NUS Press Pte Ltd
  • Understanding Public Perceptions of Chinese Law and the Legal System:Legal Experiences Matter

Over the past decade, Chinese law has undergone a considerable number of major reforms, ranging from the high-profile constitutional amendments to the implementation of multiple online platforms, which have significantly altered legal practice and the judicial process. While scholarly debate remains split over whether China is turning away from law or is becoming more legalistic, there is little empirical understanding of how Chinese law and the legal system are perceived by those most affected by it, namely the Chinese citizens. This article fills the critical gap by leveraging an original public opinion survey of more than 5,000 Chinese adults to examine their views on issues such as the importance of law and the status of legal development in relation to economic growth. The findings suggest that Chinese citizens with actual experience of the legal system—whether from study, practice or personal involvement in litigation—hold vastly different views on many of these issues from those without such experience. The findings also suggest that important policy initiatives introduced by the Chinese leadership and the judiciary, such as the emphasis on constructing a socialist rule of law and the potential introduction of some system of case law, may enjoy popular support.

INTRODUCTION

Writing in 2002, Peerenboom observed the following about the examination of Chinese law:

…most of the available accounts of the legal system failed to adequately reflect the changes in the actual role of law in Chinese society. Alarmingly, the dramatic theoretical shift toward rule of law and its potential political significance attracted [End Page 164] little notice in the Western press and academic literature. When the higher profile of rule of law was mentioned, it was generally dismissed as mere rhetoric.1

About a decade later, in 2011, China declared that a socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics had been successfully established.2 This was essentially a reference to the large number of laws passed since the "reform and opening up", effectively reconstructing a legal system from the chaos and ruins of the Cultural Revolution. The scope of this process included many of the fundamental institutions and branches of any modern legal system, from the re-establishment of the People's Court and the People's Procuratorate, to the codification of property law and tort law, and so on. The ensuing years showed little sign of any slowdown in the efforts of legal reform,3 as evidenced by substantive amendments to the existing pillars of the legal system, including the Constitution, the criminal, civil and administrative procedure laws, and the completion of the Civil Code in 2020. Equally importantly, numerous changes to the practice of Chinese law have taken place with minimal traces in the formal legislative agenda, such as the various public-access online platforms providing crucial information in relation to the judicial process.4

After 2011, however, English-language scholarship started to diverge considerably in its assessment of the status and direction of Chinese law, as to whether China is turning "against" law or "towards" law. While China was seen as marching towards the rule of law after the turn of the century,5 the 2010s raised fundamental questions about such a perception. Most notably, Minzner argues that the Chinese leaders were "turning against" law and that international scholarship should examine institutions beyond formal laws and regulations.6 Others argue that China had turned away from legal institutions because law was seen as destabilising,7 or that Chinese courts were [End Page 165] dependent on the Communist Party, allowing the Party discretion to arbitrarily determine judicial outcomes.8

Some scholars disagreed with such observations in general. Drawing on statistics such as the annual increase in the number of court cases, the amount of legal aid funding and the number of lawyers and law graduates, Chen argues that Chinese citizens can use and think about the language and discourses of law and legal concepts in "a brave new world".9 Zhang and Ginsburg argue that China has been actually turning towards law or becoming more "legalistic" in the Xi Jinping era; they also note that such differences in positions among scholars remained "impressionistic" rather than empirical.10

The existence of such polarised opinions may suggest a certain degree of information disparity between what is reported and discussed by media and scholars outside of China, as Peerenboom has initially observed, and what has influenced the work or lives of Chinese judges, lawyers and citizens on the ground. Crucial in this context is the scarcity of empirical examination of the understanding, knowledge and perception of law by ordinary Chinese, who are most affected by Chinese law and relevant legal reforms.

This study aims to address the empirical knowledge gap concerning the perception and understanding of Chinese law and the country's legal system among the Chinese citizens. To this end, an original survey of 5,201 Chinese citizens was conducted, collecting their views on a range of crucial legal issues. This strategy was not intended to leverage public opinion as a means of arbitrating between competing scholarly arguments, but rather it aimed to shed light on how ordinary citizens perceive key aspects of Chinese law, including its concepts, measures and systems.

Scholarship from democratic societies often outlines two primary channels through which public opinion can shape policymaking: selection and responsiveness.11 The selection mechanism pertains to the democratic practice of citizens electing leaders who align with their policy preferences, whereas the responsiveness mechanism refers to the incentive leaders have to heed public opinion during their tenure. While the selection mechanism might not be applicable in the Chinese context due to its political structure, the potential for a responsiveness mechanism is plausible. In authoritarian regimes, responsiveness to public opinion could stem from the need to maintain political legitimacy, rather than to mitigate electoral risks. Engaging the public in [End Page 166] decision-making processes can augment the procedural legitimacy of these regimes. This gives citizens a sense of participation and influence over policy decisions, which can strengthen the government's legitimacy.

