

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA'S SOCIAL POLICY COALITIONS

The Insider/Outsider Labor Divide and Attitudes
toward Different Welfare Programs in Mexico

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**SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR:
“The Microfoundations of Latin America’s Social Policy Coalitions: The
Insider/Outsider Labor Divide and Attitudes toward Different Welfare
Programs in Mexico”**

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Part A: Description of Meta-Analysis

To identify the census of relevant estimates, I scoured the literature (aided by a research assistant) for studies that fit *all four* of the following criteria: (1) the study uses survey data collected in (2) at least one Latin American country; (3) the study contains at least one regression with a measure of informality on the righthand side; and (4) the regression/s with informality on the righthand side have a dependent variable that measures attitudes toward a named noncontributory policy (e.g., *Bolsa Família* in Brazil), a list of noncontributory policies, and/or a named contributory program (e.g., *INSS* in Brazil). We first collected a few studies about which we already knew based on our knowledge of the literature. We then conducted a Google Scholar search using derivations of “informality” AND words such as “welfare,” “social policy,” “noncontributory policy,” “conditional cash transfers,” “*Bolsa Família*,” “*Seguro Popular*,” “*Prospera*,” and so on, and we did this in English, Portuguese, and Spanish. I also sent a query to an email listserve of subscribers who study social policy and labor in Latin America, and I sent personal queries to experts on the topic. The search encompassed the gray literature of unpublished working papers and dissertations. This search constituted part of a larger search for studies on the impact of informality on other political attitudes and behaviors in Latin America (Baker and Dorr 2022).

In the end, the search returned the five previous studies¹ reported in Figure 1. To be clear, I closely read more than thirty studies on the topic, but only these five had estimates that fit the four criteria above. Several studies fell shy only on criterion 4, containing models with informality on the righthand side with a dependent variable that measured attitudes not toward specific contributory or noncontributory programs but rather toward redistribution in general

¹ Altamirano, Berens, and Deeg 2022; Altamirano Hernández 2015; Baker and Velasco-Guachalla 2018; Carnes and Mares 2016; Menéndez González 2021

(Baker et al. 2020; Maldonado and Constanza Ayala 2020) or toward private-versus-public social programs (e.g., Berens 2015; Prillaman 2017). As mentioned in the text, I also found two studies that used survey data with the requisite right- and lefthand variables but that did not report the relevant estimate (Mundim et al. 2019; Rennó 2020). For these, I obtained the original survey datasets and estimated the coefficients myself. These regressions are reported in Table S1.

Table S1: Original Regression Estimates for the Meta-Analysis

Dependent variable:	BEPS 2018 (Rennó 2020)		IBOPE/SECOM-PR 2014 (Mundim et al. 2019)	
	Support for <i>Bolsa Família</i>		Index of support for <i>Bolsa Família</i>	Index of support for noncontributory health programs
	Wave 2	Wave 3		
Informal worker	-0.022 (0.309)	-0.070 (0.320)	0.215* (0.055)	0.088 (0.057)
Formal worker	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline	Omitted Baseline
Non-EAP	0.376 (0.336)	0.516 (0.343)	0.213* (0.057)	0.029 (0.059)
Years of schooling	-0.105 (0.061)	-0.090 (0.064)	-0.120* (0.0104)	-0.043* (0.011)
Age	-0.901* (0.378)	-0.202 (0.383)	-0.456* (0.056)	-0.127* (0.058)
Woman	-0.064 (0.250)	-0.039 (0.265)	0.087* (0.044)	0.001 (0.046)
Observations	386	327	1,982	1,982
	Ordered logit, informality measured in w1		OLS	OLS

Notes: Shaded coefficients are the relevant ones added to the meta-analysis. Cutpoints and constants are not shown.
Sources: Brazilian Electoral Panel Study (BEPS) 2018; IBOPE/*Secretaria de Comunicação Social da Presidência da República* (IBOPE/SECOM-PR).

Table S2 contains information about sources used in the meta-analysis.

