How Oppositions Turn Authoritarian

Opposition victories after periods of democratic erosion are commonly portrayed as turning points that can help restore democracy. This essay argues that this optimism is often misplaced. An analysis of more than 40 elections in Africa since 1990 in which an opposition candidate defeated an autocratizing incumbent reveals that democracy stagnated or declined in half these cases. The authors attribute this pattern to two mutually reinforcing mechanisms inherited from the previous era of democratic erosion. First, new leaders inherit a landscape of weakened institutions—pliant legislatures, politicized courts, and captured state agencies—which are far easier to exploit for their own political consolidation than to rebuild. Second, years of repression teach opposition elites which legal and coercive strategies are most effective for ensuring political survival. This "opposition learning" encourages them to use, rather than dismantle, these authoritarian instruments once they are in power. Through detailed case studies of recent opposition victories in Malawi and Zambia, the authors illustrate how these dynamics operate in practice. Despite celebrated electoral turnovers, these new governments began to repurpose the tools of their predecessors, engaging in judicial manipulation, selective prosecutions, and the co-optation of state power. This combination of institutional inheritance and learned repression often transforms a celebrated alternation of power into a "smarter autocracy," illustrating why electoral turnover by itself is seldom sufficient to guarantee democratic recovery.