Indeed, numerous China scholars have posited that the Chinese government's introduction of various "input institutions"—like the mayor's mailbox and public consultations—can be seen as efforts to legitimise the ruling party.12 The National People's Congress of China now routinely solicits public opinions on draft laws. The revised draft of the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, for example, garnered 125,962 opinions from 99,375 internet users in September 2023.13 Such platforms enable citizens to voice their concerns and grievances, contributing to the resilience and perceived legitimacy of the Communist Party of China.

In this context, the findings from the survey can provide critical empirical evidence that lays the groundwork for a deeper exploration of contemporary Chinese law and society. This evidence is instrumental in understanding the varied perceptions and attitudes of the Chinese populace towards their legal system. In turn, these insights can contribute to more nuanced discussions and analyses of China's legal landscape and its future trajectory.

SURVEY CONTEXT AND DESIGN

Compared to the extensive literature on public opinion regarding social and economic issues in China, fewer studies have investigated mass attitudes towards law. The lack of data explains why there is scant research in this area. As a result, scholars have had to rely on large cross-national surveys such as the World Values Survey14 and the Asian Barometer Survey,15 both of which cover questions related to law. One question that appears in almost every wave of these surveys is how much citizens trust the courts and other domestic institutions such as the National People's Congress and the police. Other relevant questions include perceptions of corruption in the [End Page 167] courts and views on the possibility that the courts can do anything about government leaders breaking the law. While these surveys have yielded valuable insights into public trust in legal authorities from a comparative perspective,16 researchers are constrained by their limited scope.

Some large-scale public opinion surveys conducted in China have also included modules on the legal system that are broader and more comprehensive. The most notable example is the 2015 wave of the China General Social Survey (CGSS), which dedicates an entire section to the legal system. With 29 questions formulated to cover topics on the implementation of the law, judicial supervision and the effectiveness of the courts, the survey provides rich data on citizens' evaluation of the performance of the legal system. However, surprisingly, there has not been much research output that utilises these data apart from some studies in Chinese-language journals.17 A possible reason is that despite the large number of questions in the CGSS, the survey questionnaire was predesigned and thus the research questions may not be of interest or relevance to scholars.

Given the limitations of these off-the-shelf surveys, some researchers have turned to designing their own original surveys. Michelson used a rural household survey on social conflicts and popular strategies in 37 Chinese villages to examine the impact of regional conditions and family resources on recourse to the official justice system.18 More recently, Wilking and Love conducted a conjoint survey experiment with an urban sample of 2,100 Chinese residents to examine whether instrumental or normative justifications motivate public support for the rule of law in China.19

The authors adopted a similar approach and designed an original survey in China.20 This survey is the first of its kind after the 2018 constitutional amendments and focuses on two distinguishable but related aspects of the respondents' knowledge [End Page 168] and opinion of Chinese law.21 The first aspect regards the general perception of the importance of law and the status of the legal system. The survey seeks to find out the perceived importance of law, the differences between the two fazhi (the two heterographs in Chinese for "legal system" and "rule of law" respectively), and the connection between economic prosperity and development of the law. The second aspect of the survey focuses on examining the Chinese public's support for the principles of case law or judicial precedent.

The authors administered the survey to 5,201 Chinese adults from 28 November to 8 December 2018. Survey participants were randomly drawn from an online panel maintained by a leading marketing research firm in China. As challenges abound in conducting survey research on the ground,22 participant recruitment through online panels has become an increasingly popular method for conducting research across a wide range of topics in China.23 It is worth noting that the COVID-19 pandemic broke out about 14 months after the survey, which could have changed people's perception of law and governance. Nevertheless, the timing of the survey was an opportune moment to capture insights into public sentiments following major events, such as the amendment of the Constitution. This survey is the latest and largest of its kind in the subject area, providing a perspective for future comparison where appropriate.

The survey respondents were from all 31 mainland provinces and municipalities. The demographic data of respondents are as follows: average age was 29.4 years old; 43.8 per cent were male; 71.3 per cent had college or advanced degrees; their median annual income was between RMB30,001 and RMB60,000; 43.5 per cent worked in the public sector, 30.9 per cent in private firms, 8.4 per cent in foreign firms or joint ventures, and the rest were not active in the workforce (e.g. students, retirees and unemployed).

