Migratory Pastoralism, Herders-Farmers Conflicts, and the Ruga Settlement Policy in North Central Nigeria

ABSTRACT

North Central Nigeria has experienced a series of deadly conflicts between Fulani herders and farmers. Contestation over ecological space and natural resources, prompted by climate- induced drought, has promoted a migratory form of pastoralism. The influx of Fulani herders in the region has triggered deadly eco-related conflicts between the host communities and the Fulani herders. Consequently, the RUGA settlement policy was unilaterally introduced to prevent migratory pastoralism, including, among others, to provide an immobile or stationary system of pastoralism in the host communities. This paper explains why and how host communities opposed the RUGA settlement policy in North Central Nigeria. As a significant contribution to the literature, its findings align with some theories that inform the possibility of host communities’ resistance to top-down government policies, some of which are highlighted as implementation barriers to the RUGA settlement scheme. The paper acknowledges the relevance of participatory, inclusive, and consensus-based conflict resolution strategies, particularly at local community levels.

INTRODUCTION

Since the Industrial Revolution, humanity has evolved into the changing era that is revolutionizing the Earth’s surface (Mgbemene 2011; Djoghlaf 2009; Rehan and Nehdi 2005). People’s demands on the planet’s natural resources have reached a tipping point. The expectation of sustaining the needs of future generations is uncertain (Djoghlaf 2009; Martinez 2005). The causes of climate change revolve around the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere. These are directly linked to the increased use of fossil fuels like natural gas and oil. Human intervention causing climate change has been inevitable as far back as the Industrial Revolution. Yet the atmosphere is a global space where those who have not profited from industrialization have inadvertently become the partakers of climate-change-related problems, making it a global challenge (Dodds and Sherman 2009). A resultant effect of climate change is increasing migration and competition over scarce resources, leading to social conflicts (Agnew 2012). Conflict will likely continue due to struggles for human survival, migration, and territorial possession rights (White 2018). The threats associated with changing climatic conditions influence millions of vulnerable households to migrate for a better livelihood and human safety (Warner et al. 2013).

Human migration has been linked to environmental challenges (El-Hinnawy 1985). Emerging scholarly research has considered whether the phenomenon of human migration could be regarded as a coping strategy or adaptation to climate change (Warner et al. 2013). It has been argued that environmental factors play a fundamental role in human migration (Jäger 2009) because some groups of people are more vulnerable to environmental problems than others, including pastoral-ists, herders, fishermen, farmers, and others who depend on weather and natural resources for their livelihoods (Betts and Pilath 2017). Conventionally, mobility has been attributed to a pastoralist occupation, especially regarding searching for grazing land and water, which have been considered traditional values of pastoral communities from time immemorial. However, environmental degradation and climate change have negatively affected this chosen way of life. Climate change has therefore conditioned pastoralists to choose a mobile strategy for the purpose of seasonal migration. Mobility in search of grazing lands and water has often overstrained the host communities. As a result of competition over scarce resources, violent conflicts have occurred, leading to deaths, insecurity, cattle rustling, economic interruption, and a collapse of social arrangements (Njiru 2012). Moreover, Rafael Reuveny (2007), Jon Barnett and W. Neil Adger (2007), and Rob White (2009) envisaged a potential social conflict between indigenous and climate- induced migrants, especially regarding competition over natural resources. Regions like the Horn of Africa, South America, and Central America, with reference to countries like India, Bangladesh, Kenya, Burkina-Faso, Ghana, Mali, Somalia, Niger, and Nigeria, have all witnessed such conflicts of survival between climate-induced migrants and their host communities (Hall and Farrall 2013; Reuveny 2008; Adnan 2004; Benjaminsen et al. 2009).

In Nigeria, such conflicts have been associated with resource competition between host communities (farmers) and Fulani pastoralist migrants (Brzoska and Fröhlich 2016). As a result, the federal government proposed a Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) settlement policy to address the incessant conflicts between the farmers and Fulani herders. This policy is aimed at discontinuing the traditional seasonal migratory pastoralism system. However, the proposition witnessed mixed reactions between the federal and state governments. Some states, especially in the north, agreed to accommodate such an initiative, while the policy experienced a massive revolt in several other states, including the North Central and southern regions of Nigeria. Although the introduction of the RUGA settlement policy was pigeonholed as a conflict resolution mechanism to address the seasonal migration of Fulani pastoralists to host communities in Nigeria, the policy has elicited a range of responses from the local communities.

This paper explains the various implementation barriers that thwarted the RUGA settlement policy in Benue State. Notably, the article is not intended to examine the herders-farmers’ conflicts in and of itself. Instead, it explains why and how host communities opposed the RUGA conflict resolution policy. Thus, the scope of the study is limited to the implementation barriers. The study demonstrates that, despite the intended benefits of the RUGA settlement policy, the non-democratic approach employed by the federal government, coupled with sociocultural, constitutional, and political complexities, hamstrung the success of the RUGA settlement policy in Benue State. Moreover, the communication gap between the federal and sub-national governments, a lack of information, community exclusion, and destructive historical references from similar previous policies, reinforced by local sensitivity and ethnic distrust, led to the policy’s failure. Previous experience in other states where such a policy was implemented resulted in land grabbing, expansion, and the dominance of Fulani migrants, strengthening the hostility toward the policy. Additionally, one of the host communities’ main concerns is where the land for RUGA will come from, as the host communities, primarily farmers, have already occupied the existing land for commercial farming in Benue State. This article emphasizes the relevance of accommodating local actors and relevant stakeholders in public policies. The level of community participation determines the acceptance and sustainability of such a program.

