Deconstructing and Reinforcing Gender Norms and Cultural Taboos in Myanmar’s Spring Revolution

On 1 February 2021, claiming that the results of the prior November's election were fraudulent, the military staged a coup d'etat. They planned to hold power until a new election was held. This ended a pseudo-democracy under the quasi-civilian government. The coup provoked a nationwide protest also demanding for a modern state which values the information technology knowledge of Generation Z, sees them as active social agents, with new revolutionary ideas, and fosters greater freedom of thought. Traditional groups as well as human rights defenders contested gender norms and stereotypes. In this study of the 2021 revolution, numerous changes in gender attitudes are documented. These include attitudes regarding cultural taboos about women's bodies; dominant masculine ideas about marginalized gender groups; and finally, women's political participation. Many urban youth protesters have been fighting against misogynist ideas and actively acknowledge women's roles in the political and social movements. Yet, in the power struggle between oppressors and oppressed, human dignity and moral principles have been caught in a bind, as women from both groups have been strategically targeted for personal attacks. Although this trend was not as apparent in previous anti-coup protests, this article argues that, despite some flaws, the revolution could be a driving force in changing gender perceptions in general. As such, this study observes how the 2021 revolution both deconstructed and reinforced traditional gender stereotypes and beliefs. With the aim of examining the driving forces and drawbacks of gender attitudes changes, this investigation attempts to understand the gender equality movements, arising with the coup in 2021 and their impact on the landscape of women's participation in politics.

Introduction

In Myanmar, women have long fought for social justice and gender equality. These fights include those of the early nationalist movements that sought independence from colonialism and progressing to a massive social revolution in 2021. Attitudes toward Myanmar women as the guardians of the nation’s pride and culture have been fostered in tandem with the emergence of nationalism (Latt 2019:14). For example, nationalist movements during the democratization process (2010–2020) mobilized Burmese Buddhist ideologies to impose the inter-faith marriage law (Walton 2015:11). However, the anti-coup protest in the spring of 2021 stimulated gender activists to strive to demolish those very social taboos which had been strengthened by those conservative religious, nationalist discourses. They also sought to reconcile with different ethnic groups; through the protests, trans-ethnic solidarity has been built (Prasse-Freeman and Sebro 2021). In sum, the movement sought to overcome racism as well as sexism.

During the military-dominated pseudo-democracy (2010–2021), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) had space, time, and resources to build stronger networks through community and social mobilization (Lanjouw, Phuah, and Phan 2016:17–19). These networks enabled the breadth of the protests to be wider and stronger. The courage, leadership skill, and technical competence of Generation Z has been acknowledged (Kapi 2021); the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) of the working class has been powerful (Myanmar Now 2021); and patriarchal values of the society have been challenged (Du 2021). In addition, activism for gender equality has grown during the anti-coup demonstrations. These gender equality initiatives were also intertwined with ethnic solidarity, labor movements, and the ideas of Generation Z while fighting for social justice.

In this regard, the anti-coup protests of 2021 have been seen to intersect with a social revolution: the protesters promoted gender equality concepts and deconstructed traditional deep-rooted gender stereotypes related to religious and social norms. However, this study witnessed some shortcomings in this movement’s goals to change gender norms as it was impossible to eliminate all forms of negative gender stereotypes within a short period. This means that gender norms are likely to evolve in two directions in anti-coup movements. The first is that women are seen as active agents in leading activities, and the second is that the movement used sexist forms of humiliation in its attacks on women from opposing groups. Sexual harassment and cyberbullying were directed at female military supporters in the anti-military campaigns, and this kind of gender-based harassment worsened.

The 2021 coup signaled a failure in Myanmar’s political reform process. However, social movements for gender equality have acquired more public attention in the mass demonstrations, and these comprise a constructive effort for social change. Yet, the gender-based examples of cyberbullying and humiliation were regressive. To document and explore these issues, this article will present evidence of a desk review of media news and secondary sources, and ethnographic data from in-country participant observation within a series of movements from February to July 2021.

Following a discussion of the political and cultural context, including the relationship between the military and patriarchy, and women’s movements in the country, this article will explore how the ideologies of the male-dominated military intersect with those of religious institutions and the struggles of women’s organizations. Then, this article discusses the concept of social revolution as envisaged by Myanmar’s protesters and the role of Generation Z. The third section discusses the relationship of the social revolution with goals for gender equality, methodologies for gender norms deconstruction (and reinforcement) as part of these social movements.

The Military’s Way of Reinforcing Patriarchy

Myanmar’s military and religious institutions wield enormous sway over the country’s political, social, and cultural life. These include its gender concerns. Following the 1962 coup d’état, the military dictatorship strengthened traditional gender stereotypes and religious norms, promoted nationalism, and limited women’s rights in institutional settings.

