In this Book
- Material Beings
- Book
- 1990
- Published by: Cornell University Press
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"There is much to bee learned from this book.... Material Beings is a refreshing example of straight-on, full-speed metaphysics. Van Inwagen goes where his arguments lead him—and they lead him to some remarkable places indeed."
—Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
According to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphysics and ordinary language.
According to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphysics and ordinary language.
Table of Contents
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- 1. Introduction
- pp. 17-20
- 2. The Special Composition Question
- pp. 21-32
- 4. *The General Composition Question
- pp. 38-51
- 5. *What We Shall Not Presuppose
- pp. 52-55
- 9. The Proposed Answer
- pp. 81-97
- 12. Unity and Thinking
- pp. 115-123
- 13. Artifacts
- pp. 124-141
- 14. The Identities of Material Objects
- pp. 142-168
- 15. Brain Transplants
- pp. 169-181
- 18. The Vagueness of Identity
- pp. 228-270
- 19. The Vagueness of Existence
- pp. 271-284
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