The Magical Santayanan Groundwork for Metaphysical Coherentism

Introduction

There is a tension in Santayana's ontological system, one that is generated by the interactions of his (1) doctrine of existence, (2) doctrine of systematization, and (3) critical agnosticism on the infinity of material substance. From (1) and (2), in conjunction with what will be called the expansionist postulate, an infinite material expansion is generated, one that is in conflict with (3). This tension is remediated by a coherentist proposal regarding Santayanan existence, the relevant feature of which is that existents at distinct orders of organization are in symmetrical dependence relations. "Metaphysical coherentism," which has recently been described as "one of the least explored areas in contemporary literature" (Tahko), chiefly involves positing such symmetrical grounding relations.¹

The coherentist proposal blocks the infinite expansion identified; it also supplies a more productive Santayanan treatment of the existential status of the "world system." It is quintessentially Santayanan, since (i) it is a plausible extension of coherentist themes already found within his official doctrine, and (ii) it diagnoses the appearance of the infinite expansion as a function of a broader metaphysical error he describes, that is, that of conflating the nature of being with the nature of existence.

The discussion of the paper is directed at readers interested in the exegesis and internal consistency of Santayana's ontology. However, it also discovers a distinctively Santayanan basis for a thoroughgoing metaphysical coherentism, and is thus of broader interest. Sketching Santayana's central distinction between being and existence is the first order of business.

1. Being and Existence

Santayana considers essences as universal characterizing properties or whatnesses. The distinction between essence and existence reflects the bifurcation of what a thing is (its qualitative identity) from that a thing is (the existential instantiation of something that has this identity).² As Santayana puts it, "[e]ssence is just that character which any existence wears in so far as it remains identical with itself and so long as it does so" (RB 23).

Essences, on Santayana's view, "are primordial and distinct forms of possible being" (RB 430).³ Eternal,⁴ atemporal, nonspatial, and incorruptible,⁵ these universals have ontological priority over existent things. The priority of essence follows from the fact that the realm of essence, according to Santayana, contains an infinity of qualitatively diverse characters (without duplication).⁶ Thus, any character that could be existentially instantiated is necessarily prefigured in the realm of essence:

W]hatsoever form an existence may happen to assume, that form will be some precise essence eternally self-defined…. [E]vents can never overtake or cover the infinite advance which pure Being has had on existence from all eternity.

(RB 122)⁷

Santayana reasons that it is accidental to an essence whether or not it exists (no essence exists essentially), and no essence implies, causally or logically, any other essence (RB 20–21; see also RB 836).⁸ The metaphysical contingency of existence makes the bifurcation of essence and existence total.⁹ Celestine J. Sullivan, Jr., encapsulates the relevant point: "[W]hat is a contingent fact but one the nature, or essence, of which does not imply its existence[?]" (220).

Santayana's theory of essences has an affinity to Meinong's view on nonexistent objects,¹⁰ and thus intersects with central theses described in the neo-Meinongian doctrine of noneism. "Noneism" is a term coined by Richard Routley to refer to a handful of theses. Most notably, noneists deny that (i) "only what exists can have properties" (Routley 22), and (ii) "non-existent items … cannot be sensibly spoken about or discussed" (Routley 11).¹¹ Conversely, noneists affirm that (iii) "[e]xistence is not a characterising property of any object"; and (iv) "essence precedes existence" (Routley 2–3). Santayana's commitment to (iv) has been covered already. Santayana's commitment to (i) and (ii) can be observed in the following:

The science of chess—even if chess never had existed in the world—would be an exact science…. [A]n exact science is not without an object…. Indeed, the ideal definition of that object … renders exact science of it possible.

(RB 4–5)¹² [End Page 108...