In this Book

First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia

Book
David N. Gibbs
2009
summary
In First Do No Harm, David Gibbs raises basic questions about the humanitarian interventions that have played a key role in U.S. foreign policy for the past twenty years. Using a wide range of sources, including government documents, transcripts of international war crimes trials, and memoirs, Gibbs shows how these interventions often heightened violence and increased human suffering.

The book focuses on the 1991-99 breakup of Yugoslavia, which helped forge the idea that the United States and its allies could stage humanitarian interventions that would end ethnic strife. It is widely believed that NATO bombing campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo played a vital role in stopping Serb-directed aggression, and thus resolving the conflict.

Gibbs challenges this view, offering an extended critique of Samantha Power's Pulitzer Prize-winning book, A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide. He shows that intervention contributed to the initial breakup of Yugoslavia, and then helped spread the violence and destruction. Gibbs also explains how the motives for U.S. intervention were rooted in its struggle for continued hegemony in Europe.

First Do No Harm argues for a new, noninterventionist model for U.S. foreign policy, one that deploys nonmilitary methods for addressing ethnic violence.

Table of Contents

Cover

Table of Contents

pp. vii

Preface

pp. ix-xi

1. The Rise of Humanitarian Intervention

pp. 1-15

2. US Predominance and the Logic of Interventionism

pp. 16-44

3. Origins of the Yugoslav Conflict

pp. 45-75

4. Germany Drops a Match

pp. 76-105

5. The War Spreads to Bosnia-Herzegovina

pp. 106-140

6. Only the Weak Rely on Diplomacy: The Clinton Administration Faces Bosnia

pp. 141-170

7. Kosovo and the Reaffirmation of American Power

pp. 171-204

8. Conclusion

pp. 205-222

Notes

pp. 223-308

Bibliography

pp. 309-334

Index

pp. 335-346
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