Consistent with existing studies using online samples in China, the authors' sample of respondents was younger, more highly educated, financially better off and more likely to reside in coastal and urban areas. It is important to recognise that online [End Page 169] public opinion surveys have their limitations. Nevertheless, a recent study has shown that respondents in online surveys are much more representative of over one billion Chinese netizens.24 In the Chinese context and for the authors' purposes in this study, one could argue that, for the government, netizens' opinions matter even more than those of the general population.25

Another general issue of public opinion survey is social desirability bias, i.e. when survey takers provide responses to conform to societal norms and expectations.26 Such response bias could also arise in surveys related to political attitudes or behaviour, where respondents might feel pressured to "toe the party line".27 The authors believe that this issue is mitigated as questions in this survey have been carefully designed to avoid, as much as possible, obviously "politically correct" choices. There is also no discernible "official" position to most of these questions.

Furthermore, using survey data collected through a variety of channels and methodologies in China, researchers have found that not all citizens align with the prevailing government policies, nor do their views necessarily mirror state propaganda. Importantly, despite potential risks, they demonstrate a willingness to express their opinions.28 Indeed, the perceived anonymity offered by online surveys could be a significant factor encouraging individuals to share their genuine perspectives. For instance, two recent studies have demonstrated that, despite persistent government propaganda advocating armed unification, only a slim majority of Chinese citizens support such an approach.29

What makes this particular study both challenging and useful is the fact that it focuses on the subject of law, of which the majority of the population have little practical experience and knowledge. Indeed, slightly over half of the respondents (53.3 per cent) reported having "no relevant legal experience". However, the impact and outreach of legal systems are clearly not dependent on people having had relevant first-hand experience of dealing with the court or lawyers. Almost every respondent would have been exposed to concepts such as the "rule of law" or "the Constitution", [End Page 170] and their opinions and impressions—probably unrefined—are of interest to academics because they reflect the perception of Chinese law by those directly and indirectly affected by it. The essence of this article is not the analysis of the respondents' actual knowledge about Chinese law and legal principles, which will never be as extensive and coherent as that of the experts in current scholarship, but what the public think they know about the law.

More importantly and in recognition of the greater-than-usual challenges that such a highly specialised subject as the law has posed, this study is designed to examine the differences between the attitudes of Chinese citizens with and without experience of the legal system. This requires oversampling respondents with experience of the legal system to form meaningful and statistically significant comparisons and contrasts with those without such experience. Of the remaining 2,427 respondents, 158 (three per cent) identified themselves as "currently or previously employed in judicial and legal related jobs"; 472 (9.1 per cent) had "participated in judicial procedures (such as being the plaintiff or defendant of a case)"; 1,598 (30.7 per cent) had "assisted or discussed with relatives or friends involved in the judicial process"; 577 (11.1 per cent) had "participated in judicial procedures as part of their previous or current work"; and 380 (7.3 per cent) were students, researchers or scholars in law. These percentage points add up to more than 100 because respondents could have multiple experiences.

The remainder of this article presents the main findings from the survey, including overall patterns of the responses and analysis of the relationship between the survey responses and the respondents' legal experience as well as other socio-economic characteristics.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LAW AND THE NUANCES OF FAZHI

Bearing in mind the largely "impressionistic" position of scholars with regard to the importance of Chinese law,30 the findings of this survey shed light on the debate by highlighting the perceived importance of law for Chinese citizens. For the question, "What do you think of the importance of the socialist rule of law and the construction of the socialist legal system in our country today?", over 94 per cent said that it was "extremely important" (72.5 per cent) or "important" (21.8 per cent). Only 5.3 per cent of the respondents said that the law was "relatively important and should not be overlooked", while only 17 out of 5,201 respondents considered the law to be "not important" for China.

The fact that an overwhelming majority of the respondents regarded law as "important" or "extremely important" would not escape the attention of Chinese policymakers, who are known to take popular opinion into serious and careful consideration, consistent with the aforementioned idea of "responsive authoritarianism".31 [End Page 171] Given the emphasis on the importance of law and the Constitution in the institutional reforms of the Xi Jinping era, it would be costly and therefore highly improbable for the Communist Party's political discourse to "turn against" the Chinese public's resonating belief in the importance of law.