Table S2: Sources and Notes for Meta-analysis

Study and Location of Estimates	Num. of estimates	Median <i>N</i>	Countries and Years	Social Policies Queried (DV)	Measure of Informality (IV)
Baker and Velasco-Guachalla 2018, Table 4	6	1,773	Argentina 2015; Brazil 2014	<i>AUH, Programa familias (AR); List of means-tested programs, Bolsa Familia versus INSS (BR)</i>	Social protection definition
Carnes and Mares 2016, Tables 2 and 4	2	1,220	Bolivia 2012	Pooling versus separating pension contributions	Social protection definition
Altamirano Hernández 2015, Table 3.4	4	1,141	State of Mexico, 2014	<i>IMSS/ISSSTE, Oportunidades, 65 y mas</i>	Social protection definition
Menéndez González 2021, Table A.2	1	722	Argentina, 2015	Programs for informals versus unemployment insurance for formals	Social protection definition
Altamirano, Berens, and Deeg 2022, Table 1	1	806	Puebla and Querétaro, 2018	<i>Prospera</i>	Social protection and legalistic definition
IBOPE/SECOM-PR 2014*	2	1,982	Brazil 2014	<i>Bolsa Familia, Mais Médicos, Farmácia Popular</i>	Social protection definition
BEPS 2018*	2	356	Brazil, 2018	<i>Bolsa Familia,</i>	Social protection definition

* Original analyses performed and reported in Table S1.

Source: Compiled by author

After compiling these studies and findings, I recorded the coefficients and standard errors (the raw materials of any meta-analysis) on the informality IV reported in the regression tables.

In a few instances, the models refer to a relevant estimate that could not be ascertained from the tables. For these, I retrieved the estimate through personal communication with the author. When a source reports multiple models with only a minor tweak in the specification (e.g., adding/dropping control variables), I take the average of these estimates and only report them as one estimate. This avoids double counting of virtually equivalent estimates (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012).

In readying the raw estimates for analysis, I had to make sure that they were all properly directioned, meaning they captured the effect of informality (relative to the benchmark of formality), and the DV ranged from distaste for noncontributory (and/or support for

contributory) to support for noncontributory (and/or opposition to contributory). This entailed switching the signs on regression coefficients when the author(s) deviated from this direction on either the IV or the DV. The formula to convert an OLS regression coefficient to a partial correlation is $r = t/\sqrt{t^2 + df}$, with a precision of $s = 1/\sqrt{(1 - r^2)/df}$ (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012). I use this formula for r even when the authors used an MLE technique, as it still yields sufficiently close results.

The weighted average in Figure 1 is the random effect estimate (REE), appropriate for instances like this in which estimates are drawn from different populations (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012, 46). A fixed effect estimate (FEE) assumes all estimates come from the same population. The REE is calculated as follows: $\bar{x} = \frac{\sum w_i r_i}{\sum w_i}$, where $w_i = 1/(s_i^2 + s_h^2)$, i indexes estimates, and h indexes the different studies. Although scholarly opinions on proper weights vary, the decision in this instance is largely inconsequential because the reported estimates have standard errors of similar size and thus receive relatively similar weight. For example, the unweighted average effect is +.038, and the FEE is +.045.

In the text I also report the average effect size in units of standard deviations. I do this because one of the two variables (informality) is measured binarily, rendering partial correlations slightly less useful. To calculate this, I ran a separate meta-analysis on the estimates expressed in units of standard deviation. In most instances, I retrieved the estimates in this unit through personal communication with the author/s.

Part B: Sampling Procedure and Properties


Respondent selection for face-to-face interviews occurred through multistage national probability sampling and frequency matching. The primary sampling unit (PSU) was *secciones electorales*, a geographically defined area that contains between 50 and 1500 registered voters

and one or two *casillas* (polling sites). Roughly 120 *secciones electorales* were chosen randomly, with the probability of selection directly related to their size. The secondary sampling unit (SSU) was the *manzana*, which defines a small geographic area about the size of a city block (or some similarly sized contiguous area in rural areas). Two *manzanas* were chosen per *sección electoral*. The tertiary sampling unit (TSU) was the household, with five chosen per *manzana* using a systematic skipping pattern. Within each household, interviewers chose respondents using a frequency matching approach to approximate a 50/50 gender distribution and a representative age distribution.

