In this Book

Constitutional Democracy

Book
János Kis
2003
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summary
Constitutional democracy addresses the widely held belief that liberal democracy embodies an uneasy compromise of incompatible values: those of liberal rights on the one hand, and democratic equality on the other. Liberalism is said to compromise democracy, while democracy is said to endanger the values of liberalism. It is these theses that János Kis examines and tries to refute. Making the assumption that the alleged conflict is to be resolved at the level of institutions, he outlines a new theory of constitutional democracy. A wide range of problems encountered in constitutional democracy are discussed, such as the popular vote, popular sovereignty, and non-elected justices. The volume is composed of three parts. Part One, "Public Good and Civic Virtue", revisits the debate between liberals and democrats on how to interpret the democratic vote. In Part Two, "Liberal Democracy", the author proves that on the level of principles there is no incompatibility between liberalism and democracy and that liberal theory can demonstrate that democratic values follow from fundamental liberal values. In Part Three, "Constitutional Adjudication in a Democracy", the compatibility of democracy and judicial or constitutional review is analyzed and a theory of constitutionalism is outlined. This volume appeals to scholars in political philosophy, political science, and constitutional law, but is also recommended to all those interested in liberal and democratic theory, and the transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.

Table of Contents

Cover

pp. 1-1

Title Page, Copyright

pp. 2-5

Table of Contents

pp. vi-viii

Introduction

pp. ix-xvi

The Common Good and Civic Virtue

1. Liberalism and republicanism

pp. 3-8

2. The preference-aggregating model

pp. 9-10

3. The ethical model: the responsible voter

pp. 11-16

4. The ethical model: the relation between private and communal preferences

pp. 17-20

5. The ethical model: public debate and voting

pp. 21-24

6. On the relation of the two models

pp. 25-28

7. Liberalism and the descriptive claims of the ethical model

pp. 29-34

8. Virtue in politics

pp. 35-38

9. The politics of virtue and personal autonomy

pp. 39-42

10. Concluding remarks

pp. 43-50

Liberal Democracy – Against the Compromise Thesis

1. Introduction

pp. 53-56

2. The conflict

pp. 57-60

3. Constitutional constraints, constitutional review

pp. 61-64

4. Political equality and rule by the majority

pp. 65-70

5. Equality of votes and equality of voters

pp. 71-74

6. Contractarian theory: the selection of voting rules

pp. 75-80

7. A weakness of contractarian theory

pp. 81-84

8. The typology of preferences

pp. 85-90

9. Filtering the preferences of the contracting parties

pp. 91-96

10. Moral discussion before the contract

pp. 97-102

11. The mandate of the guardians of the constitution

pp. 103-108

12. Summary and restrictions

pp. 109-116

Constitutional Review

1. Introduction

pp. 119-132

2. Interpreting the constitution

pp. 133-182

3. Striking down legislation

pp. 183-246

The Legacy of the First Hungarian Constitutional Court

1. The interpretive practice of the Constitutional Court

pp. 249-302

2. Summary and a glance to the future

pp. 303-320

Index

pp. 321-324
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