In relation to the general perception of the law's importance, a more specific issue is the differences accentuated between scholarly understanding, mostly those in English-language and in Chinese-language literature, of the two fazhi. Fazhi (rule of law 法治) and fazhi (legal system 法制) are two heterographic homophones in Chinese. Earlier scholarship in English often did not make any effort to distinguish between the two, even when referring to fazhi,32 although scholars have since explained the linguistic differences in detail.33 While both terms have deep roots in the history and development of contemporary Chinese law,34 English-language scholarship generally does not address the significance of any change from one fazhi to another, being unsure of the importance of terminology or implications beyond mere semantics. Such indifference is most noticeable in relation to the high-profile 2018 amendments made to the Constitution. While the 1999 amendments introduced the word fazhi (rule of law) for the first time, the 2018 amendments achieved numerical parity between the two words, by replacing one reference to fazhi (legal system) with fazhi (rule of law) in the preamble.35 Multiple articles in Chinese scholarship extensively pondered on this change of a single word as a major component of the 2018 amendments.36 In English scholarship, however, a detailed examination of these constitutional amendments would only mention the matter in passing, without any explanation of the context.37

Are Chinese citizens aware of the nuances distinguishing the two concepts? The answer is yes. Over 83 per cent of the respondents viewed these two fazhi as either "completely different" (18.9 per cent) or "related but substantively different" (63.6 per cent). This would suggest that the relevant constitutional amendment in 2018, while involving only one homophonic Chinese character, was significant. It is widely known that the Chinese Constitution does not describe or prescribe the forms and powers of governmental institutions and individual citizens, but instead signals political and [End Page 172] ideological changes.38 The Constitution is "programmatic" in nature, setting out aspirational ideals that are unlikely to be realised in the near future.39 Therefore, the change from "socialist legal system" to "socialist rule of law" is a vital sign. Thus, it is imperative for scholarship on Chinese law to begin critically examining such differences, which the overwhelming majority of the Chinese public evidently perceive as important, as this study shows.

The authors also asked respondents to evaluate whether the development of the legal system lags behind that of the economy or vice versa. Today, there is an established body of literature examining the relationship between China's economic growth and legal system. Different scholars dub this the "China problem" with respect to the "rights hypothesis" that economic growth requires a legal order,40 offering a new model or paradigm alongside the experience of other East Asian systems,41 or even requiring a fundamental rethink about the wisdom of the orthodox theory of law and economy.42 Nevertheless, the common view in this interpretation is that the Chinese legal system somehow "falls short".43

The findings of this survey would affirm such a perception empirically. More than half of the respondents (52.8 per cent) viewed the development of the law and legal system as lagging behind economic growth, with 7.7 per cent considering the difference to be substantial. Less than a third believed the two have developed equally (29.5 per cent), and even fewer perceived that the legal system has developed ahead of the economy (17.7 per cent); these findings thus affirm the long-held perception that the Chinese economy has developed ahead of its legal system. Relatedly, the authors also probed respondents' opinions on regional variation in legal development across China.44 Specifically, they asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement that regions with a more developed economy had better legal development. More than three times as many respondents agreed (74 per cent) than disagreed (23.7 per cent) with this statement. [End Page 173]

THE EMERGING CASE LAW SYSTEM

The notion that some system of "case law" will emerge in China has been around for more than two decades.45 There has been strong support for a system of case law or judicial precedent whose objectives are to promote judicial independence, develop the role of the constitution and rule of law, and improve the capabilities of the judiciary.46 Although scholars both inside and outside of China have expressed their views on how new systems such as "guiding cases" should be understood in legal study and practice,47 no extant study has examined whether the current approach by the Supreme People's Court, which is effectively to have a group of non-binding but highly influential guiding cases that are to be considered by all judges when they make judicial decisions, aligns with the Chinese public's understanding or expectation of the significance of existing court decisions.

This survey fills the research gap by gauging the level of support for case law among the Chinese public using the following question: "Suppose that in a short period of time (for example, within the same year), the same court hears two very similar cases one after another; how do you think the latter case should be affected by the previous case?". The authors provided five response choices that varied from strict use of precedence to no use. The first four response choices received increasing support: 11.8 per cent of the respondents agreed that the previous judgement should be strictly adhered to and similar cases should receive the same outcome; 17.6 per cent believed the previous case should be followed and the result should not be changed without good reason; 25.7 per cent thought the previous case could be publicly referred to in the court trial and judgement but the judge of the subsequent case could make a judgement independent of the previous case and 30.7 per cent held the opinion that the previous case could be referred to but there was no need to specify the impact of the previous case, and the judge of the subsequent case could make a judgement independently.