Area of Study and Methodological Design

This paper focuses exclusively on an empirical study that was conducted during independent fieldwork in Benue State, North Central Nigeria. Benue State’s population is 4,253,641. It has twenty-three local government areas. Benue State was selected for the study due to its vegetational richness, and it is considered the “food basket of the nation.” Its abundance of grassland makes the region a point of attraction for Fulani pastoralist migrants. An additional rationale behind the selection of Benue State was that it had suffered most of the attacks perpetrated by the Fulani herders and the host communities. Interviews were conducted between June and August 2020. Thirty-eight relevant stakeholders were interviewed in Benue State. The respondents included three members of civil society organizations (CSOs), six religious leaders, two traditional rulers, two political office holders, four farmers, two labor union leaders, four educated elites, six public servants, two chief security officers, two women leaders, three community leaders, and two youth leaders. The consent of all the interviewees were obtained before the interviews were conducted.

Among the critical questions posed to respondents include, what do you understand about the RUGA settlement policy, and what are your concerns about the policy? Were the communities and relevant stakeholders consulted before the federal government proposed the RUGA settlement policy? Do you support the implementation of the RUGA settlement policy in Benue State? Why? If the RUGA settlement policy is implemented, what would be the impact in Benue State? What shapes your interests in adopting or opposing the RUGA settlement policy in Benue State? What will you benefit from accepting or rejecting RUGA settlement policy? What are the reasons behind the rejection of the RUGA settlement policy in Benue State? All interviews and conversations were recorded and subsequently transcribed for data analysis purposes. Consequently, all the interviewees were anonymized for security and ethical reasons.

CLIMATE CHANGE: MIGRATORY PASTORALISM AND CONFLICT NEXUS

A plethora of studies have recognized the palpable tension between climate change–induced drought, pastoral migration, and conflict (Scheffran and Battaglini 2011; Schilling et al. 2014; Scheffran, Akumo, and Schilling 2014; Raleigh 2010; Omolo 2010). Understanding migratory pastoralism more deeply is crucial before addressing the intersectionality between climate change, migration, and conflict. Migratory pastoralism is characterized by a mobile method of animal rearing. It also represents how herd animals integrate into mobile pastoralists’ social and symbolic worlds (Honeychurch and Makarewicz 2016). The pastoralists, with their families, often follow grazing routes dictated by seasonal climates (Majok and Schwabe 1996). In other words, migratory pastoralism involves living in a multi-seasonal or cyclical location as opposed to committing to a permanent one. The pastoral nomads migrate about in predetermined areas seeking pasture for their domesticated animals, depending on the availability of domesticated livestock. Since pastoralists are generally mobile, climate change is likely to affect their migration patterns, dictating their movement across seasonal cycles.

Historically, African conflict has been primarily driven by ethnicity (Bah 2005). However, natural resources, including diamonds and oil, are often at the heart of contemporary African conflicts (Bah 2020) and resource-based conflicts are increasing due to climate change. The agro-pastoralist conflicts witnessed in some African countries, such as Uganda, Niger, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Burkina-Faso, and Ghana, result from resource scarcity and resource control reinforced by droughts, which are responsible for short-term and long-term migration (Bah 2020; Gray and Mueller 2012). Competition over access to grazing lands and water has been the primary driver of conflict between farmers and pastoralists in Africa. Pastoralists in particular have been faced with climate change–related problems (Soeters 2017).

While the nexus between resource competition and conflicts have been established in the past (Homer-Dixon 1991), evidence supports the claim that climate-change-induced drought can worsen existing fragile states, making them more prone to conflicts (Werz and Conley 2013). Undoubtedly, climate change can be responsible for instability, leading to the migration of people (Homer-Dixon 1991). There is also the possibility that climate change exacerbates the existing high level of poverty, conflict, and ethnic distrust between communities and states (UN General Assembly 2009). Such an argument is currently being validated in some African nations where the challenge of drought has led to the forced migration of Fulani pastoralists, seeking greener pasture to feed their herds. The encroachment of the herders on the farmlands has consequently sparked the pastoralists-farmers conflict in Africa (Adepoju 1995; Baker and Aina 1995). In a study carried out in East Africa between 1990 and 2009 (looking at Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Somalia, and Eritrea), scholars argued that there is a close relationship between climate change, migration, and conflict (O’Loughlina et al. 2012).

