Johns Hopkins University Press
  • Understanding the Kafala Migrant Labor System in Qatar and the Middle East at Large, with ILO Senior Migration Specialist Ryszard Cholewinski

As the eyes of the world shifted towards Qatar during the recent World Cup, media reports focused on the working conditions and deaths of the migrant workers building Qatar's infrastructure. According to a Guardian report in 2021, 6,500 South Asian migrant workers were reported to have died in Qatar from 2010 to 2020—although this number does not differentiate between work-related and non-work-related deaths. Throughout Jordan, Lebanon, and all the Gulf Arab states, a system for migrant labor called kafala has been in place for decades, in which states give employers sponsorship permits to bring in foreign workers, which bind workers to their employers and allow for exploitation.1

During the past few years, Gulf countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia have begun implementing reforms to their labor laws. Nevertheless, as improvements in the working and living conditions for migrant workers continue to lag behind what has been promised, we must explore the persistence of the kafala system and analyze possible avenues for lasting reforms. We are thrilled to speak with Ryszard Cholewinski, the Senior Migration Specialist in the International Labor Organization's Regional Office for Arab States in Beirut.

GJIA:

To introduce this conversation, what are the most pressing challenges facing migrant workers under kafala? Beyond the much-reported death tolls, how has this employment system burdened the health and well-being of migrant workers in the Middle East?

RC:

Regarding the kafala (sponsorship) system, I think it's important to say, at the outset, that sponsorship systems are not unusual. Temporary labor migration programs also exist in other parts of the world, where the worker is essentially tied to one employer or one employment sector. That, by definition, can be exploitative because of the vulnerable situation in which low-wage and low-skilled workers find themselves. Particularly, if these workers come from poorer developing countries where they've paid fees to recruiters to help them find work, they can end up in debt bondage or forced labor because they have to pay back the debts. The fact, then, that it is difficult for them to change employment in the country puts them in a vulnerable situation; if they leave their jobs, they either fall into irregular status (where their immigration status is entirely dependent on their employer) or are deported.

But when it comes to the kafala system, it is an especially extreme form of employer sponsorship, where the employer retains considerable power over the employment relationship, as well as the worker's immigration status in the country. This challenge is exacerbated because kafala [End Page 72] is not something that you can get rid of simply by changing the law. It is deeply embedded in other measures, practices, and customs as just a way of doing things. So, at the International Labor Organization (ILO), we do not talk about the abolition of kafala as if this is something that can be done right away. Rather, we focus on the need to dismantle it, recognizing that it is something that will take a range of measures to do away with.

In recent years, we have seen some significant reforms to the system, which vary across the region. In Qatar specifically, when it comes to the legislation that has been put into place, these reforms are the most advanced.2 This is quite a significant change because some years ago, Qatar was probably the furthest behind other countries. These reforms go furthest because they enable all workers in all sectors, including domestic work, to change employers by giving the appropriate notice, which could be one or two months. Qatar has also abolished the exit permit requirement, where an employer can stop someone from leaving a country. This reform goes further than in countries like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where it is only possible to change employer without the current employer's permission after one year, a rule which itself does not apply to domestic workers.

GJIA:

In a country like Qatar, where reforms to kafala have been enacted, do migrant workers still experience subpar working and living conditions? Or is it the case that once we do away with this underlying exploitative business model, we should see working and living conditions improve immediately?

RC:

The reforms in Qatar are the most advanced, but there are still challenges in their implementation. Since these reforms were put in place around September 2020, approximately 350,000 workers have had their applications to change jobs approved, which is a significant number. However, we know also that workers still don't fully have the knowledge and guidance to change jobs, and sometimes employers try to prevent them from doing so by threatening retaliatory measures. There has also been some resistance within the private sector because these reforms change the business model for companies that are used to hiring and keeping foreign workers with them for years.

We see the kafala (sponsorship) system as being at the heart of exploitative employment practices, but of course, there are many more labor issues, including abusive recruitment practices. These recruitment practices can result in workers paying up to almost a year of their salaries on recruitment fees to private recruitment agencies in the worker's country of origin. Of course, if these workers are in a situation of abuse, they are particularly vulnerable because they are forced to stay in their jobs to pay off the debt and start sending money to support their families back home.

Another issue that is particularly close to ILO's heart is the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining. In Qatar, for example, trade unions do not exist. So, in our work there has been a focus on giving voice to workers through company management-worker committees, to which workers can be elected. This is to ensure worker representation at the company level, where workers can have a say on company-specific issues like workplace health and safety, food and accommodation, and discrimination.

The situation in the UAE is similar regarding the lack of trade unions. There are now national worker committees in Saudi Arabia, which may become trade unions at some point. And in the other Gulf countries, as well as Lebanon and Jordan, there are national trade union federations, but they're often not very representative of migrant workers. So, the lack of freedom of association is obviously a gap, which exists in law and practice and is not necessarily directly linked to the application of kafala.