The sample represents the population extremely well. To illustrate, I compare the distribution of educational attainment in the sample to that in the population (the latter based on the 2015 and 2020 censuses).² I choose educational attainment since it was *not* one of the frequency-matching variables; thus, the sample is not intentionally designed to mimic the population on this variable. Figure S1 shows the distribution of educational attainment in the survey and in the 2020 Census. The two sets of figures are not perfectly comparable because census figures imply that educational attainment increased slightly between 2017 and 2020 and because the two define adulthood differently (census as 15+ and survey as 18+). Overall, however, the survey's estimates are very close—within just a few percentage points—of the census estimates.

² <https://www.inegi.org.mx/temas/educacion/>

Figure S1: Educational Attainment (as Share of the Adult Population)



Sample means for educational attainment are also very close to census means. Average years of schooling in the sample is 9.46 [9.20 9.72], which is very close to and statistically indistinguishable from the census-estimated mean of 9.39. Census-estimated means for men (9.53) and women (9.26) also fall within the confidence intervals generated from the sample: [9.51 10.27] and [8.70 9.39], respectively.

Finally, of the 344 respondents in the poll who are in dual-career marriages, 32% are in discordant marriages. This number is virtually identical to that found in Mexican household surveys (Galiani and Weinschelbaum 2012). Also, 27% of the sample are formal workers according to the social protection definition, which is close to the 35% found in a 2016 household survey (CEDLAS and the World Bank 2020).

Table S3 provides basic descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper.

Table S3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Support for IMSS versus SP	1,163	3.567	1.638	0	6
Support for IMSS versus PAM	1,151	3.748	1.832	0	6
Index of support for noncontributory programs	1,192	0.000	1.000	-2.587	1.657
Informal worker	1,205	0.409	0.492	0	1
Degree of informality	1,206	0.376	0.444	0	1
Non-EAP	1,205	0.380	0.486	0	1
Unemployed	1,205	0.056	0.231	0	1
Years of schooling	1,206	9.461	4.507	0	22
Age	1,206	42.33831	16.891	18	92
Woman	1,206	0.509	0.500	0	1
Informal worker*	1,195	0.570	0.495	0	1
Degree of informality*	1,206	0.532	0.428	0	1
Never in EAP	1,195	0.156	0.363	0	1
Prob. of transition	1,205	3.554	2.892	1	8
Formal benefits through spouse	1,177	0.127	0.334	0	1
Spouse eligible for noncontributory benefits	1,206	0.070	0.256	0	1

Source: Baker 2022.

Part C: Question Wordings

Support for IMSS versus SP: “Now, I’d like to ask you about the role of government in health insurance. Are you in favor of the government increasing spending and benefits on *IMSS*, which provides health insurance to some people through their jobs, or are you in favor of the government increasing spending and benefits on *Seguro Popular*, which provides health insurance to people that do not have it through their jobs? Or are you against the government increasing spending on either health plan? [Read the options again]: (a) *IMSS*, (b) *Seguro Popular*, or (c) no increase? [If answer of (a) or (b)] Are you very in favor, somewhat in favor, or slightly in favor?”

“Ahora, me gustaría preguntarle sobre el papel del gobierno en el seguro de salud. ¿Está Ud. a favor de que el gobierno aumente los gastos y beneficios del IMSS, el cual provee seguro de salud a algunas personas a través de sus empleos? ¿O está Ud. a favor de que el gobierno aumente los gastos y beneficios del Seguro Popular, que provee seguro de salud a personas que no tienen seguro a través de sus empleos? ¿O está Ud. en contra del gobierno de aumentar los gastos en cualquiera de los planes de seguro de salud? [LEER LAS OPCIONES OTRA VEZ]: (a) IMSS. (b) Seguro Popular. (c) O que no aumente. [Si (a) o (b)] ¿A este respecto su opinión es muy favorable, algo favorable, o poco favorable?”

(0) “Very in favor of *IMSS*”, (1) “somewhat in favor of *IMSS*”, (2) “slightly in favor of *IMSS*”, (3) “no increase”, (4) “slightly in favor of *SP*”, (5) “somewhat in favor of *SP*”, (6) “very in favor of *SP*”.

Support for PAM versus IMSS: “And on retirement plans, are you in favor of the government increasing spending and benefits on *IMSS*, which provides pension plans to some people through their jobs, or are you in favor of the government increasing spending and benefits

on *Programa de Pensión para Adultos Mayores*, which provides pension plans to people that do not have one through their jobs? Or are you against the government increasing spending on any retirement plans? [Read the options again]: (a) *IMSS*, (b) *Programa de Pensión para Adultos Mayores*, or (c) no increase? [If answer of (a) or (b)] Are you very in favor, somewhat in favor, or slightly in favor?"