Resource competition between different ethnic groups is expected to increase conflict risks. For instance, competition over grazing land and access to water in the Nadapal Belt has been considered to be responsible for the conflict between Toposa in southern Sudan and Turkana in northern Kenya, which has resulted in the death of more than twenty people (Eulenberger 2013). In the absence of effective policies, adopting a traditional mechanism (such as migratory pastoralism) to preserve pastoral livelihoods has become unsustainable. In Africa, the traditional approach to settling these conflicts has become inadequate to promote peaceful coexistence between herders and farmers in light of new environmental challenges. This is coupled with increasing and more mobile populations, soil degradation, and limited land for grazing (Akov 2017).

Even though climate change is considered a “threat multiplier” (Evans 2008), some schools of thought have argued that it is difficult to establish a direct link between climate change and conflict in a real sense (Benjaminsen et al. 2012). These scholars claimed that the relationship between changing temperatures, rainfall, and violence is not that simple. This perspective vocalized that it is fundamental to exercise caution when arguing a direct relationship between climate change and conflict (von Schorlemer and Maus 2014). Nevertheless, Nancy Omolo et al. (2017) argue that climate change-related conflict is responsible for the major security threats across the globe. As argued by Caroline Varin (2020), the devastation caused by climate change events coupled with ineffective intervention of the state served as crisis enablers, which were exploited by terrorist groups in the Lake Chad region. Corroborating this view, Reuveny (2007) postulates climate-related mobility/migration can result in conflict. Evidence from Darfur in eastern Sudan demonstrates how climate change can trigger conflict (Faris 2007). The reduction in rainfall in the early 1990s aggravated resource competition between farmers and nomadic tribes. The crisis between the two groups has claimed the lives of approximately 200,000 people, while more than one million have been displaced (International Crisis Group 2007). The incessant conflict between the pastoralists and farmers, triggered by drought and migration in many countries, indicates climate change and conflict correlations.

Herders are known to be seasonal migrants. They often travel far to seek greener pastures and water for their herds. Pastoralist communities have been highly vulnerable to climate shocks due to their low technological capacity to deal with the challenge of climate change. It is a system of animal rearing whereby the climatic condition directly influences pastoral mobility (Pratt, Le Gall, and de Haan 1997). In the case of climatic shock, migration to a region with adequate water and grassland is inevitable (Li 2007). Archaeological confirmation and historical evidence have established pastoralist migration in Eurasia due to climate change–induced drought (Alekseev et al. 2005). For example, early pastoralists migrated from the steppes of Central Asia and Mongolia to China (Bai and Kung 2011). Similar evidence from the Central Africa Republic (CAR), Cameroon, Niger, and Chad shows that pastoralists have embarked on transnational migration to sustain their livelihoods (Akov 2017).

Another perspective argues that the lack of regulation by government agencies, such as immigration to monitor the movement of foreign pastoralists into the country, often adds to the population of indigenous pastoralists. It can become difficult to identify foreign and local pastoralists due to their similar language and culture. Experience from Nigeria justifies such an argument. For instance, in 1973, the Sahelian region witnessed drought, which triggered the mass exodus of Hanagamba Fulani pastoralists from Niger to Nigeria. Their migration resulted in competition over inadequate natural resources such as water and grazing lands (Allison 2019).

Given the analysis in this section, it can be argued that climate change serves as a major determinant of pastoral migration (Galvin 2009). Of particular concern is the mobility of pastoralists, which often necessitates encroachment on farmlands, and the contamination of water sources by their herds, which has been considered one of the major drivers of conflict between pastoralists and indigenous host communities (Shittu, Galtima, and Yakubu 2016). The following section provides an overview of the clashes between Fulani pastoralists and farmers in Benue State.

HERDERS-FARMERS’ CONFLICTS AND RUGA SETTLEMENT POLICY

Benue is one of the states that is blessed with a fertile and suitable geographical landscape in Nigeria. Due to its ecological opulence, especially for agriculture, the state has been christened the “Food Basket of the Nation.” The fertile landscape has attracted an influx of Fulani pastoralists from the core northern region and the Sahelian neighboring countries, such as the Republic of Niger, Mali, and Chad (Akighir, Ngutsav, and Asom 2011). Several other factors have added to the massive migration of Fulani herders to Benue State. For example, the existing grazing reserves designated for the herders have been annexed for urban infrastructural development in many states across the country, forcing Fulani herders to look for grazing land elsewhere. Additionally, contemporary security challenges such as the Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, and cattle rustling in other northern states have also contributed to interminable migration toward the North Central and southward (Ojo 2020a).

It has been claimed that more than 64,750 cattle were stolen from Fulani herders in 2013, while 2,991 were killed by bandits and cattle rustlers in the North Central region (International Crisis Group 2017), which comprises Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, the Plateau, and the Federal Capital Territory. These occurrences are common in remote villages or ungoverned areas where security personnel are scarce (Ojo 2020a). Moreover, informal security networks formed by communities and backed by the government exacerbate the conflict’s complexity. Several vigilante groups, such as Yan Banga, Yan Sa Kai, and Kato da Gora, have been accused of unlawful arrests and unjust killings of cattle rustlers. Such illegal executions have sparked retaliatory attacks in several communities. For example, cattle rustlers, also known as bandits, killed 1,135 people in Zamfara between 2011 and 2015. They have also been accused of extorting money and cattle from herders. Such an unlawful demand for cash is frequently considered a protection levy, culminating in informal taxation in a predatory ecology (International Crisis Group 2017). The inability of the government to safeguard the livelihoods of the herders from the cattle rustlers and bandits has provided an opportunity for them to adopt self-defense mechanisms. These include bearing arms and ammunition such as AK47s to protect themselves and their livestock against unforeseeable threats. It has been claimed that the political class often hire Fulani herders to manage their herds and provide arms for their protection. Therefore, political office holders have been attributed as suppliers of arms and ammunition to Fulani herders (Bagu and Smith 2017).

