In this Book

summary
Questions about the origins of human cooperation have long puzzled and divided scientists. Social norms that foster fair-minded behavior, altruism and collective action undergird the foundations of large-scale human societies, but we know little about how these norms develop or spread, or why the intensity and breadth of human cooperation varies among different populations. What is the connection between social norms that encourage fair dealing and economic growth? How are these social norms related to the emergence of centralized institutions? Informed by a pioneering set of cross-cultural data, Experimenting with Social Norms advances our understanding of the evolution of human cooperation and the expansion of complex societies. Editors Jean Ensminger and Joseph Henrich present evidence from an exciting collaboration between anthropologists and economists. Using experimental economics games, researchers examined levels of fairness, cooperation, and norms for punishing those who violate expectations of equality across a diverse swath of societies, from hunter-gatherers in Tanzania to a small town in rural Missouri. These experiments tested individuals’ willingness to conduct mutually beneficial transactions with strangers that reap rewards only at the expense of taking a risk on the cooperation of others. The results show a robust relationship between exposure to market economies and social norms that benefit the group over narrow economic self-interest. Levels of fairness and generosity are generally higher among individuals in communities with more integrated markets. Religion also plays a powerful role. Individuals practicing either Islam or Christianity exhibited a stronger sense of fairness, possibly because religions with high moralizing deities, equipped with ample powers to reward and punish, encourage greater prosociality. The size of the settlement also had an impact. People in larger communities were more willing to punish unfairness compared to those in smaller societies. Taken together, the volume supports the hypothesis that social norms evolved over thousands of years to allow strangers in more complex and large settlements to coexist, trade and prosper. Innovative and ambitious, Experimenting with Social Norms synthesizes an unprecedented analysis of social behavior from an immense range of human societies. The fifteen case studies analyzed in this volume, which include field experiments in Africa, South America, New Guinea, Siberia and the United States, are available for free download on the Foundation’s website:www.russellsage.org.

Table of Contents

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  1. Cover
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  1. Title Page, Copyright
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  1. Contents
  2. pp. v-vi
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  1. List of Illustrations
  2. pp. vii-xvii
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  1. Contributors
  2. pp. xix-xx
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  1. Part I - Theory, Method, and Comparative Analysis
  1. 1. Introduction, Project History, and Guide to the Volume
  2. Jean Ensminger, Joseph Henrich
  3. pp. 3-18
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  1. 2. Theoretical Foundations: The Coevolution of Social Norms, Intrinsic Motivation, Markets, and the Institutions of Complex Societies
  2. Joseph Henrich, Jean Ensminger
  3. pp. 19-44
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  1. 3. Cross-Cultural Methods, Sites, and Variables
  2. Jean Ensminger, Abigail Barr, Joseph Henrich
  3. pp. 45-88
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  1. 4. Major Empirical Results: Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment
  2. Joseph Henrich, Jean Ensminger, Abigail Barr, Richard McElreath
  3. pp. 89-148
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  1. 5. Double-Blind Dictator Games in Africa and the United States: Differential Experimenter Effects
  2. Carolyn K. Lesorogol, Jean Ensminger
  3. pp. 149-158
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  1. Part II - Society Case Studies
  1. 6. Better to Receive Than to Give: Hadza Behavior in Three Experimental Economic Games
  2. Frank W. Marlowe
  3. pp. 161-176
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  1. 7. Cruel to Be Kind: Effects of Sanctions and Third-Party Enforcers on Generosity in Papua New Guinea
  2. David P. Tracer, Ivo Mueller, Jennifer Morse
  3. pp. 177-196
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  1. 8. The Tsimane' Rarely Punish: An Experimental Investigation of Dictators, Ultimatums, and Punishment
  2. Michael D. Gurven
  3. pp. 197-224
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  1. 9. Fairness Without Punishment: Behavioral Experiments in the Yasawa Islands, Fiji
  2. Joseph Henrich, Natalie Henrich
  3. pp. 225-258
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  1. 10. Economic Game Behavior Among the Shuar
  2. H. Clark Barrett, Kevin J. Haley
  3. pp. 259-274
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  1. 11. Economic Experimental Game Results from the Sursurunga of New Ireland, Papua New Guinea
  2. Alexander H. Bolyanatz
  3. pp. 275-308
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  1. 12. Maragoli and Gusii Farmers in Kenya: Strong Collective Action and High Prosocial Punishment
  2. Edwins Laban Gwako
  3. pp. 309-336
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  1. 13. Sharing, Subsistence, and Social Norms in Northern Siberia
  2. John P. Ziker
  3. pp. 337-356
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  1. 14. Gifts or Entitlements: The Influence of Property Rights and Institutions for Third-Party Sanctioning on Behavior in Three Experimental Economic Games
  2. Carolyn K. Lesorogol
  3. pp. 357-376
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  1. 15. Cooperation and Punishment in an Economically Diverse Community in Highland Tanzania
  2. Richard McElreath
  3. pp. 377-390
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  1. 16. Social Preferences Among the People of Sanquianga in Colombia
  2. Juan-Camilo Cardenas
  3. pp. 391-420
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  1. 17. The Effects of Birthplace and Current Context on Other-Regarding Preferences in Accra
  2. Abigail Barr
  3. pp. 421-444
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  1. 18. Prosociality in Rural America: Evidence from Dictator, Ultimatum, Public Goods, and Trust Games
  2. Jean Ensminger, Kathleen Cook
  3. pp. 445-464
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  1. Index
  2. pp. 465-472
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