"Y sobre los planes de retiro. ¿Está Ud. a favor de que el gobierno aumente los gastos y beneficios del IMSS, que provee planes de pensión a algunas personas a través de sus empleos? ¿O está Ud. a favor de que el gobierno aumente los gastos y beneficios del Programa de Pensión para Adultos Mayores, que provee planes de pensión a personas que no los tienen a través de sus empleos? ¿O está Ud. en contra de que el gobierno aumente los gastos en cualquiera de los planes de retiro? [LEER LAS OPCIONES OTRA VEZ]: (a) IMSS. (b) Programa de Pensión para Adultos Mayores. (c) O que no aumente. [Si (a) o (b)] ¿A este respecto su opinión es muy favorable, algo favorable, o poco favorable"

(0) "Very in favor of IMSS", (1) "somewhat in favor of IMSS", (2) "slightly in favor of IMSS", (3) "no increase", (4) "slightly in favor of PAM", (5) "somewhat in favor of PAM", (6) "very in favor of PAM".

Index of support for noncontributory programs. Each respondent's average on the two variables above. The resulting averages are standardized, so this variable is scored in units of standard deviations.

Formal worker and Informal worker (defined using the social protection definition): "Do you work? Yes or no? [If "yes"]: In your job, do you have a deduction in your paycheck for a retirement account? Yes [formal], no [informal], or you don't have a paycheck [informal]."

"¿Usted trabaja? Sí o no? [Si "Sí"]: ¿Por este trabajo le descuentan de la nómina una cuota para su jubilación o retiro? Si, no, o no tiene nómina?"

Degree of informality: This is each respondent's score on a latent trait recovered from estimating an IRT model (shown in Online Appendix Part D) on *Informal worker* and the two following alternative measures of sectoral status:

Legalistic definition: "In your job, do you have a written contract? (0) Yes or (1) no?"

"¿En su trabajo, cuenta con un contrato escrito? ¿Sí o no?"

Productive definition: "How many people, including yourself, work in your firm or business?" I code answers of 1 to 5 persons as informal (2), 11 and above as formal (0), and 6 to 10 persons as an intermediate category (1).

"¿Cuántas personas, incluyéndose a usted, laboran en su empresa o negocio? 1 persona, de 2 a 5 personas, de 6 a 10 personas, de 11 a 15 personas, de 16 a 20 personas, de 21 a 30 personas, de 31 a 50 personas, de 101 a 250 personas, de 251 a 500 personas, de 501 a más personas."

Unemployed and Non-EAP: "Do you work? Yes or no? [If "no"]: Then are you looking for work [unemployed], are you retired [non-EAP], are you a homemaker [non-EAP], or are you a student [non-EAP]?"

“¿Usted trabaja? Sí o no? [Si “No”]: Entonces, está buscando trabajo, es pensionado o jubilado, se dedica a los quehaceres del hogar, o se dedica a estudiar.

*Formal worker** and *Informal worker**: “Do you work? Yes or no? [If “yes”, then coded as *Formal worker* and *Informal worker* above. If “no”, then coded based on answer to the following question]: “In the last job you had ... did you have a deduction in your paycheck for a retirement account? Yes [formal], no [informal], or you didn’t have a paycheck [informal].” *En el último empleo que Ud. tuvo ... ¿Por este trabajo le descontaron de la nómina una cuota para su jubilación o retiro? Si, no, o no tuvo nómina?*

*Degree of informality**: This is each respondent’s score on a latent trait recovered from estimating an IRT model on *Informal worker** and the two following alternative measures of previous sectoral status:

Legalistic definition: “In the last job you had, did you have a written contract? (0) Yes or (1) no?”

“¿En su último trabajo, tenía un contrato escrito? ¿Sí o no?”

Productive definition: “How many people, including yourself, worked in your firm or business?” I code answers of 1 to 5 persons as informal (2), 11 and above as formal (0), and 6 to 10 persons as an intermediate category (1).