In the past, herders and farmers had a symbiotic relationship in Benue State and across the country (Bagu and Smith 2017). However, the recent herders-farmers’ conflicts that have emanated due to competition over ecological space have affected peaceful coexistence in the state. Allegations against Fulani pastoralists often revolve around the encroachment of farmlands and destruction of crops. Because cows, being what they are, do not differentiate grass from crops, the farmers’ cultivated crops become feed for them. Any attempt by the farmers to safeguard their farmland is usually visited with overwhelming terror (Ojo 2020a, 18). Villagers were captured and killed in many instances, and the herders raped their women. Between 2012 and 2021, more than 137,000 people and one hundred security personnel have been killed in Benue State alone, and many have been displaced, sojourning in IDP camps across the state (Sahara Reporters 2021). The conflict has spread to nearly all of Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones (North East, North Central, North West, South West, South East, and South South).

Some of the reprisal attacks perpetrated by the Fulani herders against the host communities resulted from the cattle theft and aggression committed by the host communities against Fulani pastoralists. The Miyyeti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), the umbrella body of Fulani pastoralists in Nigeria, claimed that more than 10,000 pastoralists had lost their lives and more than four million cattle had either been killed unlawfully or stolen. At the same time, over two million Fulani pastoralists have been displaced in Nigeria (Ripples Nigeria 2022). Therefore, the conflict exacerbates and threatens the unity and coexistence of diverse ethnic groups in Nigeria (International Crisis Group 2018; Akinrefon 2021).

Recently, the conflicts seem to have mutated into a series of criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom, perpetrated mostly by Fulani herders (Sahara Reporters 2021). This assumption has been challenged by many prominent individuals, tagging such criminality as ethnic profiling. Nevertheless, the traditional supreme authority in northern Nigeria, Sultan of Sokoto, has claimed that “seven out of every ten kidnappers arrested are Fulanis, but that doesn’t mean every Fulani is a criminal” (Sahara Reporters 2021).

Figure 1 depicts the number of deaths in Benue State between 2012 and 2019. At the beginning of the herders-farmers’ conflicts in Benue, fifty-one deaths were recorded in 2012, with deaths rising in 2013 (190 deaths), 2014 (241 deaths), 2015 (262 deaths), and 2016 (537 deaths), before falling again in 2017 (121 deaths), 2018 (220 deaths), and 2019 (29 deaths). Based on these figures, it can be established that 2016 recorded the highest number of deaths. These attacks were carried out in remote villages and urban centers, including places of worship, such as churches and farms. Furthermore, one of the common strategies used by the attackers is to arrive at night when the villagers are asleep, making it difficult for them to defend themselves (Ojo 2020a).

Figure 1.

Analysis of the number of people killed in the host communities in Benue (2012–19).

The lethality and belligerency of the Fulani-farmers conflict has led to the proclamation of an anti-open grazing bill by the Benue State government that restricts Fulani pastoralists from grazing openly within communities (Ojo 2020b). Following the declaration, both the South West and South East regions followed suit to restrict herders from grazing openly. It is believed that this approach will prevent encroachment on farmlands (Omorogbe 2021; Punch 2021), which will be addressed in the next section.

RUGA Settlement Policy as a Conflict Resolution Strategy

The federal government proposed a RUGA settlement policy in July 2018 to address the challenges posed by the climate-induced drought that has played a crucial role in the herders-farmers’ conflicts, resulting in relentless killings (Ojo 2020b; Ele 2020). The word RUGA is derived from the Hausa language, meaning cattle encampment (Waters-Bayer and Taylor-Powell 1986). The RUGA settlement policy may provide an opportunity for pastoralists to eschew the traditional approach in managing herds based on migration from one place to another in search of grazing pastures, instead practicing “a settled form of pastoralism” with the provision of a grazing area and accommodation for their families (Adebayo 2019). It is intended to create an opportunity for modern pastoralism that can increase productivity and holistically address seasonal migration and conflicts, allowing the herders to feed their animals and produce their dairy milk in a location designed for such purposes (Adebayo 2019). Such an initiative is considered a political process targeted at addressing social, economic, and ecological dilemmas. However, group and personal interests remain major concerns (Wolff 2004). In this context, the various social and political actors often require developing conflict resolution initiatives to respond to divergent interests (Apipalakul, Wirojangud, and Ngang 2019). Therefore, it is essential to acknowledge that community inclusion and participation in conflict resolution initiatives are upheld (Apipalakul, Wirojangud, and Ngang 2019).