However, only 14.2 per cent of the respondents agreed that the previous case should not be referred to and the judge of the subsequent case should make an independent judgement in accordance with the provisions of laws and regulations. There appears to be low support for either strict use or no use of precedents, suggesting that the Chinese public are more comfortable with a hybrid model in which precedents can be referred to but need not be adhered to. [End Page 174]

DOES LEGAL EXPERIENCE MATTER?

Do respondents' experiences of the legal system influence their opinion, knowledge and understanding of the legal system in China? The authors employed statistical analyses to explore the relationship between the responses to the survey questions and the respondents' experiences of the legal system. The dependent variables were measured as follows. For questions with responses on ordinal scales, the authors coded them into four- or five-point scales whereby higher numbers indicate that the law is "extremely important"; that the legal system and rule of law are very different concepts; that the legal system lags far behind economic development; and that judges should not be using precedents when deciding subsequent cases. For regional differences, the authors transformed the responses into a binary measure, so that "1" indicates that the respondent agrees that regions with more developed economy also have better legal development.

For each of the dependent variables, the authors employed ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the ordinal measures (Y), and logistic regression for the binary measures (P), using the following two equations:

inline graphic

inline graphic

In both equations, the main independent variables were legal experience (Experience), coded as five dummy variables, each corresponding to one of the questions probing respondents' personal experience with the legal system, with the reference category being those without any experience of the legal system. Additionally, the authors included a battery of socio-economic control variables (X) in all of the models, including age, gender (dummy variable with "1" for male and "0" for female), education (nine-point scale from no schooling to doctorate degree), business type of employment (state, foreign and private), self-reported income (seven-point scale), socio-economic status (11-point scale from poorest to richest), and geographical location of residence (eastern, central and western). Summary statistics and a correlation matrix of the variables are presented in the Appendix.

Table 1. L E O C L L S
Click for larger view
View full resolution
Table 1.

Legal Experience and Opinions about Chinese Law and the Legal System

Table 1 presents the main findings, with each model corresponding to one of the five questions. Several patterns related to legal experience are noticeable. First, legal professionals and those who had been involved in legal proceedings, either personally or through family and friends, were less likely to consider the two fazhi to be different (model 2). They were also less likely to view the law as important for China (model 1). This could perhaps be interpreted as a sign of disillusionment stemming from their personal experiences within the system, suggesting that direct exposure to the realities of legal processes might temper one's views of the law. In contrast, law students and scholars exhibited a higher regard for the law. This is possibly due to their academic immersion and potentially more idealistic perceptions of the legal system. [End Page 176]

Second, having any experience of the legal system significantly shifted the respondent's perception, categorically ensuring that they perceived the legal system as less underdeveloped relative to the economy (model 3). In terms of the individual types of experience, being a current or former legal professional had the most significant impact on responses, as they are most likely to view the legal system as less underdeveloped or even more advanced in relation to the economy. This was followed by having personally been involved in legal proceedings, having studied law, having been involved in legal proceedings through work, and having been involved through personal connections, each with a decreasing yet still significant impact weight.

This is a highly significant finding in that members of the Chinese public who are more knowledgeable or legally involved have a more positive view of the development of the legal system in relation to the economy than those who are not so involved. Further studies may be needed to evaluate whether such a trend indicates (i) recent progress made by the legal system, (ii) that those more involved in it will be in a better position to know, or even (iii) that the development of the legal system is eventually catching up with the spectacular economic growth of the past few decades.

The significance of the impact of experience of the legal system on the perception of the development of law in relation to economic growth can be contrasted with the absence of any effect on the perception of regional differences (model 4). About three-quarters of respondents agreed with the statement that the legal system is more developed in more economically prosperous regions of China. Whether these respondents practised or studied law or had been involved in litigation had minimal influence on this perception.

Third, respondents with actual experience of the legal system, including professionals and those involved in litigation, were far more likely to support a more stringent system of applying or referring to cases (model 5). But the responses of law students and scholars did not differ from those of other members of the public, indicating that legal education or knowledge has little influence over the opinions on this matter. It would seem that the current efforts led by the Supreme People's Court to establish a system of case law are driven largely by legal practice but are also generally in line with the public's expectation that there should be a referrable but non-binding system of using existing judicial decisions.

The socio-economic control variables further highlight several observations. First, age, gender and education were significant predictors of responses to a majority of the questions. For example, younger, male, highly educated respondents viewed law as more important. Older male respondents were more supportive of case law.

