In this Book

summary

Why the traditional “pledge and review” climate agreements have failed, and how carbon pricing, based on trust and reciprocity, could succeed.

After twenty-five years of failure, climate negotiations continue to use a “pledge and review” approach: countries pledge (almost anything), subject to (unenforced) review. This approach ignores everything we know about human cooperation. In this book, leading economists describe an alternate model for climate agreements, drawing on the work of the late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom and others. They show that a “common commitment” scheme is more effective than an “individual commitment” scheme; the latter depends on altruism while the former involves reciprocity (“we will if you will”).

The contributors propose that global carbon pricing is the best candidate for a reciprocal common commitment in climate negotiations. Each country would commit to placing charges on carbon emissions sufficient to match an agreed global price formula. The contributors show that carbon pricing would facilitate negotiations and enforcement, improve efficiency and flexibility, and make other climate policies more effective. Additionally, they analyze the failings of the 2015 Paris climate conference.

Contributors
Richard N. Cooper, Peter Cramton, Ottmar Edenhofer, Christian Gollier, Éloi Laurent, David JC MacKay, William Nordhaus, Axel Ockenfels, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Steven Stoft, Jean Tirole, Martin L. Weitzman

Table of Contents

  1. Cover
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  1. Title page
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  1. Copyright page
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  1. Dedication
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  1. Contributors
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  1. Table of Contents
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  1. Preface: Change the Game
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  1. Three Introductory Chapters
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  1. 1 Why Paris Did Not Solve the Climate Dilemma
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  1. 2 Price Carbon—I Will If You Will*
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  1. 3 Reflections on the International Coordination of Carbon Pricing
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  1. Nine Perspectives on Cooperation and Global Carbon Pricing
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  1. 4 Global Carbon Pricing
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  1. 5 The Case for Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions*
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  1. 6 Overcoming the Copenhagen Failure with Flexible Commitments*
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  1. 7 Climate Clubs and Carbon Pricing*
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  1. 8 How a Minimum Carbon-Price Commitment Might Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality
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  1. 9 Climate Policy at an Impasse
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  1. 10 Effective Institutions against Climate Change
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  1. 11 From the Paris Agreement to the Carbon Convergence
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  1. 12 An International Carbon-Price Commitment Promotes Cooperation
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  1. Acknowledgments
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  1. Index
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Additional Information

ISBN
9780262340380
Related ISBN
9780262036269
MARC Record
OCLC
1053193568
Launched on MUSE
2018-09-19
Language
English
Open Access
Yes
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