Throughout the decades of military rule, propaganda literature and films reinforced the notion of women as generators and preservers of national culture, which reflexively promoted male leadership (Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation [EMReF] 2018:22). The state media’s articles targeted the prominent female political icon, Aung San Suu Kyi (then under house arrest) with sexist attacks, attempting to humiliate her for having married a British citizen. The military government also formed some women’s organizations, but these were comprised of military leaders’ wives and elite political women. These included the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA) in 1991, the Myanmar National Committee for Women Affairs in 1996, and the Myanmar Women’s Affairs Federation (MWAF) in 2003. These organizations were ostensibly to promote women’s roles at all levels, but their objective of “preserving Myanmar culture” only focused on supporting traditional, patriarchal notions of femininity. Houtman and Kenkyūjo (1999:140) pointed out that the state-sponsored organizations being led by the wives of generals and other authorities attempted to counteract Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership capacity and popularity at the international level.

Following the end of the State Peace and Development Council government and the beginning of the so-called transition years, women still had limited space in the political arena due to the constitution, state institutions, religious, and cultural norms. The 2008 constitution maintained male-dominated leadership as it guaranteed the military 25% of all the seats in both upper and lower houses plus state/regional assemblies; the qualification criteria for president (Chapter 3, no. 59(d)) demanded someone well acquainted with the country’s affairs, including the defense and security sector. In this situation, women are sidelined since their opportunities to become deeply involved in the military and security sector are limited.

Well before the 2008 constitution, Inglehart and Norris (2003) argued that secularization could contribute to gender equality in Myanmar. However, during the political reforms process after 2010, the contemporary Burmese Buddhist nationalist movements were revitalized. With the advocacy of extreme nationalist groups, in 2015 the government imposed the Protection of Race and Religion Laws. Nationalist groups introduced these laws to complement the Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage and Succession Act (1939) and the interfaith marriage law (1954) (Walton, McKay, and Kyi 2015). These new laws prohibited women’s right to choose their own spouses; in particular, the state institutionalized control of women’s bodies and desires under the pretext of state sovereignty and security.

The passage of these laws stimulated feminist and gender activists’ groups to challenge the power of male-controlled institutions, and in particular, the interfaith marriage laws advocated by the Buddhist nationalists. Although the campaigns against the Protection of Race and Religion Laws did not result in a major societal change at the time, they did raise public awareness of the state’s systematic control of women’s bodies. It was not until the 2021 Myanmar’s Spring Revolution that people mobilized to publicly protest sexism and extreme nationalism. The protesters were merged from different ethnicities, religions, and working classes to fight against dictatorship and dictator’s doctrine, including Burmanization and male chauvinism.

Women’s Movements in Political Transition

The democratization process after the 2010 election created spaces for women’s organizations both inside and outside the country to coordinate their efforts. This modern activism has been involved not only in meeting the basic needs of communities but also in pushing for policy reform (Tun, Ring, and Hlaing 2019). Thus, women became more aware of their right to be more involved in political, economic, and social fields.

In terms of formal politics, the number of elected female politicians gradually increased in the general elections and by-elections from 2010 to 2020. According to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, women’s participation in parliament climbed by 13.7% following the 2015 election, including military-appointed female Member of Parliaments (MPs), up from 4.8% in 2010 and 6% in 2012 (International Foundation for Electoral Systems [IFES] 2015). In 2020, the Union Election Commission (UEC) revealed that elected women made up nearly 17% of total parliamentary members and ministerial seats for ethnic affairs in each parliament.¹ Although this number did not fulfill the targeted gender quota (30% female political involvement in the parliament) advocated by women’s rights activists, the election result in 2020 was the most significant number of women’s political representation in the country’s history. In the arena of economic development, the nongovernmental organizations implemented microfinancing and income generation activities under the women’s economic empowerment programs. These had negligible impacts on women’s livelihoods at the grassroots level because of their limited capacities, despite income-gener-ating activities and increasing the female labor force (Tun, Ring, and Hlaing 2019:9). In addition, these economic activities did not eliminate inequities in economic participation, and the employment security of marginalized women was frequently jeopardized. Female garment workers, for example, were particularly vulnerable to exploitation, and the garment industry was fraught with labor conflicts and strikes. Workers, however, grew increasingly organized because of labor protests, forming labor groups to reflect their demands and concerns. Even though they benefited little from economic empowerment efforts, working women had an opportunity to build solidarity.

Although Myanmar ratified the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1997, no permanent official entity dedicated to women’s issues was established, except military proxy organizations such as the aforementioned MWAF and MMCWA. There was a distinct lack of gender consideration in the military government’s decision-making structure. This served to prohibit proxy organizations from participating in politics, and ultimately emphasized a welfare approach toward women, echoing a view of women as subjects deserving of safeguard rather than agents capable of independent action (Belak 2002:28).

