Debating Chinese Cruelty: Summary Execution, Judicial Reform, and Extraterritoriality in the Late Qing

Abstract

In July 1903, the Qing government executed the anti-Manchu revolutionary Shen Jin through the brutal method of bamboo blows (zhangbi), sparking both domestic and international outrage. This execution led to widespread condemnation of Chinese law as cruel and barbaric, further complicating the Qing court's efforts to assert jurisdiction over the Subao case (1903–1904) in the Shanghai International Settlements. The incident also raised doubts about China's commitment to establishing a modern judicial system. Drawing on Qing imperial archives, foreign diplomatic records, and contemporary media coverage of Shen's execution, this paper explores key themes in late Qing judicial reform, including extraterritoriality, the jurisdiction of Chinese nationals in foreign settlements, and the practice of summary executions. It contributes to the understanding of the Xinzheng reforms by examining the Qing state's efforts to eliminate extraterritorial privileges amid a rising culture of summary executions during the late nineteenth century. I argue that the Shen incident represented a crisis in state-building for the Qing, as two conflicting objectives collided at the execution ground: demonstrating the civilizing nature of Qing law to Western powers and swiftly dispensing justice to revolutionaries. The inherent contradictions between these goals placed the Qing state in a deeper legitimacy crisis.

On July 18, 1903, a cadre of Qing imperial guards forcibly entered a residence in the eastern precincts of downtown Beijing, apprehending a man named Shen Jin 沈藎. Over the following days, Shen was detained and interrogated at the Board of Punishment. On July 31, rumors began to circulate that Shen had been clandestinely, brutally executed. Initial conjecture posited that Shen, a journalist, was arrested for unveiling a secret agreement between the Qing court and Russia concerning Manchuria.¹ Subsequent revelations clarified that his execution was part of a political purge orchestrated by the Qing court against anti-Manchu revolutionaries.

Shen Jin, born in Shanhua County, Hunan, in 1872, was an adherent of the Hundred Days Reform Movement. In the early 1890s, Shen met the Hunanese reformers Tan Sitong 譚嗣同 and Tang Caichang 唐才常 through a poetry society in Changsha.² In the aftermath of the abortive 1898 coup d'état and the execution of Tan Sitong, Shen and Tang, disenchanted with the Qing government, established the Independence Society (Zilihui 自立會) in Shanghai.³ Their goal was to overthrow Manchu rule and institute a constitutional government led by Han Chinese. Shen assumed the role of Right Army commander, overseeing the revolutionary organization's outreach endeavors.⁴ In the summer of 1900, taking advantage of the Qing court's weakness during the Boxer Rebellion, Independence Society members initiated a military coup in Hankou. Zhang Zhidong 張之洞, the governor-general of Hunan and Hubei, swiftly discovered the plot and suppressed the uprising, culminating in the summary executions of Tang and several other Independence Society members in August 1900. Shen, fortuitously evading the crackdown, spent the ensuing years traversing various cities incognito. In July 1903, while living in Beijing, a former Qing official named Wu Shizhao, whom Shen had erroneously considered a confidant, reported Shen to the Qing court, resulting in Shen's arrest and execution.⁵

Despite the Qing government's attempt to keep the execution low-key and expeditious, Shen Jin's demise attracted considerable attention from the foreign expatriate community and garnered extensive coverage in the international media, inviting trenchant criticism of Qing justice. A week after the execution, Edward T. Williams, a secretary and interpreter at the United States legation in Beijing, compiled an investigative report, revealing that Shen "was executed with unusual barbarity and by an illegal method." The report underscored the irregularity of the execution: "Shen was not taken to the execution ground" but was executed at the yamen of the Board of Punishment, "where there are no arrangements for executing criminals."⁶

Williams further contended that the original sentence recommended by the Board of Punishment was decapitation, but deferred to avoid the inauspiciousness of carrying out such executions during the month of the empress dowager's birthday. However, Empress Dowager Cixi rejected the Board's recommended sentence and insisted that Shen be immediately executed by heavy bamboo blows, a process that was, according to Williams, "unknown to Chinese law," though "indeed inflicted at times in the palace upon eunuchs."⁷ Citing Williams's report, the New York Times characterized the execution as an "awful death."⁸ In a separate article, the Times declared that the judicial torture in this case was "the most egregious since the massacres of 1900."⁹

Shen's execution also incited fervent reactions within Chinese society. As early as July 21, the pro-reform newspaper Ta Kung Pao 大公報 reported Shen's arrest, speculating about its relation to the crackdown on anti-Qing revolutionaries. Over the ensuing months, Ta Kung Pao continued to report on the incident, exposing the gruesome nature of Shen's punishment.¹⁰ The news of Shen's death sent shockwaves through Chinese reformist and revolutionary circles. Newspapers founded by reformists in exile in Japan reported the incident in detail, labeling it as an exceedingly cruel punishment and unjust imprisonment, and denouncing the brutality of the Qing government. Political activists such as Qiu Jin, Zou Rong, Zhang Shizhao, and Cai Yuanpei vehemently criticized the Qing government's uncivilized treatment of Shen.

Aside from creating an international and domestic sensation, the Shen Jin incident precipitated a crisis for late Qing state-building, as two conflicting objectives collided at the execution ground: showcasing the civilized nature of Qing law to Western powers and effectively administering justice to those advocating for revolution. To fulfill the former goal, crucial for regaining judicial sovereignty and terminating foreign extraterritoriality in China, the Qing court instituted Western-style judicial reforms. Yet, to achieve the latter, the court relied heavily on summary executions, contradicting both the protocols of Qing formal justice and the tenets of international law. While the ultimate purpose of both initiatives was the preservation of Qing rule, their inherent contradictions ensnared the Qing court in a profound legitimacy crisis.

To elucidate the significance of the Shen Jin incident in a legal context, in what follows I first expound on its role in another notable case in 1903, involving negotiations over the extradition of several anti-Manchu intellectuals—the Subao 蘇報 (Jiangsu Daily) case—and how the two incidents intersected legally. Shen's execution sparked a vigorous debate on Chinese judicial cruelty among three political forces: Western powers, Qing loyalists, and Han Chinese revolutionaries. Following this, I will examine the legality of the execution in light of the prevalent practice of summary executions and the politics of judicial reform in the late Qing. This analytical step will enable a critical evaluation of claims regarding the purported illegality of the execution and how such contentions served diverse political ends.

The sharply criticized judicial cruelty in the Shen Jin case resulted from the continuous erosion of the Qing dynasty's death penalty review system. This system, paramount to formal judicial procedures, had been steadily undermined during the late nineteenth century by the increasing use of summary executions. Despite the imperial court's reluctance to embrace summary executions, this expedient procedure gradually became a core part of late Qing judicial practices. The Shen Jin case epitomizes a dilemma wherein a crumbling regime's self-preservation efforts inadvertently contributed to its self-destruction as it grappled with contradictory imperatives. On the one hand, the imperial court apprehended that state-sanctioned expeditious justice might undermine the stature of Confucian benevolence and the validity of the death penalty review system—both pillars of imperial rule. On the other hand, it found itself reliant on executions without trial to deter insurgent groups proliferating throughout the empire. The outcome for the Qing court paralleled that of many historical regimes: a hastily devised remedy meant to facilitate repression recoiled upon the regime itself.

