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Reviewed by:
  • Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait?
  • Martin L. Lasater (bio)
Ralph N. Clough . Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait?Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999. xi, 155 pp. Paperback, $21.95, ISBN 0-8476-9325-2.

Since the publication of his classic volume Island China (Harvard, 1978), Ralph Clough has been considered one of America's most respected scholars on the subject of Taiwan. Presently with the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C., Professor Clough has been especially attentive in recent years to exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. The present study builds upon his earlier work, Reaching across the Taiwan Strait: People-to-People Diplomacy (Westview, 1993), to consider the impact of cross-Strait relations on the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan triangular relationship. Specifically, the purpose of Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? is "to analyze the evolving relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, evaluating the trends that are drawing them together or keeping them apart, and to make recommendations as to U.S. policies that will promote cross-strait cooperation and diminish the tendency toward confrontation" (p. xi).

Clough addresses these issues admirably. This book is well-written, to-the-point, conveniently organized, and sufficiently detailed to provide a wealth of information for scholars while not overwhelming the casual reader. All in all, Cooperation or Conflict deserves a place on the bookshelf for anyone interested in Chinese or Asian affairs.

Clough focuses on the mid-1995 through mid-1998 period, with special emphasis on the domestic and international dimensions of cross-Strait relations and the role of the United States in managing the Taiwan issue. The author is scrupulously fair in describing the points of view of the various actors involved with the Taiwan issue, particularly those on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Ironically, Clough is a little less accurate in depicting the views of Congress and the American public, who, by and large, are very supportive of Taiwan and critical of the People's Republic of China. He implies, for example, that the lobbying efforts of Cassidy Associates were responsible for the nearly 100 percent favorable vote in Congress to extend a visa to Lee Teng-hui so that he could visit Cornell University in June 1995 (p. 7). Actually, Congress was already upset over the State Department's humiliation of Lee during a brief stopover in Hawai'i in May 1994 and needed no prodding to urge President Bill Clinton to approve the visa. Any review of legislation from the 103d, 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses (1993-2000) will reveal the unbroken string of supporting votes Taiwan has received from most members of Congress. [End Page 71]

By and large, there are very few factual errors in this book. But there is room for healthy controversy. For instance, Clough writes that "Washington would probably recognize Taiwan as an independent state" if the United States intervened militarily to stop a PRC invasion of Taiwan (p. 88). This is not necessarily true, however, since Washington can both intervene and maintain its present one-China policy—these two options are not mutually exclusive.

By far the most controversial statements in the book are found in the final chapter, in which Clough offers policy recommendations for the United States. He suggests that U.S. policy should focus on preventing a crisis in the Taiwan Strait that would place the United States in the uncomfortable dilemma of either intervening militarily against the People's Liberation Army or watching Taiwan be subjugated by force. The problem with this formulation is that by placing emphasis on preventing Sino-American conflict, rather than protecting Taiwan from PRC aggression, the interests of Taiwan are harmed and the possibilities of war are probably increased.

As seen in the second-term policies of the Clinton administration, this focus on conflict avoidance can have negative implications for Taiwan—for example, Clinton's "three no's" announced in Shanghai in mid-1998 and Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth's "interim agreements" proposal in March 1999. Unable or unwilling to pressure Beijing to moderate its policies toward Taiwan—which are zero-sum in terms of insisting that...

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