The initial plan requires that all thirty-six states in Nigeria each provide 15,000 hectares of land to implement the policy (Apikins 2020). States that have agreed to implement the proposed RUGA settlement policy include Zamfara, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Taraba, Nasarawa, Sokoto, Kogi, Plateau, Adamawa, and Kaduna (Olokor 2019). However, Benue State in North Central Nigeria, which is the focus of this study and the epicenter of the Fulani/farmers conflict, has experienced a massive revolt against the RUGA policy. Even though the conflicts have claimed many lives and properties, the RUGA policy has witnessed massive opposition from the indigenous communities in Benue State (Wantu 2019).

HOST COMMUNITIES AND THE RUGA SETTLEMENT POLICY

Under the 1978 Land Use Act and as established by the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the land within the jurisdiction of each state belongs to the state, and the power to allocate such land is vested in the hand of the governor of the state. This clause makes it difficult for the federal government to authoritatively allocate land to the Fulani herders in the host communities (Sahara Reporters 2019). Based on this provision, the federal government must seek approval from the state before the land can be allocated for RUGA settlement. As suggested by the federal government, each state must provide 15,000 hectares of land, and the federal government will finance the necessary infrastructure. One fundamental question that needs to be considered is whether there is existing land that has not been occupied by members of the host communities, predominantly farmers, that can be allocated to such a settlement. According to a political office holder, he claimed that:

More than 90 percent of the land has already been occupied by agrarian farmers, which is needed for the same RUGA settlement policy. Any attempt to implement the RUGA policy in Benue State here will mean displacing other people, so you have to make the displacement process to accommodate the RUGA policy, which will not be in the best interest of the inhabitants of the land. It is a policy of displacement to occupy.¹

Given the claim mentioned above, host communities whose primary occupation is commercial farming already occupy the land in Benue. As such, it is safe to assume that there is insufficient land to fit the RUGA settlement. Therefore, which land should be designated for such a settlement project becomes relevant and likely contentious. According to a farmer:

Benue State is called the nation’s food basket. If food security is to be guaranteed, you must ensure peace, and the RUGA settlement policy will not bring peace to Benue State. I can’t support such a policy because our principal occupation is farming. In addition, we farm for commercial and consumption purposes.²

Reflecting on the massive attacks suffered at the hands of Fulani militants, it is believed that accommodating the Fulani pastoralists in the communities could exacerbate the conflict. The Southern and Middlebelt Leaders Forum, a sociocultural group promoting the interests of the southern and Middlebelt regions, echoed the consequences of accommodating the RUGA settlement by the host communities. The organization argues, “in no time, the Fulani herdsmen would make [the] situation hellish for their host communities and life will become much more unbearable for them. The Fulanis across Africa would move in droves to these settlements and Nigeria will at the speed of lightning become an exclusive Fulani territory in West Africa” (Sahara Reporters 2019).

Having acknowledged the potential consequences and future impact of accommodating the RUGA settlement policy, the Benue State government, the Middlebelt and southern governors, farming communities, as well as sociocultural groups were the vocal resistance mediums used by the host communities to oppose the RUGA settlement policy (Ibekwe and Onyewuchi 2020). However, there were other forms of resistance mechanisms employed by the state.

Another form of resistance employed by Benue State is the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law of 2017, initiated to prohibit pastoralists from grazing openly. Under Benue State law, grazing openly is a punishable offense. Therefore, positioning the RUGA settlement under Benue State’s anti-open grazing law can be considered a gross violation of extant law. In this context, it is unconstitutional for the federal government to issue an executive order without consulting the state governor to approve the RUGA settlement (Ibekwe and Onyewuchi 2020). Corroborating the above views, a religious leader claimed that:

I stand by the anti-open grazing law. If they don’t have another thing behind, let them abide by the law. The federal government should not go into someone’s business and improve the business for a particular person when we have so many crops being perished in Benue State. Has the federal government come here to build an industry to process tomatoes and pepper, has federal government come to build an industry to process oranges and mangoes, why is it that they are so interested in building RUGA all over the state for a particular business, is it only animals we eat? So these questions are very important for any rightful thinking person to know that something is actually wrong about this policy, it is evil.³

While ranching is legal in Benue, moving cattle on foot from one community to another is not. According to the Southern and Middlebelt Leaders Forum, “anyone who wants to do cattle business should do so on his or her own or approach the government of the state concerned to buy land and establish ranches in accordance with such state’s prevailing regulations” (Sahara Reporters 2019). A business of this type was regarded by host communities as a private entity to be managed by private individuals. The host communities’ perspective on government intervention in conflict resolution is now further complicated by this factor.

RUGA SETTLEMENT POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

Apart from the ecological disaster caused by climate change, implementation challenges embedded in Nigeria’s sociopolitical structure served as an obstacle to the RUGA settlement policy in the host communities. In Benue State these include conflicting interests and religious values, information deficit, the exclusion of host communities and relevant stakeholders, government biases, land grabbing, indigeneship and settlership issues, and past experiences of the host communities. These impediments are discussed further below.

