Untranslatability and resistance are terms that have a longstanding place in psychoanalytic theory and philosophies of law. But how might these terms labor differently whence their conditions rest on the founding conditions of antiblackness that position blackness as a type of permanent errancy? Pursuing the question on the untranslatability of blackness, antiblackness, and the resistances therein and thereof, the article adumbrates on the strange and estranged forty-year gap between the anti-lynching legislation’s enactment and its first court hearing (1969) as well as its second court hearing (1999)—cases which have translated the statute’s original legislative intent from anti-lynching to “self-lynching.” As the article considers the untranslatability of blackness in the various registers of “resistance” in law, representation, and the psychic economies of antiblackness, it also reflects on how the transience of such translation casts an impossible “self” via a mode of lynching in the juridical imaginary—a type of foreclosure that precedes and operates beyond the orders of de jure and de facto law.