Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good by Marta Jimenez

Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good is a close examination of an underappreciated topic in Aristotle's theories of moral psychology and moral development: shame. Jimenez argues that shame is a sui generis emotion that plays a crucial role in the habituation of moral virtue in young humans who are not yet virtuous and therefore cannot fully see the moral landscape as accurately as the fully developed virtuous adult. On this view, shame acts as a protovirtue that orients the developing moral agent toward "the noble" (τό καλόν), using social cues to learn not only what actions should be avoided or performed, but also what makes those actions shameful or noble, allowing them to eventually see beyond these external correlates of the noble and develop a grasp of nobility itself. Shame is therefore an indispensable tool for cultivating the emotional, perceptual, and cognitive abilities of a person on the path to virtue.

The treatment of shame presented here is meant to bridge what Jimenez calls the "moral upbringing gap." On the one hand, nonvirtuous people are able to engage in the same behavior as virtuous people: they can, in principle, eat moderately, stand firm in battle, use their money judiciously, and so on, in a way that is externally indistinguishable from the virtuous. But there is no guarantee that performing these behaviors will lead the nonvirtuous person to develop the psychological traits necessary to perform virtuous actions as the virtuous person does them, with the correct motivation, emotion, and reasoning (e.g. performing a virtuous action enthusiastically, because it is the right thing to do, in a clear-eyed, informed way). Jimenez argues that shame can bridge this gap between action and affect by using signs like the disapproval of others or the depictions of literary exemplars such as epic heroes, not only to see what actions should be done or avoided, but also to begin to appreciate how and why these actions are in fact noble. So understood, shame is directed at the noble itself, not merely at the things that tend to be superficially associated with the noble (such as the pleasures of social praise or the inconveniences of ill repute).

The chapters of this short book naturally fall into three groups. The first section (chapters 1 and 2) focuses on common interpretations of shame's role in Aristotle's ethics and objections to these interpretations. Chapter 1 studies the moral upbringing gap discussed above, with emphasis on moral motivation; chapter 2 focuses on the role of pleasure and pain. Both chapters draw heavily on classic works on the topic, such as Miles Burnyeat's "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good" (in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980], 69-92) and Nancy Sherman's The Fabric of Character (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

The middle section of the book describes the nuances of moral development in Aristotle's moral psychology. Chapter 3 is a case study on the varieties of states that resemble courage; this chapter may initially appear to be a digression, but it highlights the many distinct psychological components of true virtue, giving us a better sense of just how complex the path toward moral development is, and hence what role shame would need to play in this development. Chapter 4 focuses on honor, with special attention paid to the importance of genuine approbation of praiseworthy actions from reputable sources.

The final section of the book examines shame itself and the indispensable role it plays in moral development. Chapter 5 argues that shame is a sui generis emotion, not quite a full disposition (hexis), but more than a mere passion (pathos). This chapter also argues that we need not posit any special distinctions to harmonize two key passages on shame from books IV.9 and X.9 of the Nicomachean Ethics that may appear to be in tension. Chapter 6 shows how shame operates in moral development and why it is a praiseworthy thing for young persons to have: it helps them begin to see what the noble is and why it is a choiceworthy aim. As persons become more virtuous, the importance of shame diminishes, since the virtuous person can see nobility directly and is no longer tempted by shameful actions.

The aim of this book is to show how shame can play an important role in moral development without falling into two problems: (1) making developing moral agents heteronomous, because they are dependent on the moral outlook of others, and (2) making developing moral agents superficial, because they focus on how they appear to others rather than how they really are. Judged by its own aim, this book is a success: it provides a plausible reconstruction of the nature of shame in Aristotle and its function in the habituation of virtue in developing moral agents. It is also enviably clear and well-organized, with an adept balance of textual interpretation, engagement with contemporary secondary sources, and an intuitive presentation of a concept that would operate very differently in the original Greek context of Aristotle's thought than we are likely to view it today.

In some ways, however, the narrow focus of this book works to its detriment, as there are many topics that the reader might like to see discussed more thoroughly. For instance, the discussion of moral education in the Politics is only passingly addressed, though Jimenez's reliance on other texts (such as Rhetoric II.6 and Metaphysics IX.8) shows that the work is not restricted to being a treatment of the Nicomachean Ethics account specifically. The Eudemian Ethics is assumed to be mostly consonant with the NE and is therefore used largely as a resource for additional textual support to supplement the NE. It is a striking omission that Jimenez does not discuss the inclusion of shame as its own virtue in the EE's table of virtues and vices at 1221a1: this is at least a prima facie departure from NE IV.9's treatment of shame as merely a protovirtue, and calls into question the methodology of pulling from both the NE and EE together to defend a single interpretation. Moreover, if shame is a real virtue in the EE, this would seem to complicate chapter 6's thesis that shame ceases to be a praiseworthy state once agents develop into fully virtuous adults (for an excellent treatment of this topic, see Christopher Raymond, "Shame and Virtue in Aristotle," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 53 [2017]: 111–61). As to the sui generis nature of shame in Aristotle's ethics, one might have questions about the assimilation of shame and honor in chapter 5 (concepts that Aristotle treats distinctly in the NE and EE) and wonder why other states like friendship or pride could not operate in a similar way to shame in moral development or hold a similar mixed-state role in Aristotle's moral psychology.

Despite these lingering questions, Jimenez's book does an admirable job of doing what it sets out to do. It deserves a space on the shelf of any scholar interested in Aristotle's moral psychology.