Second, absolute and relative income has divergent effects. In models 1 and 4, only one of the coefficients for income and social status achieves statistical significance. In models 2, 3 and 5, when both coefficients are statistically significant, they have the opposite sign. For example, respondents with higher self-reported income believed that the concepts of the legal system and the rule of law are more different than similar; that the development of the legal system lags behind that of the economy; and that judges should pay less attention to precedents. Those respondents who placed [End Page 177] themselves in higher social status categories compared to their peers believed that the concepts of the legal system and the rule of law are more similar than different; that the development of the economy lags behind that of the legal system; and that judges should pay greater attention to precedents.

CONCLUSION

Two decades on from the observation by Peerenboom quoted at the beginning of this article and despite a flurry of English-language publications on the topic of Chinese law, there are surprisingly notable gaps between the accounts of the legal system in "Western" literature and the actual role of law in Chinese society. Even the most high-profile changes, such as constitutional amendments in favour of the rule of law, have been dismissed as mere rhetoric. The literature on Chinese law typically laments the stark differences between "law in the book" and "law in action".48 Yet there is little scholarly effort made to understand how the Chinese public view the state and development of Chinese law, based on their knowledge and experience of the legal system, which arguably is an important aspect of "law in action".

This article seeks to fill the gaps in the understanding of Chinese law in terms of how ordinary citizens view it, including their perceptions of the importance of law, the differences between the two concepts of fazhi (rule of law or legal system) and the relative state of the development of law as compared to the economy. In doing so, it provides an invaluable insight into how Chinese law is perceived and understood by those who are most affected by it.

Findings from this survey suggest that the Chinese public overwhelmingly regard law as important or extremely important. Most of them seek to distinguish between fazhi (rule of law) and fazhi (legal system). The authors also identify key differences between laypersons and those with legal and judicial experience. Any experience of the legal system, such as having studied law, having worked in a legal profession, or having been involved in legal proceedings, drastically influences their views. Those with experience or knowledge of the legal system are far more likely to hold a positive view of its state and development in relation to economic growth than those without such experience. Furthermore, their expectations about the role and importance of decided cases in legal proceedings seem to fall in line with the actual approach currently being implemented by the Supreme People's Court.

Overall, these findings open up new avenues for research into the understanding of Chinese law and raise new questions to be answered by future studies that consider the opinions and perceptions of the Chinese public. This study has shown that the Chinese public not only are accessible as an important source of opinions for rigorous studies on issues such as Chinese law and the legal system, but are also reasonably knowledgeable and conscientious about this subject matter. An understanding of what [End Page 178] the Chinese public think of Chinese law provides invaluable empirical knowledge that could be instrumental in advancing the ongoing academic debate about the evolving nature and direction of Chinese law in the past decade or so.

This article has also demonstrated that with an adequately large sample size, it would be feasible to classify and compare different groups, such as those with experience of the legal system, to develop further insights into the highly complex conundrum of Chinese law and legal practice. The authors anticipate that this article and future efforts would be able to address the gap between how Chinese law is discussed in academic literature and its actual role in Chinese society, as first identified by scholars some two decades ago.

Li Xiaojun

Li Xiaojun (xiaojun.li@ubc.ca) is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia and NYU Shanghai (on leave), as well as Non-resident Scholar at the 21st Century China Centre at UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy. He received his PhD in Political Science from Stanford University. His research areas are international political economy and international security, with regional foci on Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and North America.

Xu Lu

Xu Lu (lu.xu@lancaster.ac.uk) is a Senior Lecturer in Property Law at Lancaster University Law School. He obtained his PhD in Law at the University of Strathclyde. His research interests include English and Scottish land law, comparative property law and Chinese legal reforms.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors made equal contributions in the research and writing of this article. They are grateful to Gao Wei of Peking University for her invaluable support, to Lancaster University for funding the survey and to the editors and reviewers for their feedback that improved the piece. All errors or omissions remain the authors'.

Appendix

No description available
Click for larger view
View full resolution

Summary Statistics

No description available
Click for larger view
View full resolution

Correlation Matrix

Footnotes

1. Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March toward Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. xii.

2. State Council Information Office, "Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi falü tixi" (A Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics), 27 October 2011, p. 1.

3. Jacques Delisle, "Law in the China Model 2.0: Legality, Developmentalism and Leninism under Xi Jinping", Journal of Contemporary China 26, no. 103 (2017): 68–84.

4. Chen Lei, Liu Zhuang and Tang Yingmao, "Judicial Transparency as Judicial Centralization: Mass Publicity of Court Decisions in China", Journal of Contemporary China 31, no. 137 (2022): 726.