Conflicting Interests, Religious Values, and Government Biases

There’s an assumption embedded in the literature that a community tends to be a homogenous entity, which validates democratic decision- making and meets the exact needs of individuals (Mercer et al. 2008). In contrast to this hypothesis, a community often consists of diverse members and groups with divergent interests, values, and beliefs. According to Susanne Moser and Julia A. Eckstrom (2010), such variations in values and beliefs serve as obstacles in implementing policies at the community level. Scholars have emphasized the existence of a multiplicity of communities within a community, often distinguished by ethnicity, age, class, occupation, religion, and gender (Lane and Corbett 2005). These variations pose a mammoth challenge to government policies. Engaging all the community-based groups with diverse values and orientations often results in conflicting interests (Dodman and Mitlin 2013; Agrawal and Gibson 1999) and serves as a barrier to implementing conflict resolution policies at the community level. One powerful force is religious orientation, often considered in political and policy processes in the country.

The religious dimension forms another basis for the competing interest in the proposed RUGA settlement policy. According to a religious leader:

Benue is more of a Christian-dominated state and that the intention behind the policy is to take over the place and convert people to Islamism. So, they look at this happening as an opportunity to take advantage of. If I say it is a religion, we have heard them say, I mean the MYETTI ALLAH Cattle Breeders Association (MACCBAN). They have come out openly claiming and bragging that they started a spiritual war sometime in 1804 to capture the whole of Nigeria and dip their Quran in the Atlantic Ocean to show they had captured all of Africa. Still, the TIV people of North Central Nigeria couldn’t allow them because the warriors they had at that time couldn’t allow them to pass through. So, they have come to continue what they have started.⁴

The above perspective is reinforced by Taiwo-Hassan Adebayo (2019). He argues that ethnic tension, distrust, and the suspicious expansion-ist agenda emanated from historical knowledge of the conquest and emirate-building of Fulani in Nigeria, propelling the rejection of the RUGA settlement policy. He further argued that the jihadist movement championed by Othman Dan Fodio through military conquest in 1804 served as a tutorial model for resisting sedentary cattle rearing in host communities. Othman Dan Fodio’s jihadist campaign was instrumental in the fall of Hausa kingdoms, paving the way for the emergence of the Sokoto Caliphate and the subordination of Hausa tribes to the Fulani empire. This Jihadist movement resulted in the collapse of the Oyo Empire in Yorubaland. However, the Yoruba in the Southwest of Nigeria checkmated the expansionist movement in Osogbo (part of Yorubaland). This historical antecedent played a significant role in many host communities, with RUGA seen as an attempt to promote Islamism and Jihadist ideology in the Christian-majority Middlebelt. As a result, several ethnic groups fear dominance and conquest, which has colored their interpretations of the RUGA settlement policy (Adebayo 2019).

Moreover, Maina Williams Apikins (2020) shared a similar view, arguing that the emergence of emirates in a state like Kwara affirms the possibility of eroding local culture and social values. It is believed that without proper dialogue and an influential institution to preserve the host communities’ traditions and values, a dedicated attempt to address migratory pastoralism, such as building settlements for herders, will be vetoed by the host communities (Uwabueze 1991). Therefore, conflicting values and interests are observed as contributing factors to the resistance toward the RUGA settlement policy in Benue State.

Information Deficit

In any local environment, the acceptance or rejection of conflict resolution policy is usually determined by the community’s local actors, individual citizens, and stakeholders. Inadequate information and lack of trust and awareness plays a significant role in those communities’ opposition to the RUGA settlement policy. Without coherent details and a comprehensive understanding of the policy, the communities could be afraid of its outcome (Moser and Dilling 2007). Without adequate knowledge and orientation of policy outcomes, a misinterpretation of such a policy could also be a barrier to its public acceptance at the community level (Leviston et al. 2014; Leviston and Walker 2012; Schweizer, Davis, and Thompson 2013). Such an information deficit is linked to the failure of the proposed policy. Acknowledging formal and informal governance systems in the transmission of information from the federal government is a fundamental pillar of inclusive policy in Nigeria. Engaging the relevant stakeholders necessitates consulting with sub-national governments, including state and local governments, and traditional rulers in the communities. Paradoxically, a public servant specifically argued that there was no consultation, noting that “even the ministry of agriculture in Benue State said they were not aware when the federal government sent the memo. The government insisted that land should be provided for the Fulanis.”⁵ A union leader supported that idea by saying:

We heard about the RUGA settlement policy on radio and television. We don’t support the policy; we can’t support such a policy. My perception of the policy is an extension of the crisis. The federal government proposed a policy without carrying people along. People cannot understand what the RUGA settlement policy is. As a union leader, I oppose the policy. The policy will create more problems in the state if it is implemented. The people were not informed before the federal government proposed the policy. If people had been consulted, the policy would not have been rejected at its inception in Benue State.⁶

Trailing the same perspective, Charles Ekpo and Bright Tobi (2019, 10) maintained that the failure by the federal government to carry stake-holders along ensured that very little endorsement and information was available to the public to provide answers for inquisitive minds. Therefore, it was easy for the current Nigerian Vice President, Yemi Osinbajo, and the state governors to dissociate themselves from what they knew nothing about and heighten the fears of a possible federal-backed demagogue (Ekpo and Tobi 2019, 10).

