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Minding the Modern: Human Agency, Intellectual Traditions, and Responsible Knowledge

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Thomas Pfau
2015
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In this brilliant study, Thomas Pfau argues that the loss of foundational concepts in classical and medieval Aristotelian philosophy caused a fateful separation between reason and will in European thought. Pfau traces the evolution and eventual deterioration of key concepts of human agency—will, person, judgment, action—from antiquity through Scholasticism and on to eighteenth-century moral theory and its critical revision in the works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Featuring extended critical discussions of Aristotle, Gnosticism, Augustine, Aquinas, Ockham, Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, Hume, Adam Smith, and Coleridge, this study contends that the humanistic concepts these writers seek to elucidate acquire meaning and significance only inasmuch as we are prepared positively to engage (rather than historicize) their previous usages. Beginning with the rise of theological (and, eventually, secular) voluntarism, modern thought appears increasingly reluctant and, in time, unable to engage the deep history of its own underlying conceptions, thus leaving our understanding of the nature and function of humanistic inquiry increasingly frayed and incoherent. One consequence of this shift is to leave the moral self-expression of intellectual elites and ordinary citizens alike stunted, which in turn has fueled the widespread notion that moral and ethical concerns are but a special branch of inquiry largely determined by opinion rather than dialogical reasoning, judgment, and practice.

A clear sign of this regression is the present crisis in the study of the humanities, whose role is overwhelmingly conceived (and negatively appraised) in terms of scientific theories, methods, and objectives. The ultimate casualty of this reductionism has been the very idea of personhood and the disappearance of an adequate ethical language. Minding the Modern is not merely a chapter in the history of ideas; it is a thorough phenomenological and metaphysical study of the roots of today's predicaments.

Table of Contents

Cover

pp. 1-1

Title Page, Copyright

pp. 2-5

Contents

pp. v-vi

Abbreviations

pp. vii-x

Exordium: Modernity’s Gaze

pp. 1-6

Part I: Prolegomena

Chapter 1: Frameworks or Tools?: On the Status of Concepts in Humanistic Inquiry

pp. 9-34

Chapter 2: Forgetting by Remembering: Historicism and the Limits of Modern Knowledge

pp. 35-52

Chapter 3: “A large mental field”: Intellectual Traditions and Responsible Knowledge after Newman

pp. 53-76

Part II: Rational Appetite: An Emergent Conceptual Tradition

Chapter 4: Beginnings: Desire, Judgment, and Action in Aristotle and the Stoics

pp. 79-107

Chapter 5: Consolidation: St. Augustine on Choice, Sin, and the Divided Will

pp. 108-132

Chapter 6: Rational Appetite and Good Sense: Will and Intellect in Aquinas

pp. 133-159

Chapter 7: Rational Claims, Irrational Consequences: Ockham Disaggregates Will and Reason

pp. 160-182

Part III: Progressive Amnesia: Will and the Crisis of Reason

Chapter 8: Impoverished Modernity: Will, Action, and Person in Hobbes’s Leviathan

pp. 185-213

Chapter 9: The Path toward Non-Cognitivism: Locke’s Desire and Shaftesbury’s Sentiment

pp. 214-248

Chapter 10: From Naturalism to Reductionism: Mandeville’s Passion and Hutcheson’s Moral Sense

pp. 249-282

Chapter 11: Mindless Desires and Contentless Minds: Hume’s Enigma of Reason

pp. 283-326

Chapter 12: Virtue without Agency: Sentiment, Behavior, and Habituation in A. Smith

pp. 327-373

Chapter 13: After Sentimentalism: Liberalism and the Discontents of Modern Autonomy

pp. 374-414

Part IV: Retrieving the Human: Coleridge on Will, Person, and Conscience

Chapter 14: Good or Commodity?: Modern Knowledge and the Loss of Eudaimonia

pp. 417-436

Chapter 15: The Persistence of Gnosis: Freedom and “Error” in Philosophical Modernity

pp. 437-467

Chapter 16: Beyond Voluntarism and Deontology: Coleridge’s Notion of the Responsible Will

pp. 468-503

Chapter 17: Existence before Substance: The Idea of “Person” in Humanistic Inquiry

pp. 504-534

Chapter 18: Existence as Reality and Act: Person, Relationality, and Incommunicability

pp. 535-555

Chapter 19: “Consciousness has the appearance of another”: On Relationality as Love

pp. 556-590

Chapter 20: “Faith is fidelity … to the conscience”: Coleridge’s Ontology

pp. 591-618

Works Cited

pp. 619-649

Index

pp. 650-673

About the Author, Praise

pp. 674-686
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