The 'Ulama in Contemporary Pakistan: Contesting and Cultivating an Islamic Republic by Mashal Saif (review)

The 'Ulama in Contemporary Pakistan: Contesting and Cultivating an Islamic Republic by Mashal Saif, 2020. Cambridge University Press, 350 pp., £75.00. ISBN 9781108839730 (hbk).

In 2018, the Supreme Court of Pakistan overturned the death sentence of Christian lady named Asia Bibi who was sentenced to death in 2010 on a fake blasphemy charge and acquitted her.¹ In response to the court's decision, violent protests, led by a Barelvi group called Tehrik-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), brought the country to a standstill and protestors warned of serious consequences if the lady were to be released. In 2019, when Bibi left the country, contrary to what many had expected, there was not a single protest and the same party remained 'peaceful'. The reason for the surprising silence from TLP was the state's pre-emptive crackdown on the group.² The whole saga of the post-Asia acquittal reflects the state's disciplinary approach and control over violent religious groups. Mashal Saif's recent book, The 'Ulama in Contemporary Pakistan: Contesting and Cultivating an Islamic Republic, brings attention to this complex relationship between the state and the ʿulamāʾ, where the former shapes and influences the latter's politics.

The book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter explores the formation of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII)³ and presents it as a case study on how the CII navigates and asserts the authority and influence of the ʿulamāʾ, and, to some extent, maintains the premodern form of authority of the ʿulamāʾ as being experts, which Saif argues, has been displaced by the modern state (55).

The second chapter discusses the controversial Anti-Blasphemy Law, the use of extra-judicial violence against 'blasphemers' incited by some Barelvi ʿulamāʾ and questions its impact on the idea of the state's sovereignty and monopoly of violence. The third chapter examines the ʿulamāʾ's conceptualisation of the state's Islamic identity and their view on the permissibility of insurrection against the state. The fourth chapter turns the focus on the Shi'a ʿulamāʾ and explains the complex and paradoxical relationship between the former and the state, where the Shi'a ʿulamāʾ acknowledge the state's complicity in the violence against theShi Shi'a, yet 'produce and perpetuate' the same state (191). The final chapter presents the Shi'a political theology; an alternative conceptualisation of the state proposed by a Shi'a ʿālim where the ʿālim posits secularism as a remedy for the sectarian violence against the Shi'a community (260).

The important contribution this book brings is to see state- ʿulamāʾ relations within the framework of 'citizen-subjects' contesting their place within the Republic (14). The author has brilliantly used Foucault theories such as biopower and governmentality to frame the state's engagement with ʿulamāʾ through disciplinary techniques. There is a debate that designates the Pakistani ʿulamāʾ as a separate and independent entity and challenges the assertion that the state shapes their politics. It also questions where ʿulamāʾ lies if the state is the driving force behind their ʿulamāʾ actions. This is where the book addresses a couple of questions and helps to clarify state- ʿulamāʾ relations, particularly within the context of hybrid or military-dominated regimes. Saif highlights that the evolution of the functionality of the ʿulamāʾ in the modern nation-state is where they operate not necessarily among the state's elite, but enjoy some sort of freedom, to the extent that sometimes they challenge the state's writ. However, there are always limitations set by the state and it uses various techniques to discipline these ʿulamāʾ which include patronage, coercion, and intimidation.

The author eloquently points out that even those ʿulamāʾ who are critical of the state nevertheless contribute to its formation, and defend it. Other than the case studies the book provides, such as those of the Barelvi and Shi'a ʿulamāʾ, there are examples of Deobandi groups such as the Difa-e-Pakistan Council, a coalition of forty politico-religious parties that includes militant Sunni parties that often come to the defence of the...