Exclusion of Host Communities and Relevant Stakeholders

From the perspective of the local community, it has been claimed that there was no consultation before the federal government proposed the RUGA settlement policy. In addition, some of the respondents emphasized the exclusion of the host communities and relevant stakeholders before the proposition of such a policy. A community leader confirmed that: “the federal government did not have any consultation with the state government, traditional rulers, or religious leaders. That’s why the policy was rejected.”⁷

One of the key respondents claimed that the RUGA settlement policy is not a welcome development because the federal government introduced this policy as a calculated attempt to favor a particular ethnic group, the Fulanis. There are other reasons claimed by the respondents regarding why the policy was opposed. According to a community leader:

Why is the federal government so interested in securing land for cattle to graze while leaving other ethnic groups? The policy is meant for a particular ethnic group, which means that the policy is biased and myopic. Has the federal government made any policy for Benue citizens or other ethnic groups to do their business in the northern states? Why is it that the federal government has taken it upon herself at this particular point to ask why the people that these same herdsmen have attacked are still in the IDP camps, camps that are not even good for human beings to live in? You want them to remain there. You want to take those lands in contention and construct this RUGA for the same people you refuse to declare terrorists. You want to settle them when the victims of the attacks are still suffering in the IDP camps.⁸

The above evidence reinforces that the RUGA policy is a product of federal might, which has been defined as the judicious or extra- judicial utilization of government institutions and its agencies by the ruling federal government for and/or against its friends, opposition- controlled states, and dissident voices before, during, and after elections and at clashes of interests, not just for its immediate party aggrandizement, but to prove political points of supremacy, “being in-charge,” intimidation, rascality, power politics, and coercive diplomacy. It is the corruption and manipulation of federal institutions for individual and group gratification (Ekpo, Agorye, and Tobi 2019, 986).

Past Experience of the Host Communities, Land Grabbing, Indigeneship, and Settlership Issues

The historical memory lane of Fulani herders’ struggle for land in the host communities is a primordial phenomenon. The trajectory of the conflict between the host communities and Fulani herders dates back to the nineteenth century, especially in Benue, Plateau, Taraba, and Kaduna in northern Nigeria. During the military era in the 1970s, a piece of land was given to the Fulani, where they settled on Bauchi Road, part of Jos Plateau State, popularly referred to as Tilden Fulani. It was from this settlement that Fulani herders began their expansion to the hinterland of Jos in Plateau State, unleashing violence on host communities over the control of fertile land in Barkin Ladi, Dogon Dutse, and several areas in Central Plateau. The Fulani herders also used a similar tactic to penetrate the highlands of Jos but experienced resistance from the Tarok ethnic group in Langtang, which forced them to retreat. In Taraba State, the Fulani herders attempted to take over Gembu and confronted host communities, including the Kaka in Taraba and the Jukun and Pansa ethnic groups in the Mambilla Plateau (Odoh 2019). Moreover, in 1987, a program christened Laguda, introduced by Kaduna State, was one of the initiatives that provided an opportunity for Fulani herders to claim indigenous land of the host communities, which was achieved through a military regime that supported them. As a result, traditional Fulani local chiefs were appointed, later modified to emirship status in Jemaa Local Government Council in Kaduna State. Similarly, they further proposed such a mission in the Benue Valley and were resisted by the Tiv tribe (Odoh 2019). Such resistance revolves around the insinuation that the policy was an attempt to Islamize Nigeria. Referencing the historic expansion of emirates, Chineze Sophia Ibekwe and Nkemjika Anthony Onyewuchi (2020) demonstrate that such a manner negates the host communities’ traditional structures and cultural values.

Moreover, the fear of dominance among the three major ethnic groups—Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa-Fulani—that put Nigeria on the brink of disaster (civil war and ethnic and resource conflicts) can also be traced to the country’s political foundation. Prior to the declaration of self-rule, the northern region observed the dominance of the Yoruba ethnic group in public service. Such a manifestation was propelled by fear of the southern region’s dominance in a self-governing Nigeria. The introduction of regional government allowed the three major ethnic groups to govern themselves. However, such a self-governing structure could not resolve ethnic distrust, as evident in Mallam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s speech in 1948 during a legislative council meeting that “Nigeria deceive themselves by thinking that Nigeria is one. . . . This is wrong. I am sorry to say that this presence of unity is artificial, and it ends outside this chamber” (quoted in Bah 2005, 45).