A Turning Point in the Subao Case

To understand the complex judicial politics surrounding Shen Jin's execution and its impact on late Qing state-building, it is crucial to investigate its connection to the 1903 Subao case, a jurisdictional dispute between the Qing government and the Shanghai International Settlement over the extradition of several Chinese journalists affiliated with Subao, a Shanghai-based revolutionary newspaper. In the summer of 1903, the Qing court suppressed Subao for publishing pamphlets criticizing Manchu rule and attempted to arrest its journalists. Since Subao was registered and located in the International Settlement, determining legal jurisdiction over the accused journalists became a contentious issue.¹¹ At the heart of this dispute lay extraterritoriality, a colonial legal regime established after the Opium War. While Qing China's treaties with Western powers granted legal exemptions only to foreigners, in practice, extraterritorial privileges and the jurisdiction of the Shanghai Mixed Court extended to Chinese nationals as well.¹² As Pär Cassel astutely observes, these unregulated applications of extraterritoriality constituted "one of the most significant foreign violations of Qing sovereignty over its own subjects."¹³

Since June, the Qing government had persistently engaged with the authorities in the International Settlement, urging them to surrender the journalists for trial under Chinese justice.¹⁴ The foreign community in China found itself deeply divided over the question of extradition, leading to a protracted diplomatic impasse. Both the English-language press and the Shanghai Municipal Council vehemently opposed extradition, asserting that the journalists should be tried in the Shanghai Mixed Court rather than under Qing jurisdiction. William Bayne, chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council, contended that the principle of not extracting Chinese residents from the Settlement without due trial was integral to "the continued prosperity and security of the foreign settlement."¹⁵

In contrast, most diplomats adopted a pragmatic stance on extradition. A July 30 article in the Times, a widely distributed British daily newspaper, encapsulated the views of these foreign ministers. US Minister Edwin Conger leaned toward surrendering the journalists, expressing concern that converting the foreign settlement into an asylum for Chinese revolutionaries or rioters might severely jeopardize foreign interests. French minister Georges Dubail echoed these sentiments, arguing that Chinese "should not be sheltered in foreign settlements from punishment for acts so serious as lèse-majesté." Delegates from Russia, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands concurred. The British chargé d'affaires and the Japanese minister remained silent. Only the Italian minister pointed out that the Qing court might administer punishment without the formality of a trial due to the political nature of the offense.¹⁶

Shen's gruesome execution on July 31 compelled the diplomats to shift their stance on extradition. In response to the execution, the British Parliament convened a debate on August 4.¹⁷ Prime Minister Arthur Balfour subsequently announced that Britain would not surrender the Subao journalists to Chinese justice, citing the "horrible barbarity" of Shen's execution.¹⁸ Upon learning details of Shen Jin's "barbarous execution," U.S. Minister Conger instructed his Shanghai consul on August 7 that the Subao prisoners "should not be surrendered without ample guaranties against similar punishment."¹⁹

The Qing government persistently asserted its jurisdiction over the Subao case, even sending an ambassador to negotiate with the US secretary of state. The goal was to assure the US that the journalists would receive prison sentences instead of execution. Due to the ominous precedent set by Shen Jin's execution, however, these efforts proved futile.²⁰ In October 1904, the Subao case was tried in the Shanghai Mixed Court. The primary offenders received two-year prison terms, while the remaining defendants were released.²¹ Commenting on the trial, the Annual Register, an established British reference book that recorded world events, credited Shen Jin's execution with facilitating "a fair trial in the presence of a foreign assessor."²²

Extraterritoriality and Judicial Reform

The Subao affair was not the first instance of Sino-foreign disputes regarding the jurisdictional status of Chinese nationals in the Shanghai International Settlement. Throughout the late nineteenth century, various Chinese nationals, including criminals, merchants, and intellectuals, sought sanctuary in foreign settlements protected by extraterritoriality to evade Qing jurisdiction. Despite the Qing state's aversion to such actions, officials often felt powerless to regulate these violations due to staunch resistance from the Shanghai Municipal Council, which fiercely defended the judicial autonomy of the International Settlement.²³

The Qing state's unwavering resolve to assert jurisdiction over the Subao case marked a significant shift in its approach to asserting judicial sovereignty. Over the course of several months, the government mobilized a series of high-ranking officials to negotiate with foreign nations. This diplomatic offensive included, in succession, the Shanghai daotai, the governor-general of Liangjiang (Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangxi), various officials from the Qing Foreign Ministry, and the Chinese minister in Washington, D.C. Concurrently, the Qing court engaged a British attorney to file a lawsuit against the Subao journalists in the Mixed Court.²⁴

The impetus behind the Qing court's endeavors was the urgency to regain judicial sovereignty in the face of rising Chinese nationalism. As the twentieth century dawned, the termination of extraterritoriality became a paramount agenda in Qing state-building. The extraterritoriality regime granted foreigners immunity from Chinese law while withholding analogous privileges from Chinese abroad. This system had been a persistent source of Sino-foreign disputes and was viewed as a flagrant breach of Chinese judicial sovereignty.²⁵ Moreover, the legal orientalist rhetoric deployed by foreign powers to justify extraterritoriality, asserting the backwardness of Chinese justice compared to the civilized West, served as a constant reminder of national humiliation. China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War further reinforced the link between extraterritoriality and Chinese weakness in the face of imperialism.²⁶ Additionally, Japan's abolition of extraterritoriality in 1899 intensified Chinese sentiments, as it set a precedent for Asian nations to reclaim judicial independence through Westernized reforms.²⁷

In June 1901, Hunan-Hubei Governor-general Zhang Zhidong and Liangjiang Governor-general Liu Kunyi 劉坤一jointly submitted three memorials to the imperial court, initiating a decade-long effort of state-led Westernized reforms. One memorial specifically addressed judicial reforms, such as prison reform, the elimination of torture, and moderation of corporal punishments.²⁸ The Qing court's primary objective in these reforms was to abolish extraterritoriality, thereby preserving its faltering rule in the face of heightened nationalism. By October, the Qing court had appointed Sheng Xuanhuai to propose abolishing extraterritoriality to Britain during a commercial treaty negotiation.²⁹ When this negotiation failed, to assure foreign powers of China's commitment to judicial modernization, Zhang Zhidong recommended Shen Jiaben 沈家本, a legal expert from the Board of Punishment, and Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳, a Western-educated attorney, to oversee the revision of the Qing criminal code.³⁰ Finally, in the September 1902 Sino-British Commercial Treaty, Britain promised to relinquish extraterritoriality upon satisfactory judicial reform in China:

