The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula and the Seven Days (review)

The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula and the Seven Days. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2000. Pp xvi, 258. $34.95.)

This seventh title in the University of North Carolina's "Military Campaigns of the Civil War" series continues this important series' format and usefulness. Rather than one narrative history and analysis of operations and generalship on the Peninsula from March through August 1862, the volume contains nine discrete essays—each by a separate Civil War scholar—on various aspects of the Peninsular campaign.

Gary W. Gallagher, John L. Nau III Professor of the History of the Civil War at the University of Virginia, continues his graceful and learned editorship of the series. He wrote the lead chapter, which sets the campaign in the broader context of the war. He rightly recognizes the pre-eminence of the eastern theater throughout the war, and he persuasively argues that the "'half-success' at Richmond had a seismic effect on the Confederacy's war for nationhood. Lee's debut as a field commander marked the most important watershed in the development of the Army of Northern Virginia—and one of the crucial turning points of the entire war" (19).

Broad coverage also comes from John T. Hubbell of Kent State University, who assesses the generalship of George B. McClellan in the campaign. His conclusions are consistent with the current consensus that "Little Mac's" leadership left much to be desired. The Union commander is also criticized by William J. Miller, whose focus on Federal engineers demonstrates how they overcame problems of terrain along the swampy Chickahominy River valley. Their successes undercut McClellan's claims that difficult ground constrained him. Rather, Miller cogently contends, McClellan's problems arose from his own failure to recognize and exploit opportunities.

Confederate commanders, too, come in for criticism. Peter S. Carmichael assesses John B. Magruder and perceptively points out how that general's bad example in front of soldiers made his failures in the Seven Days Battles far worse, in R. E. Lee's eyes, than the more short-lived shortcomings of James Longstreet and Thomas J. Jackson. Lee knew, writes Carmichael, that "officers could not gain the confidence of their troops without a calm demeanor and the look of self-assurance. Jackson and Longstreet possessed that essential element of leadership, but Magruder did not" (117). Jackson's generalship—or lack thereof—during the Seven Days is explored by Robert K. Krick. His renowned—and rightful—regard for Jackson in general makes his critique of "Stonewall" in this particular campaign all the more compelling.

The impact of the campaign on the home front is analyzed in the essays by James Marten and William A. Blair. Marten explores the impact of the operations on the attitudes, morale, and even loyalty of civilians and slaves in southeastern Virginia. Blair argues that the very failure of the Union conservative strategy on the Peninsula made more credible the Radicals' efforts to promote a more ruthless prosecution of the war, including emancipation.

Those insights are interesting, but it is back on the battlefield that this reviewer's two favorite essays are engaged. Robert E. Lee Krick gives an excellent account of Gen. Chase Whiting's decisive breakthrough on June 27, 1862. "Whiting's nine regiments broke the Federal line and triggered the victory," writes Krick; "their reliance on high morale, sound tactics, and superb leadership among junior officers became a blueprint for the army. . . . Perhaps the assault at Gaines's Mill differs from those at other battlefields only in its particulars, but Whiting's men set the standard. The legendary bond between R. E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia was born that afternoon" (208). Equally valuable is Keith S. Bohannon's study of Federal and Confederate artillery at the Battle of Malvern Hill. He moves beyond the stereotype that the Bluecoats did well and...