“¿Cuántas personas, incluyéndose a usted, laboraron en su empresa o negocio? 1 persona, de 2 a 5 personas, de 6 a 10 personas, de 11 a 15 personas, de 16 a 20 personas, de 21 a 30 personas, de 31 a 50 personas, de 101 a 250 personas, de 251 a 500 personas, de 501 a más personas.”

Never in EAP: “Do you work? Yes or no? [If “no”]: In the last job you had, were you own-account, did you have a boss and a job, did you work without pay, or have you never worked outside the house [never in EAP]?”

“¿Usted trabaja? Sí o no? [Si “No”]: En el último empleo que Ud. tuvo, ¿se dedicó a un negocio o actividad por su cuenta?, ¿tuvo trabajo con un jefe y un salario?, ¿tuvo trabajo sin pago?, o nunca trabajó afuera de la casa.

Prob. of transition: If respondent is a *Formal worker*, they were asked the following: “How probable do you think it is that in the next 5 years you will have a job that does NOT have a deduction in your paycheck for a retirement account—that is, a job in the informal sector? (4) Very probable, (3) quite probable, (2) somewhat probable, or (1) not at all probable.” If respondent is an *Informal worker*, they were asked the following: “How probable do you think it is that in the next 5 years you will have a job that DOES have a deduction in your paycheck for a retirement account—that is, a job in the formal sector? (5) Very probable, (6) quite probable, (7) somewhat probable, or (8) not at all probable.” These are the codes for the x-axis in Figure 2. Table 3 includes a dummy for seven of the eight categories.

“¿Qué tan probable cree Ud. que en los próximos 5 años tendrá un trabajo que NO tenga descuento jubilatorio en su nómina, es decir un trabajo en el sector informal? Muy probable, Bastante probable, Poco probable, Nada probable.” “¿Qué tan probable cree Ud. que en los próximos 5 años tendrá un trabajo que SÍ tenga descuento jubilatorio en

su nómina, es decir un trabajo en el sector formal? Muy probable, Bastante probable, Poco probable, Nada probable.”

*Formal benefits through spouse: “And your spouse. Through their job, do they have a deduction in their paycheck for a retirement account? (1 if R is not a Formal worker) Yes (0) no, (0) they don’t have a paycheck, (0) you don’t have a spouse, or (0) my spouse doesn’t work.”
¿Y su esposo/a, por su trabajo actual tiene descuento jubilatorio en la nómina de ella/él?
Sí, no, o no tiene nómina? [Si “no”]: Trabaja pero no tiene descuento? No tiene esposo/a Esposo/a no trabaja?*

*Spouse eligible for noncontributory benefits: “And your spouse. Through their job, do they have a deduction in their paycheck for a retirement account? (0) Yes, (1 if R is a Formal worker) no, (1 if R is a Formal worker) they don’t have a paycheck, (0) you don’t have a spouse, or (1 if R is a Formal worker) my spouse doesn’t work.”
¿Y su esposo/a, por su trabajo actual tiene descuento jubilatorio en la nómina de ella/él?
Sí, no, o no tiene nómina? [Si “no”]: Trabaja pero no tiene descuento? No tiene esposo/a Esposo/a no trabaja?*

Education level: “What was your final year of schooling?” I take the natural log of the codes below.

“¿Hasta qué año escolar estudió usted (grado máximo)?”

- 1 Ninguno
- 2 1° Primaria
- 3 2° Primaria
- 4 3° Primaria
- 5 4° Primaria
- 6 5° Primaria
- 7 6° Primaria
- 8 1° Secundaria
- 9 2° Secundaria
- 10 3° Secundaria
- 11 1° Bachillerato/Preparatoria o carrera técnica
- 12 2° Bachillerato/Preparatoria o carrera técnica
- 13 3° Bachillerato/Preparatoria o carrera técnica
- 14 1er Año de Universidad
- 15 2do Año Universidad
- 16 3er Año Universidad
- 17 4to Año Universidad
- 18 5to Año Universidad
- 19 6to Año Universidad o más
- 20 1er Año de Postgrado
- 21 2do Año de Postgrado
- 22 3er Año de Postgrado
- 23 4to Año de Posgrado o más

Wealth: Wealth is an asset ownership indicator (Filmer and Pritchett 2001) created from the latent trait of an IRT model I ran on the 18 items listed below. The variable is standardized to mean of zero and standard deviation of one.