During the decade prior to the 2021 military coup, non-governmental women’s organizations pressured the government to create laws that would safeguard women’s rights and promote women’s security and equality in political and economic participation, as articulated by the CEDAW Convention. As a result, women’s activism emerged to challenge the interfaith marriage law and pushed legislators to draft the Protection of Violence Against Women Law, which included detailed articles regarding sexual harassment at the workplace (Tun, Ring, and Hlaing 2019:20). Then, women’s rights activists expedited their engagement with political parties to increase female political representation. However, social taboos and gender stereotypes remained untouchable, limiting women’s rights advocates’ advocacy efforts.

In sum, during the 2010s, women’s movements did not bring about immediate social change; instead, activists were able to establish a sense of community among themselves, enhancing women’s leadership abilities. In 2021, just days after the coup, it was factory workers, especially women, who launched the first strike. Those women joined students and CSOs on the front lines of protests calling for the restoration of democracy. Their demands included not only the elimination of dictatorship but also social revolution, including the removal of racism and sexism (Aguilar and Quadrini 2021).

Key Concepts of Social Revolution and Myanmar

According to Latt (2021), revolution is a political necessity since society can no longer function without over-throwing outmoded values and conventions. Latt argued that there is no way out of Myanmar’s vicious circle caused by military dictatorship without going through the agony of losing the old skin, including military supremacy, racism, historical amnesia, religious extremism, misogyny and ideologies that reflect old and irrelevant ideals and standards. It suggests that revolution necessitates not only the overthrow of the regime but also a comprehensive reform of society. The term “social revolution” refers to a change in political and economic structures. Unlike political revolutions, which replace old political regimes with new ones, social revolutions require dismantling a society’s prevailing beliefs and myths, as well as its political institutions, social structure, and leadership (Huntington 2006; Paige 2003).

Regarding social revolution patterns, Tiruneh (2014) put forward two kinds: spontaneous, such as the Russian Revolution in 1917, and planned, such as the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Tiruneh explained that revolution was involuntary and organizations or individual leaders did not create a revolutionary crisis in a spontaneous pattern, and in order to succeed, it required military support. In contrast, a planned revolution had a voluntary and purposive nature for social upheaval. The military had to be defeated by guerrilla fighters to achieve the revolution in the planned setting, while organizational strength, resources, popular support, and ideology change appeared critical for the success of the planned revolution.

In addition to Tiruneh’s model, two patterns for revolution were suggested by Huntington (2006:274): Western and Eastern. In the Western pattern: first, traditional states collapse; second, social mobilization; and third, an institutionalization of new regimes. In the Eastern pattern, social mobilizations emerged before the fall of the state, and finally, new regimes are institutionalized. The fundamental distinction between the two patterns was that the Western pattern was seen in traditional monarchical countries, while the Eastern model took place in modernizing patrimonial states. Reflecting on these explanations, Myanmar’s Spring Revolution can be examined based on its root causes, whether the revolution is spontaneous or planned. This understanding helps to observe the changes in gender movements, one of the critical aspects of social revolution, and how these changes have become more widespread.

In the context of Myanmar, since the idea of social transformation, including gender equality, was incorporated in the anti-coup campaigns, social revolution can be assumed to be a part of the mass civilian uprisings to overthrow the dictator’s rule. Then, the setting of the revolution was supposed to be a combination of both spontaneous and planned patterns. Obviously, the revolution was not voluntary according to Tironeh’s model because it occurred as a result of the fall of pseudo-democracy sustained by the quasi-civilian government and the collapse of civil-military relations.

In the case of women’s rights, feminists mobilized a series of movements instead of a one-time massive movement for radical change (Tun, Ring, and Hlaing 2019). Movements’ essence shifted from one which attached women’s issues with nationalism and national interest to one of detachment. The social mobilizations for gender equality and elimination of patriarchal notions were emphasized within a given space for political freedom, prior to the conditions of a failed state. As social groups did not generate a revolutionary crisis under the quasi-civilian government and instead stressed gradual development, this article argues that the Myanmar’s social revolutionary pattern in the earlier years more closely resembles Tiruneh’s model of a spontaneous setting.