China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform and she will also be prepared to relinquish her extraterritorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement of their administration, and other considerations warrant her so doing.³¹

While Britain's promise was largely motivated by Zhang Zhidong's concessions on Sino-British commercial terms, it nevertheless raised expectations within Chinese society for the restoration of judicial sovereignty. Concurrently, Japan's success in abolishing extraterritoriality frequently served as an inspiring reference in reformist discourse. In March 1903, Lin Qi 林棨, a Japanese-educated legal scholar, drew a poignant comparison between Japan and China. He lamented that while Japan's shame over extraterritoriality had driven that country to reclaim sovereign independence and achieve parity with other nations, China remained stagnant on this front. Lin observed, "In our country, foreigners have enjoyed consular jurisdiction since the opening of our ports. Yet our people remain oblivious to this anomaly, accepting it as a matter of course. How tragic!"³² Two months later, the Shanghai-based Chinese newspaper Shenbao reported on a series of lectures by Gilbert Reid, an American missionary with extensive ties to the Chinese reformist community. Reid's talks explored the connection between extraterritoriality and China's declining international status. The lecture transcripts, published in Shenbao, were hailed as foreign advocacy for Chinese efforts to repeal extraterritoriality.³³

The months leading up to the Shen Jin incident witnessed a complex tapestry of public sentiments, encompassing concerns about the future of Chinese justice, disgruntlement with Manchu rule, optimism for judicial reform, and excitement at reclaiming judicial sovereignty. Together, these sentiments engendered a precarious political climate that necessitated decisive action by the Qing court. Under such circumstances, the extradition of the Subao journalists was a crucial opportunity for the Qing court to demonstrate its determination to redeem Chinese sovereignty and assert its legitimacy before both domestic and global observers. On the brink of triumph in this jurisdictional battle, the Qing government suffered a dramatic reversal due to the publicity of Shen Jin's death. The exposure of judicial brutality at a critical juncture in Chinese efforts toward judicial reform and abolishing extraterritoriality helped substantialize the notion of Chinese judicial cruelty, rendering the Qing government's claims untenable.

A Reuters correspondent observed that Shen's execution marked a regression in political conditions in China to the aftermath of the failed coup d'état of 1898.³⁴ In Tianjin, Chinese reformists were prompted to seek political asylum in the city's foreign settlement.³⁵ An editorial in The Spectator, a conservative British magazine, contrasted Shen's execution with judicial torture in medieval Europe, questioning the sincerity of China's so-called Western-style judicial reform: "Those who govern China have learned nothing from recent experience, that their talk of reform is, except upon one subject—improved military armaments—talk only, that the ideals of the West have as little influence with them as ever."³⁶

Responses from Qing Loyalists and Chinese Revolutionaries

To mitigate the Qing court's reputational damage from the Shen Jin crisis, Gu Hongming 辜鴻銘, an English professor at Hankou's Self-Strengthening Institute (Ziqiang xuetang 自強學堂) and a confidant of Zhang Zhidong, refuted the allegations of Chinese judicial cruelty.³⁷ On August 25, Gu wrote to G. E. Morrison, the Times' China correspondent based in Beijing. The letter was subsequently published under the title "Political Offence and its Punishment in China" in the English-language North China Herald. Gu pledged to provide a "temperate statement of the case from the Chinese point of view" in contrast to the West's "exaggerated sentiment and intemperate language."³⁸

Gu addressed three principal Western criticisms of Shen's execution: procedural irregularities, the severity of the punishment, and the brutality of the execution. Regarding the sudden change of execution method from beheading to heavy bamboo blows, Gu clarified that this decision was announced in an order-in-council while the Board of Punishment awaited a death warrant from the throne. He explained:

The intervention of the order-in-council in the regular course of justice might seem to be an irregular exercise of the prerogative of the Crown, but in China the King in Council is entitled for State or other reasons to overrule the decision of the law officers of the Crown—for judicium in concilio regis est suprema lex—the judgment of the King in Council is the highest law.³⁹

Gu further argued that, contrary to Western perceptions of unchecked power, "the punishment of a person by the arbitrary will of the Sovereign without reference to the law officers of the crown in China is illegal and unconstitutional and was under the examination of a certain department."

To illustrate that such intervention was not unique to Chinese law, Gu referenced a case in the Boer War (1899–1902) involving the forced deportation of a pro-Boer British woman from South Africa. Although British jurist Frederic Harrison decried this act as unlawful, an order-in-council legitimized the deportation. Gu pointed out that inherent Western bias against Chinese justice explained why the Chinese government attracted criticism for similar intervention while the British did not:

But I do not think it would ever have entered into the head of a German Secretary of State in Berlin to raise that question in the German Reichstag. At any rate I have not heard that the British Government was denounced as a barbarous government for this alleged unconstitutional act of the British Cabinet.

Gu attributed the brutality of the execution, which drew the most criticism, to cultural differences in conceptions of cruelty and pain. He first contended that execution by heavy bamboo blows "is considered a less severe and cruel punishment than to be beheaded inasmuch as in the former case there is no dismemberment of the body, for which the Chinese have a special horror."⁴⁰ Gu then provided a cross-cultural reference, noting that during the American Revolutionary War, an English officer convicted of treason pled to face a firing squad rather than hanging. Gu claimed that this request would similarly strike the Chinese mind as "ridiculous and incredible."

Gu's rebuttal was firmly grounded in his belief that Western observers had ulterior motives in denouncing cruelty in the Shen case. He highlighted the inconsistency in foreign attitudes toward the persecution of Chinese political offenders, observing that after the 1900 Boxer Uprising foreign powers demanded quick executions of any Chinese associated with anti-foreign societies.⁴¹ Gu found it illogical that the same foreign governments later sought intervention for leniency on behalf of Chinese revolutionaries avowing their intention to overthrow the Qing government and to murder all Manchus.

Gu's article elicited strong reactions from those who sympathized with Shen. An editorial in the North China Herald expressed profound disappointment: "It is melancholy to see a man of education and culture" like Gu pen such a lengthy letter to "whitewash" the empress dowager's brutal treatment of Shen. The editorial dismissed Gu's defense of the execution as untenable and suggested that he might have written it to curry favor with the powerful, possibly in hopes of securing a promotion for himself. Challenging Gu's claim of presenting a moderate Chinese perspective, the editorial asserted, "We are sure that all decent Chinese will indignantly repudiate this exculpation of the empress dowager."⁴²

While Gu's rebuttal was likely commissioned by Zhang Zhidong, one must approach with judicious skepticism his critic's characterization of Gu as a mere court literatus. Unlike traditionalists who repudiated Westernization out of parochialism and trepidation, Gu's conservatism was a product of his cosmopolitan experiences. Born and raised in British Malaya and educated in Europe, Gu arrived in China in his late twenties.⁴³ His education in Western jurisprudence and experiences as a British colonial subject uniquely positioned him to call out Western hypocrisy in the Shen Jin incident.

