In this Book

The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda

Book
Alan J. Kuperman
2004
summary

In 1994 genocide in Rwanda claimed the lives of at least 500,000 Tutsi—some three-quarters of their population—while UN peacekeepers were withdrawn and the rest of the world stood aside. Ever since, it has been argued that a small military intervention could have prevented most of the killing. In The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention, Alan J. Kuperman exposes such conventional wisdom as myth.

Combining unprecedented analyses of the genocide's progression and the logistical limitations of humanitarian military intervention, Kuperman reaches a startling conclusion: even if Western leaders had ordered an intervention as soon as they became aware of a nationwide genocide in Rwanda, the intervention forces would have arrived too late to save more than a quarter of the 500,000 Tutsi ultimately killed. Serving as a cautionary message about the limits of humanitarian intervention, the book's concluding chapters address lessons for the future.

Table of Contents

Cover

Title Page, Copyright

pp. i-iv

Contents

pp. v-vi

Preface

pp. vii-x

Acknowledgments

pp. xi-xiv

1. The Common Wisdom

pp. 1-4

2. Roots of the Rwandan Tragedy

pp. 5-13

3. Mechanics of the Genocide

pp. 14-22

4. When Did We Know?

pp. 23-37

5. The Military Scene

pp. 38-51

6. Transporting Intervention Forces

pp. 52-62

7. Plausible Interventions

pp. 63-77

8. Contending Claims

pp. 78-99

9. Early Warning and Preventive Intervention

pp. 100-108

10. Lessons

pp. 109-119

Appendix A. A Model of the Genocide's Progression

pp. 120-123

Appendix B. Airlift in Some Previous U.S. Military Interventions

pp. 124-125

Appendix C. Theater Airfield Capacity Based on Operation Support Hope

pp. 126-128

Notes

pp. 129-156

Index

pp. 157-162
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