5. Peerenboom, China's Long March toward Rule of Law; Zou Keyuan, China's Legal Reform: Towards the Rule of Law (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

6. Carl Minzner, "China's Turn Against Law", American Journal of Comparative Law 59, no. 4 (2011): 978–84.

7. Benjamin Liebman, "A Return to Populist Legality? Historical Legacies and Legal Reform", in Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Sebastian Heilmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011).

8. Li Ling, "The Chinese Communist Party and People's Courts: Judicial Dependence in China", American Journal of Comparative Law 64, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 37–57; Zhang Qianfan, "The Communist Party Leadership and Rule of Law: A Tale of Two Reforms", Journal of Contemporary China 30, no. 130 (2021): 578–95.

9. Albert H.Y. Chen, "China's Long March towards Rule of Law or China's Turn against Law?", Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 4, no. 1 (2016): 26–7.

10. Zhang Taisu and Tom Ginsburg, "China's Turn toward Law", Virginia Journal of International Law 59, no. 2 (2018): 306–89.

11. Michael Tomz et al., "Public Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies", International Organization 74, no. 1 (2020): 119–43.

12. Andrew J. Nathan, "China's Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience", Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 6–17. For examples of such institutions in domestic and public policymaking, see Steven J. Balla, "Is Consultation the 'New Normal'?: Online Policymaking and Governance Reform in China", Journal of Chinese Political Science 22, no. 3 (2017): 375–92; Thomas Bernauer et al., "Could More Civil Society Involvement Increase Public Support for Climate Policy-Making? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in China", Global Environmental Change 40 (2016): 1–12; Chen Jidong, Jennifer Pan and Xu Yiqing, "Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China", American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 2 (2016): 383–400; Gregory Distelhorst, "The Power of Empty Promises: Quasi-Democratic Institutions and Activism in China", Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 4 (2017): 464–98; Li Xiaojun, "The Durability of China's Lawmaking Process under Xi Jinping: A Tale of Two Foreign Investment Laws", Issues & Studies 57, no. 1 (2021): 2150001.

14. Ronald F. Inglehart et al., eds., "World Values Survey: All Rounds –Country-Pooled Datafile Version" (Madrid: JD Systems Institute, 2014), at <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp> [1 October 2022].

15. See Asian Barometer, at <http://www.asianbarometer.org/> [8 February 2024].

16. For example, Lai Yung-Lien, Cao Liqun and Jihong Solomon Zhao, "The Impact of Political Entity on Confidence in Legal Authorities: A Comparison between China and Taiwan", Journal of Criminal Justice 38, no. 5 (2010): 934–41; Yang Qing and Tang Wenfang, "Exploring the Sources of Institutional Trust in China", Asian Politics & Policy 2, no. 3 (2010): 415–36; Wu Yuning, "The Impact of Media on Public Trust in Legal Authorities in China and Taiwan", Asian Journal of Criminology 9, no. 2 (2014): 85–101.

17. For example, Li Xiaofei, "Sifa xinren de eryuan jiegou ji qi Zhongguo hanyi" (The Dual Structure of Judicial Trust and Its Implications in China), Huanqiu falü pinglun (Global Law Review) (2019): 131.

18. Ethan Michelson, "Climbing the Dispute Pagoda: Grievances and Appeals to the Official Justice System in Rural China", American Sociological Review 72, no. 3 (2007): 459–85.

19. Jennifer R. Wilking and Gregory J. Love, "Why the Rule of Law? Experimental Evidence from China", Justice System Journal 41, no. 4 (2020): 360–78.

20. Given the nature of the study, the authors partnered with a leading law school in China that helped them navigate the administrative procedures both before and after the implementation of the survey.

21. The authors designed the questionnaire, taking into consideration the permissible boundaries set by law, policies and practice. For instance, it would be impractical to ask any questions that clearly pertain to sensitive and controversial issues, such as whether the respondent supports the removal of a term limit in the Constitution for the President of the People's Republic of China. There are many meaningful questions in the area of law about which the Chinese public can be asked for their opinion, as demonstrated in the authors' survey.

22. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Rory Truex, "Repressive Experiences among China Scholars: New Evidence from Survey Data", The China Quarterly 242 (2020): 349–75.

23. For example, Fang Songying and Li Xiaojun, "Historical Ownership and Territorial Disputes", The Journal of Politics 82, no. 1 (2020): 345–360; Li Xiaojun and Chen Dingding, "Public Opinion, International Reputation, and Audience Costs in an Authoritarian Regime", Conflict Management and Peace Science 38, no. 5 (2022): 543–60; Fang Songying, Li Xiaojun and Adam Y. Liu, "Chinese Public Opinion about US–China Relations from Trump to Biden", The Chinese Journal of International Politics 15, no. 1 (2022): 27–46.