However, the revolution took on more characteristics of the planned pattern following the military coup d’etat. Preexisting social forces like civil society organizations united with new generations from the urban middle classes and leading to changes in the political and social ideology (Jordt, Than, and Lin 2021). This included an end to racist and sexist ideologies. In May 2021, groups of Generation Z, socially marginalized groups such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and asexual (LGBTQIA) and working-class-based movements, including peasants’ and laborers’ groups, joined the ethnic armed organizations together and established a new people’s army called People’s Defense Force (PDF).²

For gender equality movements in Myanmar, the planned revolution urged participants to collaborate across other sociological lines: class, race, and religion. As they argued, organizational strength, resources, public support, and ideological transformation all play a vital role in the planned setting. The more cohesive and complementary the groups are, the more resources and support they will be able provide participants to help them achieve their objectives. When it comes to changing ideology in a planned revolution, the desires of the key agents for reform must be voluntary, purposeful, and strategic (Tiruneh 2014). Thus, a planned revolution requires the incorporation of those who have resources and knowledge to lead a change. In the technological era, the digital generation’s contribution of technical expertise and political and social campaign ideas are vital to achieve the revolution’s goal.

The 2018 findings of Pew Research Center survey revealed that Gen Z, also referred to as the digital generation, is more racially and ethnically diverse than previous generations. As such, these digital natives have called for a more liberated and equal society (Parker and Igielnik 2020). For example, they supported the idea of using gender-neutral pronouns and putting more gender options on official documents. Moreover, this digital generation has an advantage of being able to initiate global-scale activism by using connective action to promote inclusiveness and to overcome marginalization (Spyrou 2020 cited in Biswas 2021:2).

The 2021 revolution in Myanmar was not voluntary (according to Tironeh’s model) at first, but it got more coordinated and planned as different social groups joined. They created more opportunities to use their technological advantages in social mobilization, such as organizing online campaigns and revolutionary forces, disseminating information, and engaging in fundraising activities. Furthermore, in contrast with previous movements, the 2021 uprising seemed to demand for a radical change to end the prolonged civil wars in the geographically peripheral areas and to eliminate social inequalities between different races, ethnicities, and genders. In the view of Latt (2021), Myanmar never had a true revolution; the 1988 movement was not a revolution as it did not anticipate societal reconstruction. As long as military dictatorship is founded on military power which constantly asserts that “might is right,” Latt argued that without changing society’s underlying ideals, neither economic nor social development will reform the entire system. Both social and armed revolution were joined together to end the fifty years’ dictatorship in Myanmar.

The Trend of Social Revolution for Gender Equality

Deconstructing gender norms and beliefs for social transformation

Following the Theory of Collective Behavior, Gurr (1973:362) argued that social change was related to any change in any of these determinants of actions, including: (1) values; (2) norms; (3) patterned forms of action and institutions by which people organized or are organized for action; and (4) situation and circumstances including environment, resources, and technology that can hinder or support the pursuit for change. For Gurr, the core argument regarding revolutions and social change is that there would be an identifiable, abrupt change in fundamental patterns of beliefs and action (Gurr 1973). In Myanmar, some people were willing to accept gradual economic and social change within the framework of given political freedoms; they simultaneously increased their resilience and ability to respond to social inequalities. Yet, the existing inequalities, injustices, and silent sufferings of people came to the fore, and people demanded more radical social change following the military coup. Though the revolution was not planned, the revolutionary movements emerged as a coalition between civilians, CSOs, women’s and workers’ organizations and ethnic armed groups. Then, the CSOs’ efforts and gradual contributions for social transformation could be acted upon.

Sarong and Power

During the anti-coup movements, there were many diverse campaigns intending to change people’s values and norms about gender. For instance, the “Sarong (Htamein) Revolution” on International Women’s Day (March 8). This movement engaged social taboos regarding menstruation as well as stereotypes about masculinity. On the day of the Sarong Revolution, some women used their sarongs as marching flags and others hanged them high on a line to make a barricade. Some men wrapped sarongs around their heads. The movement was intended to eradicate the misogynistic norms including those that argue that women’s sarongs are dirty, awful, and contain evil magic (Lusan, Hlaing, and Fishbein 2021).

The Sarong Revolution served to challenge male superiority and the military’s superstitious beliefs. Myanmar Buddhists have historically believed men to be superior to women due to possessing hpon or an essential male power. Khaing (1984) explained that although hpon is not evidenced in doctrinal Buddhism,³ it is part of popular interpretation among Myanmar Buddhists (cited in Miedema, Shwe, and Kyaw 2016:676). Hpon represents power and nobility possessed only by men, and women are regarded as lesser for not having it. According to anthropologist Melford Spiro (1977), in Burmese belief systems, if a woman’s head leans on a man’s right shoulder, or if she sleeps, walks, sits, or eats on his right side, or if the lower part of her body or her skirt is higher than him, a man’s hpon can be decreased, if not eliminated. The threat is related to perceptions about the vagina and womb being polluting and therefore harmful to men. The genitalia of postpartum women are considered to be exceptionally threatening (Spiro 1977:266, 267).

