Hume's Scepticism, Pyrrhonian and Academic by Peter S. Fosl (review)

Peter Fosl presents an engaging and historically rich account of Hume's skepticism. For those readers interested in deepening their knowledge and understanding of Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism, both in regard to their origins and their legacy, I highly recommend it. But I also recommend it for those who would like to better understand Hume's skepticism, although I do think there is some tension in Fosl's reading.

Before I discuss this tension, a brief summary of the book is in order. Fosl's primary claim is that Hume's skepticism is a hybrid of Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism. To show this, Fosl divides the book into two parts. In the first, Fosl presents a detailed account of the ancient and modern versions of Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism. In the second, Fosl argues how and why Hume's skepticism is a combination of Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism.

In chapter 1, Fosl defines "Clitomachian … 'Academic sceptical non-realism'" (31), which, he argues, reflects Hume's position. This kind of "scepticism does not entail making positive epistemological claims about the true and the real, probable or otherwise; and it does not involve any positive epistemological claims, even the minimal epistemic egalitarianism on the basis of epistemic nullity" (34). Fosl also calls this "doxastic scepticism" (171).

In chapter 2, Fosl highlights five points about early modern Academic skepticism, "cull[ed] from Cicero," that are "characteristically Humean": (1) "Non-apprehending," that is, one does not affirm or deny truths about reality; (2) "Doxastic moderation," which "produces results that are persuasive … rather than proven" and so is neither dogmatic nor an instance of extreme skeptical doubt; (3) "Limited inquiry," that is, inquiry that is limited to what we can actually experience; (4) "Integrity," which takes priority over making truth claims; and (5) "Modesty," which is opposed to immodest claims to the truth (69–70).

Fosl then explains in chapter 3 that, contrary to many common interpretations, ancient Pyrrhonism does not entail the "radical and complete elimination of belief" (110). Rather, Pyrrhonism is not dogmatic and has a number of positive aspects. In chapter 4, Fosl argues that Hume adopts a modern version of Pyrrhonism. In the process, Fosl summarizes the seven Pyrrhonian points that are salient in Hume's skepticism (170): (1) We must conform to appearances rather than dogma (e.g. abstract rational and/or theological inquiry)—and this conformation is "fourfold": we must conform to "a.) nature, b.) custom, habit and tradition c.) passions, and d.) technical arts." (2) We must practice a suspension of belief. (3) This suspension is "Apelletic" (i.e. follows the example provided by the painter Apelles of Kos in the anecdote reported by Sextus Empriricus; see 99–100), that is, open to its fortuitous outcomes. (4) We must not be assertive about the "non-evident or hidden." (5) We must be "zetetic," that is, we must remain open to critique and revision. (6) Our inquiries should end in "undisturbedness, peace or tranquility." (7) We must adhere to common life.

For the remainder of the book (chapters 5–8), Fosl examines how the "Pyrrhonian Fourfold" (210), mentioned directly above, applies to Hume's thought. Specifically, in chapter 5, Fosl argues that Hume's naturalism is "most fundamentally … centered on the ongoing press of nature disclosed through his Apelletic empiricism" (210). According to Hume, there is a "press" of nature (this is a. in the Fourfold) that occurs "prior to any theory of an independent causal order" (203). As such, it informs our theories: "'nature' … [is] an unbidden, resistant, irresistible and non-rational press—the press of impressions, the pressure to conceptualise experiences discursively and to act" (203). To clarify these ideas, Fosl writes, "The 'nature' and 'necessity' that Hume confronts here is neither rationalistic necessity nor the necessity of causal realism. It is rather the pressing, propelling quality of the current of experience that makes possible thinking, perceiving and doing, despite sceptical arguments or fantasies to the contrary...