In this Book

Losing Binh Dinh
summary
Boylan's careful and well-documented analysis of US and South Vietnamese counterinsurgency efforts in Binh Dinh province is a powerful and convincing refutation of those Revisionists who have counter-factually asserted that the US had won the war by 1970—only to have it lost because of the failure of Congress to support Saigon after the 1973 Paris agreement.

Table of Contents

  1. Cover
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  1. Title Page, Copyright
  2. pp. i-iv
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  1. Table of Contents
  2. pp. v-vi
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  1. Acknowledgments
  2. p. vii
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  1. List of Abbreviations
  2. pp. viii-x
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  1. Introduction: Verlorene Siege
  2. pp. 1-10
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  1. 1. The “Pacified” Province
  2. pp. 11-43
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  1. 2. Fast and Thin
  2. pp. 44-70
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  1. 3. The Balance of Forces
  2. pp. 71-96
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  1. 4. Growing Dependency
  2. pp. 97-132
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  1. 5. Overextension
  2. pp. 133-168
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  1. 6. Slowdown
  2. pp. 169-205
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  1. 7. The Red Queen’s Race
  2. pp. 206-242
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  1. 8. Aftershocks
  2. pp. 243-263
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  1. Conclusion: Triumph Mistaken
  2. pp. 264-300
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  1. Notes
  2. pp. 301-344
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  1. Bibliography
  2. pp. 345-352
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  1. Index
  2. pp. 353-366
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  1. Back Cover
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