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2. Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Epistemology: Caring Habits and Caring Knowledge The body . . . is wholly animated, and all its functions contribute to the perception of objects—an activity long considered by philosophy to be pure knowledge. —Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception In the middle of his career William Shakespeare wrote The Merchant of Venice . Typical of Shakespearean comedies, The Merchant of Venice creates merriment through deception and romantic misunderstanding.One of the play’s subplots, however, explores human prejudice and the need for revenge. Antonio ,the merchant of Venice,is a Christian who lends money without charging interest because of the prevalent Christian belief that the Bible prohibits assessing interest on debt. Shylock is a Jewish moneylender who charges interest , similarly employing biblical grounds to justify his practice. Antonio publicly denounces both Shylock and the Judaism on which his practices are based. Shylock secretly loathes Antonio and seeks an opportunity to exact revenge. Just such an opportunity presents itself when Antonio’s relative Bassanio seeks funds to properly woo the fair Portia of Belmont. Shylock offers to lend Bassanio the money if the loan is endorsed by Antonio as security . He demonstrates his good faith by declaring that the loan will bear no interest; should Antonio default, however, Shylock will extract a pound of flesh from him. Anti-Semitism was rampant in England at the time The Merchant of Venice was written, so that a Jewish moneylender made a handy villain. Shakespeare adds complexity to Shylock’s character, however, giving the moneylender appealing qualities. Shylock has suffered at the hands of Christians throughout his life, so he elicits a certain amount of sympathy. He garners further compassion by arguing, in one of Shakespeare’s most quoted pas02 .38-60/Hamington 4/7/04, 8:18 AM 38 Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Epistemology 39 sages,that Jews and Christians share more than they do not: “I am a Jew.Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases,heal’d by the same means,warm’d and cool’d by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us,do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die?”1 Ironically Shylock voices this impassioned plea to justify his sadistic revenge against Antonio , but Shakespeare nevertheless constructs a masterful yet brief soliloquy that cuts to a common denominator of humanity: the body.2 Beyond the socially constructed differences between Jews and Christians is the shared knowledge of embodied experience. Shylock’s plea reminds us that everyone experiences and thus understands pain and pleasure. To circumvent the enmity between the Jews and Christians, Shylock appeals to an implicit shared knowledge, thus altering the moral dynamics of his situation. By recalling embodied knowledge, Shylock creates the possibility of shared understanding —a resonance—and therefore an opportunity for his Christian audience to care about him.Those who hear his rhetorical questions,whether they are the other characters in the play or the audience watching the drama , are compelled to answer yes. Shylock crafts an image whereby he is no longer wholly other—a moneylending Jew and therefore despised in a Christian community. He is a fellow human being, and the Christians he addresses can identify with what it is to have a body and feel through that body.3 The shared corporeal resource to which Shylock alludes does not guarantee that the Christians will care for him, but by attending to and highlighting embodiment , he increases the chances that his auditors will reconsider their moral stance toward him.In attempting to capture empathy from those with bodies and bodily habits like his,Shylock recalls affective knowledge that goes beyond the words uttered. Shakespeare provides insight into the bodily basis of the human capacity to know and care for other embodied beings. The insightful work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, to which I turn in this chapter, offers rich tools for exploring how the body can ground care. In the rest of this chapter I will attempt to support three interrelated claims. (1) Knowledge is necessary but not sufficient for caring. (2) What “counts” as knowledge should include what the body knows and exhibits through habits. (3) Merleau-Ponty’s corporeal-centered epistemology can be extrapolated to reveal the embodied, habitual basis of care. Ultimately I contend that...

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