “things.” These meanings are not inherent in things but rather are derived from social interaction (Manis and Meltzer 1978). The self is one of those things about which meanings are socially derived. “The self is no more immune to re-examination from new perspectives than any other object” (Strauss 1997, 35). Cooley and Mead, two of the most important founders of symbolic interactionism , were concerned with how the self is formed through social interaction. Cooley (1902) theorized that our sense of self is shaped by what we suppose others think of us. Borrowing from the economist Adam Smith (who used the idea to describe buyer-seller relations), Cooley called this “the O F F E N D E R I D E N T I T I E S , O F F E N D E R N A R R AT I V E S . 17 looking-glass self.” Mead (1934) echoed this theme of perspective taking: “We appear as selves in our conduct insofar as we ourselves take the attitude that others take toward us. We take the role of what may be called the ‘generalized ’ other. And in doing this we appear as social objects, as selves” (270). In fact, Mead radicalized Cooley’s ideas on role taking by arguing that the self itself—and not just a “sense” of self—was constituted by that process. David Miller (1973) explains: “Although Cooley’s ideas were very suggestive to Mead, Mead was not satisfied with what had to be presupposed if Cooley’s theory was true. In...