There are also challenges when it comes to access to justice. There has been a lot of attention on this recently because the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the situation of migrant workers in the Gulf. Many migrant workers who lost their jobs at the height of the pandemic were stuck in those countries because of the closing of borders and were not paid their end-of-service benefits or indemnities. Connected to that were the difficulties in accessing justice mechanisms, like dispute resolution and complaint mechanisms. [End Page 73] There continue to be a lot of obstacles in accessing these systems, whether it be that documentation is only accepted in Arabic or in English or that there are delays when these cases are brought before the courts.

A final obstacle to the implementation of the kafala reforms is what is referred to as absconding regimes. In these, employers can report workers as being absent from work. In the case of domestic workers, employers also make false allegations claiming that workers have stolen something from the household. These reports and allegations can lead to the worker falling into an irregular status and then being subjected to penalties for being in such a status. So that is another way that employers can exert power over workers, which can be an impediment to the effective implementation of reforms. There have been reforms in these areas as well, but the issues can be quite systemic, particularly across the Gulf and Lebanon, for example.

GJIA:

You're from the International Labor Organization, an agency within the United Nations that sets international labor standards. Does the UN lack the enforcement capacity to actually push for reforms to kafala when states are not willing to pursue reforms themselves?

RC:

Well, that's the million-and-one-dollar question. This issue is one that always arises in the context of international supervisory systems, whether it be the supervisory system within the ILO, the UN human rights treaty bodies monitoring the implementation of core international human rights instruments, or the system of Universal Periodic Review through the UN Human Rights Council. Qatar is a very good example of how effective the ILO supervisory system can be. The complaints against Qatar were brought under the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29),3 and the Labor Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81),4 an instrument requiring countries to set up adequate labor inspection systems to enforce labor standards. These complaints gained traction because Qatar was in the spotlight concerning the World Cup, making the complaints under the ILO supervisory system particularly effective.

Other systems are also taken seriously, like the Universal Periodic Review process conducted by the UN Human Rights Council. Through this process, other governments propose various recommendations to the governments of the Arab states, including those on migrant worker issues. These Arab governments care about these recommendations because they often present themselves as being at the forefront of innovation, so reputational risks are involved if they do not comply.

Another mechanism that can place leverage on Arab governments is the United States State Department Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) Report. The TIP Report gives countries ratings based on how well they protect against human trafficking and forced labor. For example, Bah-rain is the one country in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with a Tier One rating—this is something governments consider very important and wish to emulate. Meanwhile, Kuwait was recently downgraded from Tier Two to the Tier Two Watch List. This raised serious concerns in Kuwait, given the political and economic relationships countries like Kuwait have with the United States. So, this is another aspect of leverage that is important to bear in mind when it comes to labor reforms, including around kafala.

GJIA:

On the conversation of leverage, FIFA President Gianni Infantino recently claimed that FIFA's presence in Qatar influenced the Qatari regime to begin reforming kafala. Is this a model for how multinational corporations should engage with Gulf regimes on the kafala issue, or how else can these non-state [End Page 74] actors best interact with countries that violate international labor laws? Should the policy be one of engagement and persuasion or boycotting and ostracization?

RC:

There is clearly a role for multinational corporations to play. Still, it's important to link whatever they're doing to international benchmarks, as their operations may also fall short of these benchmarks. When it comes to multinationals, the ILO has outlined its Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which includes freedom from forced labor and child labor, non-discrimination, freedom of association, and the right to a safe and healthy working environment. The ILO has engaged on a voluntary basis with foreign business councils and interested private companies in Qatar and elsewhere that wish to improve their human rights due diligence mechanisms, particularly regarding recruitment processes and the working conditions they offer to their workforce.

There are various ways of doing this. For example, in February 2022, the Belgian multinational construction company Besix signed an agreement with a global union, Building and Wood Workers' International (BWI), a constituent of the ILO. This was an agreement on health and safety standards at work. Besix was the principal company responsible for building the Burj Khalifa and is involved in other Gulf construction projects. It has a very diverse workforce and is proud of its record when it comes to health and safety.

The problem, however, is that there are also national companies operating across the Gulf that are not as forward in protecting and upholding these labor standards. So, this issue is not just about multinationals. In fact, there appear to be fewer multinationals operating than before. It's also important to access the companies operating locally; they may be smaller, but they still, on an aggregate basis, employ a very large number of workers. So, the need for appropriate labor laws that are effectively enforced must exist on the national level as well.

GJIA:

You talked about issues that migrant workers face in their countries of origin, like predatory recruitment practices. Is an inherent part of dismantling kafala promoting the sustainable development of these countries of origin? And if so, does that make it so that the ultimate goal is that we reach a point where there is no need for labor migration whatsoever?

RC:

ILO's mandate is very much based on social justice and decent work, which is a core aspect of realizing social justice. That means decent work everywhere, including in countries of origin. But the reality is that in many of these countries, there is a lack of decent work and a problem of underemployment. Given the labor supply and demand equation and the significant income differentials between South Asian countries and the Gulf, it's still seriously worth many workers' while to move to a Gulf country and send remittances back home, even when there are jobs in their countries of origin.