After the 1911 Revolution, Gu would staunchly maintain the Manchu hairstyle with a queue, aligning himself with a coterie of Qing loyalists in propagating political and cultural conservatism.⁴⁴ Proclaiming himself a "spokesman for the East," Gu would go on to publish Englishlanguage treatises on traditional Chinese philosophy.⁴⁵ Already in a 1908 memorial to the Guangxi Emperor Gu expressed his reservations about China's emulation of Western political systems, admonishing against the precipitous and uncritical adoption of the Western judicial models.⁴⁶ Notwithstanding his conservative stance, Gu cultivated a diverse social milieu, engaging with Western-educated Chinese and foreign expatriates, and serving as a conduit for Western culture and history to Chinese students.⁴⁷ His rebuttal encapsulated Gu's dual identity as a cosmopolitan intellectual and Qing loyalist, particularly his apprehension regarding the potential subjugation and eventual effacement of Chinese civilization by Western imperialism.

The debate in the North China Herald reflected a broader condemnation of the Qing government's tyranny, sparked by the Shen Jin case, which resonated not only throughout the nation but also among overseas Chinese communities. In Shanghai, hundreds of people attended a memorial service for Shen, where Cai Yuanpei denounced the Qing government's blatant disregard for human rights.⁴⁸ While still imprisoned in the International Settlement, the Subao journalists published elegiac tributes to Shen, one of which, penned by Zou Rong, poignantly stated, "Though Shen's body succumbed to judicial torment, his spirit will bear witness to the Qing dynasty's demise."⁴⁹ In September 1903, Zhang Shizhao 章士釗, the editor of Subao, compiled a pamphlet titled Shen Jin. The pamphlet contained a detailed account of Shen's revolutionary activities and writings memorializing him. Paying tribute to Shen's courageous life, Zhang characterized him as "not a constitutionalist, but a revolutionary; not someone who writes, but someone who acts."⁵⁰ Although Subao was forcibly shut down, Zhang quickly established a new daily—Guomin riri bao 國民日日報, where he continued to condemn judicial cruelty: "Nothing is treated with more disdain than Chinese lives. In any civilized nation, an execution is widely reported in the media. Convictions here hinge on irrefutable evidence and confessions."⁵¹

Prominent among critics of Shen's execution were Chinese reformists exiled in Japan. Liang Qichao 梁啟超's Yokohama-based Xinmin congbao 新民叢報 contended that "even within the parameters of Qing law, death by heavy bamboo blows is categorized as irregular punishment (feixing 非刑), and its use starkly illustrates Empress Dowager Cixi's unbridled authority."⁵² The journal also expressed disillusionment with the inactivity of the Board of Punishments, suggesting a bleak outlook for Chinese politics.⁵³

Hansheng 漢聲, established by Hubei students in Japan, expressed anti-Manchu sentiments in more strident terms: "Shen's demise fills our eyes with tears, our hearts with anguish. The Manchus' ruthless execution of our Han brethren demands every patriot's call for vengeance."⁵⁴ Similarly, Jiangsu 江蘇, a monthly established by Jiangsu students studying in Japan, urged a national awakening to the injustice of Shen's execution: "Fellow countrymen, heed my words! Was Shen not one of our Han? With his brutal end, unjustly administered without formal charges, aren't all 400 million Han under threat of similar fate? Our silence and acquiescence to such acts would see China's land forfeited as we fall under the Manchu's tyranny."⁵⁵

Shen's demise also galvanized Chinese revolutionaries towards a more radical path. Qiu Jin 秋瑾, while studying in Japan at this time, was deeply moved by Shen and his Independence Society comrades' martyrdom for the Han people's resurgence, lamenting the absence of similar sacrifices by Chinese women. This spurred her decision to return to China, resolved to dedicate her life to the revolutionary cause.⁵⁶ Yang Yulin 楊毓麟, a Hunan-born revolutionary, composed a poem lamenting Shen's execution. In 1903, Yang made a failed attempt to assassinate the empress dowager by targeting the Forbidden City and the Summer Palace with explosives. In the following years, Yang remained active in attempts to assassinate Manchu officials.⁵⁷

Shen's tragic end also underscored the paradoxical nature of Chinese attitudes toward extraterritoriality. While revolutionaries criticized the Qing court's failure to uphold Chinese judicial sovereignty, labeling extraterritoriality as a national humiliation, they simultaneously recognized that this colonial regime provided them with a buffer to oppose Qing tyranny. The revolutionary publication Zhejiang chao 浙江 潮, established by Zhejiang students studying in Japan, pointed out that, although the Qing court launched an extensive search for reformists in Shanghai, their efforts were thwarted by the fact that the International Settlement was protected by extraterritoriality. In contrast, Shen faced "a dreadful sentence without any formal charges," a misfortune attributed to his capture in Beijing, where extraterritorial protection did not apply.⁵⁸

In post-1911 Revolution commemoration, Shen's death continued to be viewed as "a harbinger of the dynasty's downfall." A 1934 editorial in the KMT-affiliated political journal Jianguo yuekan 建國月刊 placed Shen's ordeal in the context of the persistent conflict between Manchu rulers and Han scholars, likening Shen to early Han martyrs who resisted Manchu rule.⁵⁹

Ultimately, while Qing loyalists like Gu Hongming strove to justify Shen's execution and preserve the dynasty's standing, their efforts only magnified public outrage. In this way, the violent handling of Shen Jin's case not only exposed the hollowness of the Qing court's promises of judicial reform but also ignited broader revolutionary fervor, ultimately undermining the very claim to sovereignty that the state had so desperately sought to restore.

Summary Executions in the Late Qing

In a telegram to Washington, D.C., United States minister Conger conveyed his astonishment at the Qing government's "very stupid" secret trial and barbarous treatment of Shen Jin.⁶⁰ For a regime ostensibly committed to judicial modernization, the Qing government's handling of the case indeed appears contradictory. To fully comprehend the implications of this execution, it is imperative to revisit the operations of Qing law in the decision-making process, rather than merely adopting the predominant moralistic assessments that emphasized judicial harshness and procedural anomalies. In particular, one must consider the crucial legal context: the increasing prevalence of summary executions in the late Qing period.

When contemporary critics scrutinized the legality of Shen Jin's execution, they often overlooked the jurisprudential foundation upon which the definition of legality relied. During Shen Jin's trial in July 1903, the applicable Chinese law was the Great Qing Code (Da Qing lüli 大清律例), supplemented by judicial regulations (zhangcheng 章程) issued by the imperial court and provincial administrations.⁶¹ Given that Shen was a Chinese national apprehended on Chinese soil, analyzing this case necessitates reference to the existing Qing legal traditions. Case records from the First Historical Archives of China reveal that Shen was detained on July 19 following a secret imperial mandate and subsequently interrogated at the Board of Punishment. Wu Shizhao, Shen's neighbor and a former Qing official, facilitated the arrest by revealing Shen's whereabouts to the court. During the interrogation, Wu testified that Shen was indeed a fugitive implicated in the 1900 Independence Society uprising.⁶²

The court's official account of Shen's involvement with the Independence Society aligns with contemporary records compiled by Shen's friends. It chronicles Shen's initial tutelage under Liang Qichao and his subsequent flight to Tokyo following the collapse of the Hundred Days' Reform. In 1899, at Liang's behest, Shen returned to China and co-founded the Independence Society with Tang Caichang. Exploiting the tumult of the 1900 Boxer Uprising, this organization convened a congress in Shanghai and forged alliances with secret societies throughout the Yangzi River Valley to foment insurrection in Hubei. When Zhang Zhidong uncovered the plot, swiftly suppressed it, and summarily executed key Society members in Wuchang, Shen narrowly escaped, adopted a pseudonym, and went into hiding.