In everyday folklore, believers in the power of the sarong point to the story of Nanmadaw Mae Nu. In the early nineteenth century, Mae Nu, a common woman, was bathing in the river when a hawk came and grabbed her sarong. The bird carried it away and dropped it on the left wing of the southern royal palace of Konbaung King Bagyidaw. As a result, Mae Nu piqued the king’s interest, and she later rose from her humble beginnings to become his queen (Tha 2019). She was one of the most powerful queens in the Konbaung Dynasty, and her daughter became Queen Sin Phyu Ma Shin under the rule of King Mindon. Her granddaughter, Chief Queen Suphaya Latt, under the administration of King Thibaw, would become notorious for her alleged power-thirsty domineering of her husband’s authority. Mae Nu’s story is still referenced in contemporary Burmese narratives as evidence of the sarong’s power as an improper thing with nefarious powers.

In daily practice today, women’s clothes, particularly the sarong and underwear, are washed separately from men’s clothing. When they are placed out to dry, women’s garments are hung below men’s and at the back of the house. Men are cautious not to walk under a line of sarongs, as doing so would threaten their hpon. Women who abide by and follow such social practices have been praised as “good women.” In reverse, the power of women’s sarong creates a paradox: belief in the sarong as an unclean and untouchable thing also imbues it with a power that can threaten male superiority.

As the social taboos about the sarong are deeply rooted in Myanmar society, it is not easy to transform those gender attitudes quickly, though there have been important efforts to do so. For example, performance artist Htein Lin used women’s sarongs for his public exhibitions from 2015 to 2019. His works earned praise from women’s rights defenders, but at the same time, garnered criticism and attacks from the ultranationalist monks, their followers, and the anti-modernists (Myint 2019). Yet, this trend changed in the 2021 uprising when protestors used sarongs as weapons counter the social taboos of Burmese society and the superstitious beliefs of the military. Some still maintained their gender stereotypes about the sarong, but women’s rights activists changed those people’s attitudes and encouraged them to view sarongs as a powerful tool to attack the military. The lines of sarongs hanging over the streets like barricades caused insecure feelings for the security forces. The nationwide sarong campaign on 8 March challenged gender stereotypes of patriarchal society in a setting they created.

The massive participation of protestors in the Sarong Revolution indicated how the new generation accepted new perspectives which were detached from traditional norms. In contrast, 2021’s “Sarong Revolution” discarded old ideas like building male centralism by oppressing women and their dresses. In this light, it can be said that the sarong movement has been one of the initiatives which cut off the branches and the roots of patriarchal practices supported by the military. It is a breakthrough the previous movements never had; for instance, the previous nationwide uprisings such as the 8888 movement and the Saffron Revolution in 2007 aimed solely at changing the regime, rather than revolutions leading to the changes of societal attitudes, including gender stereotypes.

Fighting against Misogyny

Women’s activism needs to oppose the dual evils of dictatorship and the patriarchal system. Bahlieda (2015:73) has identified the concept of neopatriarchy, which extends from dominance of the father or other male in the family to male forces in the entire society through grabbing “power, money, and might” or “god, guns, and greed” which control the government, economic system, and the military.

Two ways of strengthening male power can be found in Myanmar: supporting religious myths and supporting military power. First, based on the religious norm, believing in hpon (masculine power) and reinforcing that power again and again through myths and daily practice is just supporting male privilege and ultramasculine virility (Naujoks and Ko 2018). Second, special reports compiled by The Shan Women’s Action Network (2002) and The Free Burma Rangers (2019) added “sexual violence” as a methodology by which the military constructs its power. As they argued, the junta used rape as a weapon over ethnic minority women to disgrace and devalue the ethnic armed forces and their communities.

However, not every man has benefited from male supremacy. They can be fighters, mediators, and peace-builders, or they can also be victims, survivors of violence, and defenders in armed conflict, land seizures, or migration. Nevertheless, even men can be trapped within their constructed norms and can be disadvantaged and victims of the patriarchal system. Clowes (2013) and Naujoks and Ko (2018) suggested that men’s vulnerability in different ways from women’s also needed to be recognized and addressed. Gender-equitable norms should be promoted, for instance, saying “good people” instead of referring to “good men” or “good women.” Furthermore, the advocated norms should not equate “manliness” with “power over others,” which does not mean “men” as “enemies,” just strategic partners. In this light, the gender ideological revolution was brought through the general strike: first, eliminating male dominance thoughts; second, reducing social taboos; third, breaking stereotypes of masculinity; and finally, promoting the movements of marginalized gender groups.

