Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) kept close track of developments in Czechoslovakia throughout 1968, but the alliance did not pursue a coherent policy toward the uprising. A close examination of NATO actions from January 1968 until the invasion on 20-21 August helps explain why a coordinated approach never materialized. Certain structural features of the alliance and a host of domestic and external distractions precluded a joint response. NATO members worked individually rather than collectively to avert Soviet military action through quiet diplomacy, but these efforts made almost no difference.

Additional Information

ISSN
1531-3298
Print ISSN
1520-3972
Pages
pp. 111-138
Launched on MUSE
1999-08-01
Open Access
No
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