We're also increasingly seeing labor migration from certain African countries, like Ethiopia and Uganda, to work in the domestic work, hospitality, and security sectors. In these sectors, migrant workers might make just 250-300 U.S. dollars a month in a Gulf country, but this income differential is still so stark compared to their home countries that it is nevertheless worthwhile for them to migrate and send remittances home.

But I don't think the end goal is ending the migration. The right to leave your own country to take up employment where those possibilities exist is a basic human right. We aim to ensure that workers are given all the options, that they're not forced to migrate, that they're fully informed about where they're going and what they're going to be doing, and that they're given information about the options for employment at home. Regrettably, we know that some countries of origin essentially have policies to send their nationals abroad because it's seen as a safety valve to economic problems and unemployment back home, generating remittances because of the challenges of developing their economies sustainably.

So, sustainable development at home, including access to decent work, is important. ILO promotes the development of coherent national employment policies. In fact, one of the so-called Governance or Priority Conventions of the ILO [End Page 75] is the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), recognizing the need for countries to adopt balanced employment policies that take into account both people arriving to work in the country but also their own nationals who are migrating elsewhere. Unfortunately, what we see in some countries of origin is that they have overseas employment policies, but they don't have national employment policies. That is a problematic disconnect, sending a message to their workers that the situation will always be like this.

Nevertheless, what we saw during the pandemic when many migrant workers returned to their countries of origin were measures being adopted on a temporary basis to support these workers and try to reintegrate them into national labor markets.5 So more serious attention has been given to national employment policy recently, something that we think is important.

GJIA:

In light of the increasing international spotlight surrounding kafala with the World Cup, the changes caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the promises of reform, where do you see kafala going in the coming years and decades? Is there a sincere effort on the part of Gulf leaders to reform and dismantle kafala in the years to come?

RC:

In terms of where things are going, the jury is probably still out. On the one hand, the commitment to reform is certainly more serious than it has been in the past. Qatar is a good example of that. The Qataris say they want their reforms to be a legacy. There has been criticism from some NGOs and commentators that these reforms will be swept under the carpet once the World Cup is over.6 But that's not what we see now—we do see a long-term commitment.

It's hard to say whether the reforms in Qatar have also been a catalyst for some of the other reforms taking place in the GCC. Regardless, in many of these countries, there has been a gradual movement to reform in terms of affording more labor mobility for migrant workers within labor markets, which is in line with the priorities in national vision plans (e.g., Qatar Vision 20307, Saudi Arabia Vision 20308) to further economic growth and development. This dynamic will likely continue, and it is not going to go away with the World Cup. That in itself can be a catalyst for continuing reforms.

On a broader level, though, when it comes to temporary labor migration programs, wherever they may be, they tend to have features that can be inherently exploitative—the tying of visas to a single employer, restrictions on rights and freedom of association, low wages, and poor working conditions. So, to some extent, even though kafala is seen as unique, it's important to see it in the context of the paradigm of temporary labor migration today. This paradigm has its defects, whether in the Gulf region under kafala or the United States with its temporary migration program for agricultural workers from Central America. Taken in this wider context, then, we get a fuller view of the shortcomings of kafala as an inherent part of the shortcomings of today's

temporary labor migration paradigm.

Ryszard Cholewinski

Ryszard Cholewinski is the Senior Migration Specialist in the International Labor Organization's Regional Office for Arab States in Beirut. Prior to this, Mr. Cholewinski was a Migration Policy Specialist in the ILO's Labour Migration Branch in Geneva. Mr. Cholewinski is a lawyer by training who has written extensively on labor migration, the human rights of migrants, and European Union migration policies. He holds a doctoral degree from the University of Ottawa, a Master's in Laws degree from the University of Saskatchewan, and a Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of Leicester.

Notes

1. "What Is the Kafala System?," Council on Foreign Relations, Last modified November 18, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-kafala-system.

2. "Overview of Qatar's Labour Reforms," International Labour Organization, April 7, 2022, https://www.ilo.org/beirut/countries/qatar/WCMS_760466/lang--en/index.htm.

3. "Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)," International Labor Organization, Accessed February 12, 2023, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB%3A12100%3A0%3A%3ANO%3A%3AP12100_ILO_CODE%3AC029.

4. "Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81)," International Labor Organization, Accessed February 12, 2023, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB%3A12100%3A0%3A%3ANO%3A%3AP12100_ILO_CODE%3AC081.

5. "Protecting Migrant Workers during the COVID-19 Pandemic," International Labour Organization, April 30, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/publications/WCMS_743268/lang--pt/index.htm.

6. McSweeney, Eoin and Mohammed Abdelbary, "The World Cup Has Brought Some Change to Qatar. Will It Last?", Cable News Network, November 28, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/28/middleeast/world-cupcatalyst-for-change-qatar-mime-intl/index.html.

7. "Qatar National Vision 2030." Planning and Statistics Authority. State of Qatar. Accessed February 12, 2023. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/qnv1/pages/default.aspx.

8. "Saudi Vision 2030." Vision 2030. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Accessed February 12, 2023. https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/v2030/overview/.

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