First of all, the Sarong Revolution sought to overpower traditional male chauvinism. Some male protestors recognized the power of sarong as a weapon to attack the military and followed women’s lead in that movement. On the other hand, they rejected the old perspective which saw the sarong as unclean and untouchable. Some male protesters wrapped sarongs around their heads taking portraits of themselves and sharing them on Facebook. They saw these actions as mocking the superstitious beliefs of military personnel. Such changes indicated that the 2021 uprising was more social and cultural revolutionary as the movements have gone beyond gender identity politics rather than just protesting against the coup.

Second, the 2021 movement also changed men’s and women’s perspectives on social taboos, particularly about menstrual pads. Mainstream culture has placed stigma on female bodies and believes menstrual blood is dirty. As a result, women and girls are taught not to discuss their menstrual hygiene and reproductive health widely in the community, except for interpersonal support from their female guardians and friends (Paing 2019). This creates insecure feelings for women during their period and makes them shameful about openly buying menstrual pads.

Unexpectedly, menstrual pads also became an issue to be discussed widely by the community in the Sarong Revolution. Pads were also hung on the line together with sarongs; Lau (2021) and Nachemson (2021) noted, which seemed like adding a petrified item to challenge the military security forces. Furthermore, on the social media, protesters shared tips about other useful applications of the products, “[a] pad can be used effectively to help temporarily control bleeding of minor cuts and wounds during the crisis.” Such notes were very popular and were shared by thousands of Facebook users in the last week of February; the time the military started shooting at protesters in Yangon. Men became interested in using the pads and even started discussing different types and brands of pads. The Facebook conversations between men and women of Generation Z about pads tended to be a light discussion. For further progress regarding the former taboo, more people have expressed awareness of the particular needs of women in regard to aid delivery for internally displaced peoples and political prisoners. A dividing line between male and female entities faded as men and women exchanged their issues, calling for open discussion. Accordingly, men participated voluntarily in buying and donating menstrual pads.

Third, young men broke some masculine stereotypes regarding appearance and the way of dressing to show the state of togetherness and solidarity with all oppressed gender identities. For instance, men were actively involved in “Red Lipstick” and “Flower” campaigns on 19 June, remarking women’s activism and courage. The posts on social media about men putting on lipstick and wearing flowers enhanced peer-to-peer motivation to take part in the supporting activities for women. The conditions like all being oppressed and treated unequally awakened people that they all were on the same boat, rather than differentiating gender identities of people being in brutal repression. “Male engagement” was achieved in promoting male participation in the campaigns which recognized the sufferings of marginalized gender groups.

Similarly, femboy culture was also introduced during the protest to counter ideas about toxic masculinity. The term femboy came out in the late 1990s not only to devalue customary male standards and roles but also to embrace individualism (Exum 2020). That trend, engaging femboy movement with the protest against the military junta, has been new to Myanmar people. Mobilizing people with a new approach could be a good initiative leading to a social and cultural ideological revolution, which aims to go beyond the elimination of dictatorship (Jordt, Than, Lin 2021:14). People also encouraged the adoption of femboy outfits to attract media attention. Based on the people’s interest in femboy culture, the protestors also brought another creative idea in which changing outfits and changing appearance between men and women, even those who did not themselves identify as femboys. Gender binding fashion challenged the rules of who wore what and blurred gender lines regarding appearance and clothing.

Finally, the protestors appreciated the efforts and contributions of people from marginalized gender identities. Significantly, 2021 protesters supported the equal rights campaigns of LGBTQIA people. In the 8888 uprisings, there was evidence that the LGBTQIA members used to lead their own community’s group for protest by shouting the slogan, “To Get Democracy Is Our Cause, Our Cause.” Unlike the previous demonstration, the LGBTQIA groups mobilized people to recognize the inequalities of LGBTQIA and support their rights through their rainbow banners “Release our leaders, Respect our votes, Reject military coup. LGBTQIA 4Democracy.”

It was obvious to witness that LGBTQIA in the recent anti-coup protest possessed their symbols, such as a pride costume and rainbow anti-coup sign, that can represent their identity (Hlaing and Fishbein 2021). According to the experiences of some LGBTQIA protestors, others became interested in the rainbow flag and inquired about its meaning. Some expressed their appreciation of the courage of LGBTQIA members. One of the transgender activists, Sue Sha Shin Thant, raised, “We are like one group; we are no different. I am proud of being LGBT, and I am proud of myself participating in the protests. Our participation will be a landmark event for the next generation.”⁴ Reports from LGBTQIA CSOs highlight that with the five months of the coup, there were twelve cases of LGBTQIA fatalities, with seventy-three being arrested and/or charged under 505 (a), sixty-five still being detained, and twenty-eight either in hiding or having fled to non-State Administration Council controlled areas.