Importantly, the justification for Shen's initial sentence—immediate beheading as per the regulations (zhaozhang zhan lijue 照章斬立決)—is explicitly detailed in a memorial submitted by the Board of Punishment on July 28, 1903:

Under the established regulations (zouding zhangcheng 奏定章程) for punishing society bandits (huifei 會匪), any captured individuals holding significant positions within these organizations are to be summarily executed (jiudi zhengfa 就地正法), even if they have not personally disseminated seditious proclamations to incite rebellion. Once their identity is confirmed through interrogation, immediate action is warranted. In Shen Jin's case, he played a pivotal role in covertly establishing the Independence Society, as per Liang Qichao's instructions, with the objective of distributing the so-called "rich-mountain tickets" (fuyoushan piao 富有山票) [throughout the Yangzi River Valley] to provoke uprisings.⁶³ Although Shen did not directly distribute this propaganda, his foundational involvement in the Independence Society sufficiently identifies him as a leading society bandit (huifei toumu 會匪頭目), a grave offense justifying immediate execution by beheading (zhan lijue 斬立決), according to the regulations. Customarily, punishments are suspended during the sixth lunar month, but due to the severity of Shen's actions, the Board urgently petitioned for an exemption to carry out his execution immediately, as a deterrent to other potential rebels.⁶⁴

On July 31, an imperial edict instructed the Board of Punishment to replace the recommended sentence of immediate decapitation with "immediate execution by heavy bamboo strokes" (jiri libi zhangxia 即 日立斃杖下).⁶⁵ Notably, there are several inconsistencies between this case file and E. T. Williams's investigative report, which significantly influenced Western perceptions of the incident. Williams contended that the Board of Punishment proposed delaying the execution due to the upcoming birthday celebration of the empress dowager. Given that her birthday occurred in late November rather than August, however, Williams's account clearly contains inaccuracies.⁶⁶ It seems that he surmised this rationale based on a fragmented collection of evidence.

Contrary to Williams's speculation, the memorial itself contains no suggestions of postponing the execution date or altering the method of execution. Throughout the trial, Shen was consistently labeled a society bandit in accordance with Qing legal terminology, with immediate execution being in line with judicial regulations for dealing with such groups. The regulation cited in the memorial as the legal basis for Shen's sentence is the "Regulation for Strictly Punishing Society Bandits" (Yancheng huifei zhangcheng 嚴懲會匪章程).⁶⁷ Promulgated by Zhang Zhidong in October 1892 to sanction summary executions against burgeoning secret societies like the Gelaohui 哥老會 in Hubei, this regulation was later reviewed by the Board of Punishment for inclusion in the Compendium of Newly Ratified Regulations (Xingbu zouding xinzhang 刑部奏定新章), thus elevating it to imperial law status.⁶⁸ The regulation stipulates:

If society bandit leaders organize meetings, distribute seditious materials to recruit members, or hold significant positions within these societies, then even without direct involvement in propagating these materials, those found upon thorough investigation to have collaborated with sects, incited disturbances, or caused harm, shall, after their detailed confessions are recorded, be subject to immediate execution.⁶⁹

During the 1900 suppression, Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi invoked this specific regulation to conduct summary executions of Independence Society members. They continued this practice in subsequent years, targeting Society fugitives.⁷⁰ Liu Kunyi took particular interest in Shen Jin's case. He offered a substantial reward for Shen's capture and gave explicit instructions for his execution to be carried out far from foreign settlements to avoid international interference.⁷¹ This strategy proved effective when Shen Jin was eventually arrested and executed in Beijing in July 1903, consistent with the pattern of prosecuting Independence Society members under this legal provision.

Moreover, execution by heavy bamboo blows was not an anomalous deviation, as Williams had asserted, but rather a type of summary execution with precedent in Qing legal traditions. A sub-statute concerning "conspiring and inciting major insurrections" (moufan dani 謀反大逆) in the Great Qing Code stated that family members of sedition leaders would be enslaved to meritorious officials, and those attempting to flee would be "punished heavily (congzhong banli 從重辦理) as per the statute on runaway slaves."⁷² In the 1905 Duli cunyi 讀例存疑, an extensively circulated annotation of the Code, esteemed Qing jurist Xue Yunsheng 薛允昇 elucidated: "Although it did not specify the meaning of 'punish heavily,' the punishment prescribed in the original memorial [that ratified this sub-statute] was immediate execution by heavy bamboo blows" (jixing zhangbi 即行杖斃).⁷³

Evidence beyond statutory references supports the widespread use of this punishment in Qing judicial practices, particularly during the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864). In an effort to swiftly restore political and social stability, an 1853 imperial edict empowered provincial governors and local officials to execute rebels and bandits on the spot. This decree significantly expanded the geographical scope of authorized summary executions from Sichuan, Fujian, and Guangdong to the entire empire.⁷⁴ In 1853, for instance, as Zeng Guofan 曾國藩managed operations against Taiping insurgents in Hunan's Yongxing County, he instructed his subordinates to carry out summary executions of captured rebels using heavy bamboo blows:

To deliver a message of warning, these criminals must be executed on the spot. Since these culprits have habitually committed banditry, after considering public sentiment, I order their immediate execution with heavy bamboo blows (libi zhangxia 立斃杖下). Standard protocols need not be followed (bubi zhao xunchang banfa 不必照尋常辦法).⁷⁵

A native of Hunan, Zeng closely monitored rebellions in this region and vehemently endorsed the summary execution of rebels and society bandits to mitigate the risk of mutual cooperation among these groups. In an 1853 memorial, Zeng underscored the destabilizing potential of collusion between the Taiping rebels and the Tiandihui, a secret society active in southern China.⁷⁶ Later, in a separate memorial regarding bandits in Changsha, Zeng stated:

Now that thorough interrogations have yielded confessions and affidavits from these bandits, I shall use the provincial governor's banner (xunfu lingqi 巡撫令旗) to conduct summary executions.⁷⁷ One hundred and four will be immediately beheaded (zhan lijue 斬立決), two will face execution by heavy bamboo blows (libi zhangxia), and thirty-one will receive life imprisonment (jianbi yuzhong 監斃獄中).⁷⁸