24. Li Xiaojun, Shi Weiyi and Zhu Boliang, "The Face of Internet Recruitment: Evaluating the Labor Markets of Online Crowdsourcing Platforms in China", Research & Politics 5, no. 1 (2018): 1–8.

25. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

26. Anton J. Nederhof, "Methods of Coping with Social Desirability Bias: A Review", European Journal of Social Psychology 15, no. 3 (1985): 263–80.

27. Stephen P. Nicholson and Huang Haifeng, "Making the List: Reevaluating Political Trust and Social Desirability in China", American Political Science Review 117, no. 3 (2023): 1158–65.

28. Ilaria Mazzocco and Scott Kennedy, "Public Opinion in China: A Liberal Silent Majority?", CSIS Report, 9 February 2022, at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/public-opinion-china-liberal-silent-majority> [31 October 2023].

29. Qi Dongtao, Zhang Suixin and Li Shengqiao, "Urban Chinese Support for Armed Unification with Taiwan: Social Status, National Pride, and Understanding of Taiwan", Journal of Contemporary China 32, no. 143 (2023): 727–44; Adam Y. Liu and Li Xiaojun, "Assessing Public Support for (Non)Peaceful Unification with Taiwan: Evidence from a Nationwide Survey in China", Journal of Contemporary China 33, no. 145 (2024): 1–13.

30. Zhang and Ginsburg, "China's Turn toward Law", p. 295.

31. Runya Qiaoan and Jessica Teets, "Responsive Authoritarianism in China", Journal of Chinese Political Science 25, no. 1 (2020):139–53.

32. Ronald C. Keith, China's Struggle for the Rule of Law (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), p. 1.

33. Peerenboom, China's Long March toward Rule of Law, pp. 63–4; Deborah Cao, Chinese Law: A Language Perspective (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 35–43.

34. Lu Xu, "The Changing Perspectives of Chinese Law: Socialist Rule of Law, Emerging Case Law and the Belt and Road Initiative", Chinese Journal of Global Governance 5, no. 2 (2019): 157–60.

35. Ibid., p. 158.

36. Cong Lin and Qi Haojian, "Cong jianquan shehuizhuyi fazhi dao jianquan shehuizhuyi fazhi" (From "Improve the Socialist Legal System" to "Improve the Socialist Rule of Law"), Fazhi bolan (Legality Vision) 35 (2018):117–8; He Qinhua and Qi Kaiyue, "Fazhi biancheng fazhi: xianfa xiugai tuijin shehuizhuyi fazhi jianshe" (Legal System Became Rule of law: Constitutional Amendments Propel the Construction of Socialist Rule of Law), Shandong shehui kexue (Shandong Social Science), no. 7 (2018): 5.

37. Lin Feng, "The 2018 Constitutional Amendments: Significance and Impact on the Theories of Party-State Relationship in China", China Perspectives 2019.1 (2019): 11–21.

38. William C. Jones, "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China", Washington University Law Quarterly 63 (1985): 707–35.

39. Peerenboom, China's Long March toward Rule of Law, p. 61.

40. Donald Clarke, "Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem", American Journal of Comparative Law 5, no. 1 (2003): 89–111.

41. Peerenboom, China's Long March toward Rule of Law.

42. Frank Upham, "Lessons from Chinese Growth: Rethinking the Role of Property Rights in Development", in The Beijing Consensus: How China has Changed Western Ideas of Law and Economic Development, ed. Chen Weitseng (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 139–40.

43. Yao Yang and Linda Yueh, "Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China: An Introduction", World Development 37, no. 4 (2009): 756.

44. Cai Yongshun and Yang Songcai, "State Power and Unbalanced Legal Development in China", Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 42 (2005): 117–34.

45. Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 284–5.

46. Zhang Qi, Zhongguo sifa xianli yu anli zhidao zhidu yanjiu (Study on Chinese Judicial Precedents and the Case Guidance System) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2016).

47. Hu Yunteng and Yu Tongzhi, "Anli zhidao zhidu ruogan zhongda yinan zhengyi wenti yanjiu" (Examining Several Major, Difficult or Controversial Issues of the Case Guidance System), Faxue yanjiu (Chinese Journal of Law) (2008.6): 3; Bjorn Ahl, "Retaining Judicial Professionalism: The New Guiding Cases Mechanism of the Supreme People's Court", The China Quarterly 217 (2014): 121–39.

48. Chen Jianfu, "The Transformation of Chinese Law—From Formal to Substantial", Hong Kong Law Journal 37 (2007): 738.

Share