In this Book
Constitutional Democracy
Book
2003
Published by:
Central European University Press
summary
Constitutional democracy addresses the widely held belief that liberal democracy embodies an uneasy compromise of incompatible values: those of liberal rights on the one hand, and democratic equality on the other. Liberalism is said to compromise democracy, while democracy is said to endanger the values of liberalism. It is these theses that János Kis examines and tries to refute.
Making the assumption that the alleged conflict is to be resolved at the level of institutions, he outlines a new theory of constitutional democracy. A wide range of problems encountered in constitutional democracy are discussed, such as the popular vote, popular sovereignty, and non-elected justices.
The volume is composed of three parts. Part One, "Public Good and Civic Virtue", revisits the debate between liberals and democrats on how to interpret the democratic vote. In Part Two, "Liberal Democracy", the author proves that on the level of principles there is no incompatibility between liberalism and democracy and that liberal theory can demonstrate that democratic values follow from fundamental liberal values. In Part Three, "Constitutional Adjudication in a Democracy", the compatibility of democracy and judicial or constitutional review is analyzed and a theory of constitutionalism is outlined.
This volume appeals to scholars in political philosophy, political science, and constitutional law, but is also recommended to all those interested in liberal and democratic theory, and the transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.
Table of Contents
Cover
pp. 1-1
Title Page, Copyright
pp. 2-5
Table of Contents
pp. vi-viii
Introduction
pp. ix-xvi
The Common Good and Civic Virtue
1. Liberalism and republicanism
pp. 3-8
2. The preference-aggregating model
pp. 9-10
3. The ethical model: the responsible voter
pp. 11-16
4. The ethical model: the relation between private and communal preferences
pp. 17-20
5. The ethical model: public debate and voting
pp. 21-24
6. On the relation of the two models
pp. 25-28
7. Liberalism and the descriptive claims of the ethical model
pp. 29-34
8. Virtue in politics
pp. 35-38
9. The politics of virtue and personal autonomy
pp. 39-42
10. Concluding remarks
pp. 43-50
Liberal Democracy â Against the Compromise Thesis
1. Introduction
pp. 53-56
2. The conflict
pp. 57-60
3. Constitutional constraints, constitutional review
pp. 61-64
4. Political equality and rule by the majority
pp. 65-70
5. Equality of votes and equality of voters
pp. 71-74
6. Contractarian theory: the selection of voting rules
pp. 75-80
7. A weakness of contractarian theory
pp. 81-84
8. The typology of preferences
pp. 85-90
9. Filtering the preferences of the contracting parties
pp. 91-96
10. Moral discussion before the contract
pp. 97-102
11. The mandate of the guardians of the constitution
pp. 103-108
12. Summary and restrictions
pp. 109-116
Constitutional Review
1. Introduction
pp. 119-132
2. Interpreting the constitution
pp. 133-182
3. Striking down legislation
pp. 183-246
The Legacy of the First Hungarian Constitutional Court
1. The interpretive practice of the Constitutional Court
pp. 249-302
2. Summary and a glance to the future
pp. 303-320
Index
pp. 321-324
| ISBN | 9786155053887 |
|---|---|
| Related ISBN(s) | 9789639241282, 9789639241329 |
| MARC Record | Download |
| OCLC | 76898650 |
| Pages | 342 |
| Launched on MUSE | 2014-01-01 |
| Language | English |
| Open Access | No |