It is crucial to recognize that the use of heavy bamboo blows for capital punishment was not merely an ad hoc wartime measure but was also present in relatively peaceful periods. As Hidemitsu Suzuki notes, in 1732 the Yongzheng Emperor formally recognized the legitimacy of this form of execution. The emperor stated in a vermillion-rescripted memorial that "both execution by heavy bamboo blows (zhangbi 杖斃) and immediate beheading (zhanjue 斬決) are equivalent to formal justice (tong zhengfa 同正法)."⁷⁹

During periods of relative stability, such as the High Qing era, heavy bamboo blows (zhangbi) were primarily employed against criminals like "villains" (e'gun 惡棍), bandits, rebels, or convicts who severely violated Confucian ethnics, including acts of striking one's grandparents.⁸⁰ This method was favored because it circumvented the lengthy and cumbersome process of transferring capital cases to higher authorities for review (jieshen 解審). This procedural review could take years and posed risks such as prisoner escape, recantation of confessions, and potential social unrest.⁸¹

The use of heavy bamboo blows in times of peace also served to control access to sensitive information. The Qing death penalty review system mandated extensive documentation through various bureaucratic levels, which could expose politically sensitive information to widespread scrutiny. In contrast, summary executions through heavy bamboo blows allowed for direct and confidential communication with the throne, ensuring the containment of sensitive details. This likely explains why Shen Jin's verdict appeared only in palace memorials and not in the Board of Punishments' routine memorials (xingke tiben 刑科題本).⁸²

While detailed guidelines for Qing officials in selecting methods of summary execution are not documented, the use of heavy bamboo blows appears to have been designated for less formal circumstances. In contrast, beheading served both as a summary execution method and as a formal sentence subject to the death penalty review process. Within this system, sentences of immediate beheading sometimes were commuted to suspended beheading until after the Autumn Assizes (zhan jianhou 斬監候).

The imperial decision to change Shen Jin's execution method from the initially recommended beheading to execution by heavy bamboo blows likely aimed to bypass the lengthy death penalty review procedures. Moreover, since beheadings were commonly performed by professional executioners in urban marketplaces, they would draw sizable crowds of spectators.⁸³ Given the public discontent with the Qing court in July due to the Subao case, a public execution of anti-Qing figures like Shen could have provoked heightened criticism from international observers—a scenario Empress Dowager Cixi was keen to avoid. Therefore, the imperial edict more likely indicated a preference for a swift and discreet resolution rather than cruelty per se. Two Republican-era political commentators (whose uncles were key figures in the Hundred Days Reform) offered this speculation about the empress dowager's reasoning: while she was determined to execute Shen, she worried that a public execution of a revolutionary might damage the reputation of the Xinzheng Reform, the sweeping set of modernizing reforms initiated in 1901 and an important means by which the Qing government sought to reassert its authority. According to these commentators, she therefore chose a more discreet approach that effectively amounted to assassination.⁸⁴

Examining the role of execution by heavy bamboo blows in Qing judicial practice enables a reappraisal of the claims concerning the court's motives in the Shen Jin case. While some Western observers and anti-Manchu critics argued that this method was chosen to maximize Shen's suffering, it is plausible that such narratives were amplified to fulfill their respective agenda, even if their private assessments were more nuanced. The Chinese revolutionaries likely recognized that the empress dowager's primary objective was to affect a swift and discreet execution, yet they deliberately depicted the method as exceptionally brutal to further their anti-Qing agenda. Similarly, Gu Hongming's defense of the Qing court—asserting that perceptions of pain and cruelty vary across cultures—was itself politically charged. As a result, their discussions all overlooked a more significant factor in this case: the pervasive use of summary executions as a fundamental aspect of late Qing judicial practice.

Domestic Debate over the Legitimacy of Summary Execution

Prior to the Taiping Rebellion, a tacit understanding existed between local officials and the emperor regarding summary execution. This method, considered an auxiliary form of capital punishment, was typically reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Its key advantage was its ability to execute swiftly and sometimes discreetly, circumventing the protracted and complex death penalty review process while limiting the disclosure of sensitive information. The purpose of employing this method was to complement rather than undermine the formal justice system. Within this framework, imperial bureaucrats endeavored to maintain a delicate balance between formal and informal practices of law in administering capital punishments, thereby optimizing efforts toward maintaining social and political stability. Both the emperor and provincial officials recognized that the overarching goal of justice administration was to preserve imperial rule, an aim that sometimes necessitated bypassing of the cumbersome death penalty review system. Occasionally, the emperor even perceived local officials' initiative in applying summary executions during exigent circumstances as indicative of their administrative acumen.⁸⁵

The delicate balance between central and local authority was upended during the Taiping Rebellion, as the imperial court vastly expanded provincial powers by granting provincial officials the right to conduct summary executions on an unprecedented scale. Though intended as a temporary measure to swiftly quell uprisings, the local implementations of this practice increasingly evaded imperial oversight. After the war, the imperial court endeavored to reinstate the death penalty review system, recognizing that continued reliance on summary executions could precipitate unchecked provincial power and erode imperial authority.

In 1882, three imperial censors petitioned the emperor, advocating for the curtailment of summary executions by provincial authorities. They cautioned that maintaining the 1853 Summary Execution Regulation would lead to an escalation in unjust capital sentences. One of the censors, Xie Qianheng 謝謙亨, argued that the 1853 regulation, having been specifically formulated for wartime conditions, should be contingent upon the presence or absence of armed conflict. He further proposed the abolition of summary execution throughout the empire, with two notable exceptions: Gansu, where "troublesome Hui people frequently cause disturbances" (chanhui shirao 纏回時擾), and Guangxi, where an ongoing military campaign against "Vietnamese bandits" (Yuenan tufei 越南土匪) was being conducted along the border.⁸⁶

Unsurprisingly, provincial governors resisted relinquishing rights over summary execution, citing endemic banditry and social unrest as justifications. In 1883, Ding Baozhen 丁寶楨, governor of Sichuan, opposed Xie's proposal to abolish summary execution. He argued that several factors made this reform impractical in Sichuan: the province's sparse population, rampant banditry, and ethnic diversity. Ding contended that these local conditions would make it easier for condemned prisoners to escape and hide during transfers for judicial review, while making it harder for officials to track them down. This situation, he claimed, would ultimately threaten the stability of Sichuan and its neighboring provinces.⁸⁷

Consequently, summary execution remained a significant aspect of late Qing law enforcement, particularly in Hunan and Hubei, partly influenced by Zeng Guofan's relentless approach during the Taiping era. Noteworthy instances include the 1892 summary execution of ten society bandits by the magistrate of Liling County for attempting to besiege the yamen, and the 1897 summary executions by the magistrate of Dong'an County and the prefect of Yongzhou of several society bandits plotting to infiltrate Guangxi.⁸⁸ The prevalence of secret societies in the two provinces provided Zhang Zhidong with a compelling rationale to persuade the imperial court in 1892 to adopt a new judicial regulation authorizing local officials to summarily execute society bandits.