Women’s Representation at the Institutional Level and Informal Spaces

In addition to the deconstruction of gender norms in nationwide protests, changes in gender representation were also seen at the institutional level. For instance, the NUG increased the number of women representatives in the governmental ministerial positions and extended the Ministry of Women, Youths, and Children Affairs separately to ensure their full enjoyment of human rights and inclusiveness in the development process. These outcomes are thought to be the result of gender activists’ efforts during the previous legislative term, as they advocated for increased female political representation in parliament and decision-making positions. Moreover, women’s courage and capacity, particularly in the first rally of female garment factory workers in Yangon and the Sarong Revolution, proved that they are capable of holding leadership positions. These circumstances prompted the NUG, the underground government, to become more gender responsive.

As a result, approximately 30% of the executives and ministers of the initial formation of the NUG (eight out of twenty-six) were women, but the group expanded to thirty-five members by the end of July.⁵ In contrast, in the former government term (2015–2020), Aung San Suu Kyi was the only woman in the national-level cabinet; two out of fourteen State/Region Chief Ministers and one out of fourteen State/Region Hluttaw speakers of the house were female. In this light, the number of appointed female ministers was the most significant compared with the previous government term; and giving more spaces to women at the ministry level meant to support the affirmative action for a gender quota, 30% of women’s involvement in the government bodies.

Zin Mar Aung was appointed as a Minister of Foreign Affairs, the second female minister in Foreign Affairs Department after Aung San Suu Kyi’s position. Khin Ma Ma Myo was named Deputy Minister of Defense and became the first female to hold this position in the Defense Ministry. Except for Aung San Suu Kyi, none of the female members in the cabinets of the NUG is descended from an elite political family, though previously, the wives and daughters of the high-ranking officials used to be given high positions in the government or ethnic-armed groups in Myanmar. This trend initiated a move from kinship-based politics to civilian rule.

In terms of intersectionality, the newly formed NUG was also composed of young ethnic women being appointed as the deputy ministers, such as a Karen woman Naw Htoo Phaw (Deputy Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management), a Shanni woman Ei Thinzar Maung (Deputy Minister of Women, Youths and Children Affairs), and a Kachin woman Ja Htoi Pan (Deputy Minister of Education). Then NUG appointed an openly LGBT minister in the Ministry of Human Rights which was extended on the 3rd of May. This represented an attempt to demonstrate that sexual orientation was irrelevant when considering a candidate for a government ministry position.

As mentioned earlier, women actively engaged in the strike. Moreover, as noted by Khan (2021), the Women’s League of Burma estimated that approximately 60% of protesters were women, while the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners indicated that women accounted for almost 40% of detainees. The number of female militants joining PDF supported by the NUG was expected to be high, but they were least likely to be given a leadership position. In this regard, female participation was more significantly recognized in the nationwide uprisings than in previous movements. However, not all of them were given an equal chance to take leadership positions at different institutional levels. The meaningful institutional change needed to be implemented for the effective inclusiveness of marginalized groups at all levels.

Regarding the institutional change, almost 30% of women’s involvement was initiated in the core body of the NUG which represented as a legitimate government of Myanmar with the support of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, a group of elected MPs in the 2020 general election.⁶ As a progressive step of social change for gender equality, the NUG pioneered the increase of women’s participation in the government by using de jure recognition.

By looking at the efforts and contributions for social change in gender perspective, it was witnessed that the four social determinants (people’s value, people’s norms, institution, and circumstance) were not transformed sequentially; instead, these were interrelated and complementary to each other. More precisely, this session first addresses how social taboos on sarongs were deconstructed, before moving on to other forms of activism, including online movements, for gender equality to challenge misogynism. Then, this session concludes with a discussion of women’s political representation in NUG, which demonstrates how social and political attitudes changed throughout revolution.

Reinforcing Gender Stereotypes: Drawbacks in Social Revolution

As mentioned earlier, Myanmar’s Spring Revolution was not voluntary according to Tironeh’s model since people from different levels of the society had not come to organize together before the coup; instead, they had accepted a steady change in the social, political, and economic arena. The boiling point was reached only after their democratic dream was absolutely shattered—which sparked a revolution. Having said by people that injustice, oppression, and unequal treat of the military were intolerable, the hatred upon the oppressors pushed people into a moral dilemma when they wanted to defeat their enemies by any means. Moreover, it is questionable if the changes in people’s thinking in social norms can be sustained or entrenched in society.

In Myanmar’s revolution, some pitfalls were found, which reinforced traditional gender stereotypes and women’s subordination. The Sarong Revolution was a double-edged sword as it had two contradictory meanings: empowering the sarong with a positive view on the one hand and strengthening the belief in sarong’s magic power on the other. That movement aimed to remove misogynist norms on women’s clothes for the general public; in contrast, it can be interpreted as strengthening the military’s misogynistic belief about the sarong. This trend unintentionally led to some negative results such as gender issues being taken advantage of in order to try to devalue the dignity of the military personnel and pro-junta group. For example, the illustrations of some cartoonists reinforced patriarchy, sexism, and homophobia (Kyi 2021). Comics portrayed female civil servants who did not join the CDM as sex objects. Portraits of military personnel were transformed into gay icons out of irony.