The fear of ethnic dominance further triggered the conflict that emanated from the 1962 census results. A census was employed to attain political leadership, as the population of each region determines the allocation of seats in the federal legislative chamber and the voting pattern. In this context, the population was weaponized to attain political leadership in the country. Other ethnic-related conflicts include the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War and the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba disputes at Ketu Market in Lagos, triggered by ethnic distrust and fear of dominance (Bah 2005). This trajectory has dictated the pace, resulting in substantial resistance against the RUGA settlement policy in Benue State. One of the respondents, a community leader, argued that:

The RUGA settlement policy is a tactic to hijack our indigenous land and give it to the stranger. For example, in 1982, there was a policy similar to RUGA settlement in Southern Kaduna—a Christian-dominated region— and now the indigenes are not there anymore. We have also witnessed the case of Zango-Kataf in Kaduna State, where they were allowed to settle, and over time this caused conflict between the settlers and the indigenous host communities.⁹

Thus, past experiences often influence decision-making outcomes. This is because when people experience positive results from past decisions, there is a likelihood of following the same path when the need arises to decide on a similar issue. However, people tend to eschew previous mistakes, resulting in adverse outcomes (Sagi and Friedland 2007). Therefore, the people’s experience on the erstwhile decision will impact determining the future decision making (Juliusson, Karlsson, and Gärling 2005). Additionally, a youth leader narrated that:

If such policy is allowed, the Fulanis will be given local government, ward, and political voting units, which in turn will enable them to dominate and have a political right to contest for elected political offices at the governor-ship, legislative, and local government levels in Benue State.¹⁰

Most host communities felt the federal government wanted to grab their lands and give them to the Fulani herders. According to a community leader, the RUGA settlement policy is to acquire large acres of land for the Fulanis to graze on. That position is supported by a farmer who said:

We don’t have land for the Fulanis to settle and graze. I don’t support such a policy. The best way to raise cows is to own a ranch. That is the contemporary way of rearing cows. We don’t have land to give to the Fulanis. Our people are struggling to get a small parcel of land to farm, so we don’t have such land. Therefore, there will be a negative impact of such a policy. It is a form of land grabbing.¹¹

Ekpo and Tobi (2019) buttressed the above point of view, arguing that the trouble with the RUGA settlement policy is fear of the unknown, revolving around conspiracies of Islamization, Fulanization, and a federal- backed land-grabbing agenda. Several coincidences, actions, and inactions of the Buhari-led federal government created a favorable climate for the aforementioned fears to thrive (Ekpo and Tobi 2019, 10). In the absence of arrests and prosecutions of Fulani pastoralists involved in the killing of farmers in their host communities, it was assumed that Fulani pastoralists were being supported by the government (TSA 2022). It is against this background that a civil servant noted that:

If I say they were coming to take over our land, it is true. As we speak now if you go to some parts of Goma local government, our sitting governor’s local government area, and you go to our former governor’s local government area, Governor Suswan local government area, as we speak currently, go to Kwande Local Government Area, they are in the most fertile areas for people to cultivate and plant their crops. They have settled in those areas and have settled alone. They are causing mayhem, not only causing mayhem, they are killing people in order to drive people away so they can settle there permanently. The RUGA settlement policy is a tactic to hijack our indigenous land and give it to strangers. For example, in 1982, there was a RUGA settlement in Southern Kaduna, and now the indigenes are not there anymore. So, my perception of the RUGA policy is that it is a strategy to hijack and take land from the original owner and give it to strangers.¹²

Validating the above view, Adebayo (2019) argues that the issue of indigeneship and settlership, which often provides an enabling environment for political powers at the state and local levels, provides a cautionary note for the host communities to discard the RUGA settlement policy. An excellent example of such an indigeneity and settlership conflict between the Fulani herders and host communities is the case of Berom and Mambila in Plateau and Taraba states. The Berom ethnic group, considered one of the largest in the region, has engaged in unlawful killings of Fulani pastoralists, often to prevent them from encroaching on their farmlands. Such killings have triggered reprisal attacks, culminating in the killings of hundreds of villagers in Berom communities. This has also led to counter-reprisal attacks in Fulani pastoralists’ communities by farmers. In such an environment, vigilante groups on both sides (farming and Fulani pastoralist communities) were formed to prevent attacks and counterattacks (Ajala 2020).

CONCLUSION

This paper has presented several implementation barriers to the RUGA settlement policy in Benue State. These obstructions frustrated the federal government-led program to mitigate herders-farmers’ conflicts. A limited number of local citizens understood the benefit of the policy for the host communities. These findings align with theories that highlight the possibility of policy rejection by the host communities due to the exclusion of local actors/stakeholders (Cheng and Mattor 2006). Using a top-down approach against the interests of vulnerable groups or the affected populace has been proven obsolete. Existing theories consider community involvement a potent means of achieving government policies (Jacobs and Price 2003; Burns and Heywood 2004). Several schools of thought acknowledge that the participation of people and relevant stakeholders often results in better outcomes. Therefore, host communities are essential in formulating policies for such schemes to be widely accepted. This paper agrees with these schools of thought that have attributed the failure of many policies to absolute reliance on a non-democratic approach, which has downplayed the desiderata of the relevant local institutions and stakeholders (Larsen and Gunnarsson-Östling 2009). Therefore, the relevance of community participation and multi-level governance in decision-making processes can be affirmed in the case of the RUGA settlement policy in Benue State.