In Eudemian Ethics VIII.3, Aristotle treats a virtue that he calls kalokagathia, “nobility-and-goodness.” This virtue appears to be quite important, and he even identifies it with “perfect virtue” (EE VIII.3, 1249a17). This makes it puzzling that the Nicomachean Ethics, a text that largely parallels the Eudemian Ethics, does not discuss kalokagathia at all. I argue that the reason for this difference has to do with the role that the intellectual virtue practical wisdom (phronêsis) plays in these treatises. The Nicomachean Ethics, I argue, makes use of a more expansive conception of phronêsis than does the Eudemian Ethics. Hence, the work that is done by kalokagathia in the Eudemian Ethics—crucially, accounting for the unity of the virtues—is done in the Nicomachean Ethics by phronêsis.