In the first week of May, criticism prompted the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) media group to remove a sexist cartoon from their Facebook page.⁷ However, the cartoons or words involving racial and gender discrimination, as well as body shaming, continue to be commonly used to defame the opposing groups. For instance, the Senior General Min Aung Hlaing was called “Ma-Ah-La” (the acronym of mother fucker in Burmese) or “Ah Pu Lay” (the shorty), and the words like “The military generals should have dressed up women’s sarong for their cowardice” were used.

Furthermore, Thiha (2021) observed that the opponents of the coup distributed pornographic videos and sexually explicit images of persons with a military background or those supporting the army. Under the theme of “social punishment,” wives and daughters of the military backup families were mainly targeted. These cases highlighted that even the pro-democracy activists tended to follow the oppressive way used by the military toward ethnic women in the prolonged armed conflicts, which was the cultivation of “rape culture” as a tactical weapon or repression of women’s identity and sexuality.

In this context, two issues were found: a moral dilemma and a lack of strong adherence to social justice values. This revolution was the power struggle between the armed and unarmed groups and between the privileged and underprivileged groups. In this case, the concern of unarmed group is whether or not it was fair to allow the powerful and the powerless group to play under the same rules, as this way could favor the powerful people to win and the marginalized group to lose, which would impose a violent and repressive agenda on the powerless. As a result, the moral values embraced by modern liberal society do not appear to be fully exercised by the society struggling to attain the prerequisite conditions of liberation. The application of immoral principles is supposed to be a weapon for powerless groups to exercise their power when their status is endangered by being marginalized to the extreme edge. This trend suggests that the revolutionary groups unexpectedly or unintendedly reinforced the norms and values they had previously condemned. When the military used excessive violence and oppressive measures, the moral values of democratic forces were particularly questioned in terms of how they would conduct those principles.

In respect of these issues in Myanmar’s revolution, it was obvious that society was forced to catch up with the rapid change before truly understanding and accepting the essence of democratic values by different social groups. Although a ten-year partial democratization with military influence aided social groups in establishing solidarity, there was insufficient time and space to embed all social justice principles into the community widely. As a result, social groups had to rely on slow and steady growth, and sometimes the progress may move backward.

When the huge revolt of 2021 became widespread, society had to strive to keep up with a quick shift in ideology. This trend posed a challenge and a social dilemma for society, since they were not appropriately guided and trained for social transformation. Thus, throughout the revolution, social mobilizers worked to enhance public awareness of gender equality and sensitivity while also reversing old gender stereotypes at the same time.

Conclusion

The military coup in Myanmar in 2021 resulted in mass upheavals, though civilians had increased their adaptability with a partial democracy during the prior decade. The CSOs led people’s campaigns for social transformation using a spontaneous revolutionary approach, but the intersection with different issues needed to be strengthened, as changing people’s prejudices required more time. In terms of gender equality, the intersection of gender with age, class, and ethnicity still required improvement. Then, the revolution was changed into a planned setting and more coordinated among protesters’ groups with different interests such as class-, gender-, or ethnicity-based issues.

Regarding gender issues, unlike the freedom movements under previous regimes, the 2021 Myanmar’s Spring Revolution raised a series of campaigns and movements which focused on women’s rights, LGBTQIA rights, the transformation of gender norms and removal of misogyny. The uprisings received huge public support, and the trend led to open discussion and sharing about the gender-related topics ever ignored before. The new social and cultural revolutionary approaches and campaign ideas brought by Generation Z enlightened the protesters to call for a radical change where people can fully enjoy democratic values. In the case of Myanmar’s 2021 nationwide uprising, the revolution is just demanding a change, not the changes in the society that are calling for the revolution.

Thus, the pro-democracy reformists have two remaining responsibilities: (1) end the dictatorship; and (2) promote social transformation in line with the establishment of a new democratic society. Within six months of the coup, having seen more female representation in the higher leadership positions of the government body, not all different levels enjoyed such opportunities. The reason for this is that the shift was brought about by an unexpected revolution, and it is still necessary to wait and evaluate how effectively gender attitudes and practices have changed in a long run. The revolution received public awareness and coordination in gender issues more than before, women and LGBTQIAs continued to be singled out for humiliation to attack the opposing groups. The society was struggling between the upholding attitudes and the justice society they claimed for. Thus, this study believes that the social revolution is supposed to take more time than the armed revolution to end military dictatorship.