1-16: “I’m going to read you a list of things. Please tell me which ones you have in your house. Piped water. Landline phone. Mobile phone. Subscription television. Washing machine. Refrigerator. Vacuum cleaner. Video games. Internet. DVD player. Gas stove. Electricity. Sewage connection. Personal computer. Computer tablet. Automobile.”

Le voy a leer una lista de cosas y dígame cuales tienen en su casa. Agua entubada. Teléfono fijo. Teléfono celular. TV de paga (cable, dish, sky)). Lavadora. Refrigerador. Aspiradora. Juego de video. Internet. Reproductor de DVD. Estufa de gas. Luz eléctrica. Drenaje). Computadora (portátil o PC). Tablet. Automóvil propio.

17: “Do you have a smartphone with access to the internet, such as a blackberry, iphone, android, etc.”

¿Tiene usted un Smartphone con acceso a Internet como una blackberry, iphone, android, etc.?

18. “How many light bulbs do you have in your home? “*¿Cómo cuántos focos tienen en su casa?*”

Part D: Item Response Theory Analysis of Three Informality Items

Besides the social protection definition, another definition of informality is the legalistic one, whereby the threshold of formality is reached when a signed contract that enforces the government labor code is in place (Perry et al. 2007, 29). Respondents were asked the following: “In your job, do you have a written contract? Yes [formal] or no [informal]?” The other main definition is the productive definition, which considers workers in small firms to be informal. This is considered the theoretically weakest of the three definitions (Gasparini and Tornarolli 2009, 20), but I still measure it: “How many people, including yourself, work in your firm or business?” Answers of 1 to 5 are informal, 11 and above are formal, and 6 to 10 compose an intermediate category. (Perry et al. 2007, 9).

To create the continuous *Degree of informality* measure (Holland 2017, chap. 2), I ran an item response theory (IRT) model on all three items to estimate each respondent’s placement on a latent formality↔informality trait. Table S4 reports the graded response IRT model on the three binary/ordinal informality items. The discrimination parameter estimates how well the item differentiates individuals on the latent trait (*Degree of informality*). The item with the largest

discrimination parameter is the most useful—the sharpest—in separating individuals into the two camps. The social protection definition has the largest discrimination parameter, and the productive definition, as posited by the literature, is the theoretically weakest.

Table S4: Convergent Validity of Different Measures of Informality: Results from an Item Response Theory Model, Mexico 2017


	Discrimination parameter	Difference parameter
Social protection definition (<i>Informal worker</i>)	6.587* (2.233)	-0.633* (0.054)
Legalistic definition	4.356* (0.747)	-0.473 (0.059)
Productive definition	2.573* (0.284)	-0.701* (0.072)
		-0.390* (0.064)

Notes: Entries are parameters estimates from a graded response IRT model. $N=680$.

Source: Baker 2022.

Part E: Figure 2 Redrawn for Entire Adult Population

Figure S2: Expectations about Future Job Transitions by Sector and Marital Situation among Adult Mexicans



Notes: $N = 1,082$

Source: Baker 2022.

Part F: Impact of Spouse's Sectoral Status with Fully Interactive Models

**Table S5: Testing the Impact of Intrahousehold Pooling:
Correlates of Attitudes toward Two Different Social Policy Programs in Mexico 2017**

Dependent variable:	Support for IMSS (low) vs. SP (high)	Support for IMSS (low) vs. PAM (high)	Index of support for noncontributory programs
Model Number:	S5.1	S5.2	S5.3
Not a formal worker	0.392 (0.225)	0.717* (0.220)	0.343* (0.120)
Spouse is formal worker	0.125 (0.347)	0.302 (0.347)	0.104 (0.186)
Not a formal worker × Spouse is formal worker	-0.347 (0.388)	-0.730† (0.386)	-0.368† (0.207)
Years of schooling	0.028 (0.116)	0.103 (0.113)	0.013 (0.060)
Age	0.007 (0.189)	0.377* (0.185)	0.078 (.010)
Woman	-0.004 (0.134)	0.180 (0.131)	0.088 (0.071)
Observations	821	813	843
	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	OLS

Notes: Cutpoints and constant are not shown. Samples are limited to married respondents.

Source: Baker 2022.

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