Despite the imperial court's concerted efforts to reinstate the death penalty review system, the political instability of the post-Taiping era presented inherent challenges.⁸⁹ This system, designed to preserve the emperor's exclusive authority over the execution of imperial subjects, mandated that all death penalties be reported to Beijing for imperial review and approval.⁹⁰ To maintain imperial control across the vast empire, the system was imbued with complexity and formality, aiming to standardize judicial procedures and discipline officials throughout that process.⁹¹ While the mechanism functioned adequately during periods of relative peace and prosperity, prioritizing imperial authority over efficiency, the post-Taiping era's widespread displacement, pervasive poverty, armed conflicts, and escalating crime rates plunged many regions into a state of anarchy. In particular, the growing backlog of capital offenses severely strained government capacity in terms of manpower, revenue, and prison administration, compelling administrators to resort to the expedient practice of summary execution.⁹²

Additionally, the mass demobilization of troops following the Taiping Rebellion precipitated an influx of underemployed, itinerant males possessing military skills. Weiting Guo observes that the Qing government perceived these "roaming braves" (youyong 遊勇), who joined either local militias or rebel groups for sustenance, as a significant threat. The imperial court was particularly apprehensive about potential collusion between rebels, sectarian groups, and these wandering exsoldiers. Consequently, in 1882, the court expanded the purview of summary executions to encompass both "roaming braves" and "society bandits." Guo notes that the blurred boundaries between bandits and militia members engendered "a distinct culture of summary execution, which utilized extreme punishment on the one hand and extracted resources from the violence network on the other" in the late nineteenth century.⁹³

Strained by the Taiping crisis, the Qing court found it increasingly challenging to uphold the death penalty review system amidst social unrest and the burgeoning power of provincial authorities.⁹⁴ Beyond the reality of turmoil in the late nineteenth century, local officials who had experienced the expediency of bypassing imperial review in administering death penalties were reluctant to relinquish summary execution. In their justifications for employing summary execution, local officials readily adopted the discourse of unrest. For instance, three months before Shen Jin's execution, Chong-shan, the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang, summarily executed five criminals, including three involved in armed robbery and two society bandits. Chong-shan's justification echoed the common rationale voiced by provincial officials: "Fujian, nestled between mountains and the sea, is plagued by piracy. Following Japan's occupation of Taiwan, the collusion of local criminals and bandits, engaging in violence, murder, and robbery, has intensified. Their heinous crimes necessitated summary execution under existing regulations."⁹⁵ Likewise, local gentry and militia groups frequently employed summary executions in eliminating bandits and robbers in their localities.⁹⁶ As the twentieth century dawned, summary execution had become deeply embedded in the political and social fabric of China, evolving from a temporary military measure to a routine form of punishment for those identified as rebels, bandits, robbers, and perpetrators of major crimes.

Ironically, key proponents of Western-style judicial reforms, including Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi, were themselves staunch advocates of summary execution. As Han officials who had risen to prominence through their roles in suppressing the Taiping Rebellion, they had witnessed firsthand how effective summary executions could be in restoring socio-political order, and they had amassed considerable political power in the process. Thus, while the 1901 judicial reform they championed promised to align Qing laws with "modern" standards, these efforts concealed a darker reality: Zhang, Liu, and other provincial authorities were relying on mass executions as an expedient solution to rebellions. This contradiction resonates with the stark disparity between the judicial ideals propagated by Western powers and the reality of summary executions in regions under Western colonial influence.

Zhang Zhidong, in particular, was an ardent advocate for legitimizing summary executions. In the wake of the Taiping Rebellion, as the Qing court sought to curtail such practices, Zhang persistently opposed imperial policies, staunchly defending the necessity of summary executions to maintain local order. His consistent advocacy is exemplified by his 1882 memorial calling for the summary execution of bandits and his proposal, a decade later, to promulgate the "Regulation against the Gelaohui Society Bandits" (Gelaohui huifei zhangcheng 哥老會會匪章程).⁹⁷

Even during the Xinzheng reforms, Zhang's stance revealed a deep-seated skepticism, if not outright rejection, of Western perspectives on capital punishment. During the drafting of the New Qing Criminal Code (Da Qing xin xinglü 大清新刑律) Zhang advocated for the indiscriminate application of the death penalty to conspirators against the state, regardless of their position or rank. He maintained that such treasonous acts flagrantly violated the Confucian ethical imperative of absolute loyalty to the emperor and thus warranted capital punishment without exception. Responding to officials who challenged his draconian approach, Zhang insinuated that their leniency towards such transgressors was tantamount to harboring anti-Qing insurgents.⁹⁸

Political pragmatism consistently underpinned the strategic thinking of statesmen like Zhang Zhidong. The ostensibly contradictory initiatives to abolish extraterritoriality, endorse summary executions, and enact Western-style judicial reforms were in fact interlinked components of a comprehensive strategy. This multifaceted approach aimed to ensure political and societal stability, ultimately serving the singular goal of preserving Qing rule in China.

Prior to 1903, debates surrounding summary execution remained largely confined to internal discussions among Qing officials. The execution of Shen Jin and the subsequent outcry over Chinese judicial cruelty thrust this issue into the public spotlight. This heightened scrutiny intensified both national and international discourse regarding the legitimacy of such judicial practices. In April 1905, Shen Jiaben and Wu Tingfang, charged with revising the Qing Code, submitted two memorials advocating for the elimination of cruel punishments. The first memorial called for the abolition of extreme punitive measures, including death by a thousand cuts (lingchi 凌遲), public display of severed heads (xiaoshou 梟首), and posthumous execution (lushi 戮尸). Instead, they proposed limiting capital punishment exclusively to beheading, marking a shift toward more humane and efficient judicial practices.⁹⁹

In their second memorial, Shen and Wu addressed the widespread misuse of torture in criminal investigations. They specifically pointed to the excessive use of heavy and light bamboo blows, which often resulted in severe injury and even death of suspects during interrogations. They proposed to eliminate these corporal punishments from the new criminal code, advocating instead a transition to monetary fines to align with Western practices.

To preemptively counter potential resistance from conservative factions, Shen and Wu astutely referenced Zhang Zhidong's 1901 memorial on judicial reform. In this document, Zhang had mentioned that corporal punishment during trials violated the principles of humane governance. Specifically, Zhang advocated for the conversion of sentences of beating by heavy and light bamboo to imprisonment.¹⁰⁰ In so doing, Shen and Wu subtly reminded the throne that the idea of moderating corporal punishments originated from Zhang Zhidong himself, thereby adroitly countering conservative opposition to their proposals.

The Qing court ultimately adopted the recommendations put forth by Shen and Wu. Their memorials suggest that even within the Qing judiciary there was discontent with Shen Jin's execution by heavy bamboo blows. The absence of opposition in historical records may be attributed to apprehensions about confronting powerful conservatives such as Empress Dowager Cixi and Zhang Zhidong. Notably, at the time of Shen Jin's execution, Zhang Zhidong wielded considerable influence over judicial reforms, and even Shen Jiaben's appointment to revise the criminal code was secured through Zhang's endorsement.

The debate within the Qing court over the abolition of summary execution was a defining feature of the Xinzheng period, epitomizing a deep-seated contradiction in late Qing state-building efforts. This tension centered on balancing the suppression of revolutionaries with maintaining the integrity of the formal judicial system. In late August 1908, the new Department of Law (Fabu 法部), reorganized from the Board of Punishment, issued a decree prohibiting summary execution for ordinary theft cases.¹⁰¹ In November, however, a conflicting imperial edict instructed local officials to rigorously investigate overseas Chinese revolutionaries returning to China for insurrectionist activities: "When catching such bandits, promptly interrogate and execute them on the spot."¹⁰²

This imperial directive drew sharp criticisms from Les Temps Nouveaux (Xin shijie 新世紀), a Paris-based weekly initiated by overseas Chinese.¹⁰³ The magazine pointed out that summary executions were essentially tools for the Qing regime to exert a reign of terror. It cautioned moderate reformists against being deceived by the Qing court's facade of reform, which perpetuated a regime characterized by brutality and oppression. In a notable departure from the typical anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stance of Han Chinese nationalists, the magazine adopted the Western discourse of Chinese judicial barbarity:

The Qing court's liberal use of summary execution against the Boxer rebels tarnished China's international reputation with judicial brutality and inflicted a hefty financial burden on the Chinese populace. Their purported restoration of social order through summary execution was nothing more than a barbaric rhetorical disguise. Should Chinese revolutionaries ascend to power, would they be justified in summarily executing Manchu rulers like Zaifeng and Puyi?¹⁰⁴

Through this, the magazine effectively distinguished "China" from the stigma of "Chinese judicial cruelty," attributing such backwardness to the Manchu government.

The controversy surrounding summary execution intensified in the final years of the Qing dynasty, particularly as revolts spread across the empire. During this period, many provincial officials continued to employ the 1853 regulations to summarily execute so-called bandits. Paradoxically, even the outcomes of the Xinzheng modernization were utilized to further summary executions. In 1906, an uprising of miners and peasants along the Jiangxi-Hunan border prompted Zhang Zhidong to dispatch the Hubei New Army to suppress the insurrection, resulting in numerous instances summary executions.¹⁰⁵

In Guangdong, Governor-general Zhang Mingqi 張鳴歧, defying the Department of Law's opposition, authorized police to summarily execute robbers who resisted arrest. This decision provoked vehement criticism from constitutional advocates. In May 1911, the Shanghai-based newspaper Shishi xinbao 時事新報 published an editorial titled "On Summary Execution," arguing that Zhang Mingqi's stance undermined the constitutional principle of judicial independence from administrative powers. The editorial warned that such practices could lead to abuses of power by officials, thereby jeopardizing the Qing court's constitutional movement.¹⁰⁶

Constitutional scholar Tao Baolin 陶葆霖, writing in Fazheng zazhi 法 政雜志, a legal magazine established in 1911 by Chinese constitutionalists, documented the significant decline of the death penalty review system since the enactment of the summary execution regulation in 1853. Tao argued that local officials' refusal to relinquish their authority over death sentences, even at the onset of the Xinzheng era, demonstrated a reckless disregard for human life and violated human rights. Tao poignantly observed that the greatest threat to the constitutional movement emanated from within the Qing bureaucracy itself. In contrast to earlier Qing officials who had proposed merely limiting the practice, Tao advocated for the complete abolition of summary execution.¹⁰⁷

Despite the efforts of constitutionalists, summary executions continued unabated, and the late Qing judicial reforms ultimately failed, contributing to the dynasty's collapse in 1911. In its haste to gain Western recognition and end extraterritoriality, the Qing government implemented these reforms precipitously. Within two years of Shen's death, the Qing penal code underwent several major revisions, likely too rapidly to align with social realities.¹⁰⁸ Some new laws, borrowed from Western legal traditions, represented a stark departure from the Qing Code.¹⁰⁹ Paradoxically, these reforms, intended to address perceived flaws in Chinese law, may have inadvertently reinforced the practice of expedited justice in China. Following the 1905 abolition of the three cruel punishments, summary execution remained one of the few available methods for punishing serious crimes.¹¹⁰ The situation deteriorated further during the Republican era, as ongoing regional conflicts and an ineffective modern court system created fertile ground for the continued use of summary executions.¹¹¹

Conclusion

In 1907, E. T. Williams, whose report directed international attention to the brutality of Shen's execution, published a paper entitled "Witchcraft in the Chinese Penal Code." Addressing a Qing statute outlawing witchcraft, he noted: "The retention of these laws in the Chinese Code in spite of recent revision indicates for China a stage of culture similar to that which prevailed in Europe in the seventeenth century."¹¹² By this time, the Westernization of Chinese law had become an inexorable trend. Yet, even as Chinese reformers scrambled to align their legal system with Western standards—often at the expense of social realities—some international observers still deemed these efforts insufficiently radical.

The 1903 Shen Jin crisis underscored the profound challenge of late Qing judicial modernization. It highlighted the intense scrutiny under which Chinese and Japanese judicial practices were placed by powerful states that held the authority to grant "modern" or "civilized" status to one state and deny it to another. In areas under colonial influence, contradictions between judicial ideals and practices—such as summary execution—were magnified. These disparities were easily interpreted as unfitness or insincerity for judicial civility, leading to severe diplomatic and domestic consequences, although such contradictions were not unique to China.

Shen Jin's execution occurred amid critical negotiations by foreign diplomats regarding the extradition of Subao journalists. Before his death, foreign diplomats in Shanghai were almost ready to surrender the Subao journalists to the Qing government. Publicity surrounding Shen's brutal execution derailed the Qing court's plans, undermining its purported claim of transitioning towards a modern, civilized regime. This setback, occurring at a crucial moment, symbolically reduced the leverage that China had begun to accumulate through the Xinzheng judicial reforms. The international community celebrated the adjudication of the Subao case in the Shanghai Mixed Court as a triumph of Western humanitarianism over Oriental barbarism and as a demonstration of Western protection of Chinese revolutionaries. Meanwhile, Shen's execution served as a glaring example of the perceived cruelty inherent in Chinese law. This situation provided foreign powers with further justification to disregard the Qing court's claims over jurisdictional rights of Chinese nationals in foreign settlements and bolstered calls for the retention of extraterritoriality.

The Shen Jin crisis served as a painful reminder for Chinese reformists and revolutionaries of the grave consequences of maintaining the existing judicial system, underscoring the necessity for meticulous alignment with Western ideals of justice, civility, and modernity. The pressing need for reform accelerated drastic changes and eventually culminated in widespread uprisings across the empire. Despite China's relentless efforts to revise its judicial system in the ensuing decades, the specter of summary executions persisted, and the abolition of extraterritoriality did not materialize until World War II.¹¹³