Indian Perspectives on Consciousness, Language and Self: The School of Recognition on Linguistics and Philosophy of Mind by Marco Ferrante (review)

Indian Perspectives on Consciousness, Language and Self by Marco Ferrante explores theories of consciousness by examining the non-dual philosophy of Recognition mainly represented by the two philosophers Utpaladeva (c. 925-975 CE) and Abhinavagupta (c. 975-1025 CE), and also carefully concludes that the trajectory of their ideas have compelling influence from Bhartṛhari (c. 460-510 CE) and his commentator Helārāja (c. 980 CE). No philosophy ever evolves and develops in a void. No philosophical tradition or theory functions in oblivion. In the history of philosophy in South Asia, this is also true of the traditions that have staunchly stood up and rigorously argued for the ubiquity of consciousness. The dynamism of these traditions is represented by philosophers of language like Bhartṛhari and further continued by Buddhist philosophers like Vasubandhu (4th-5th CE), Dignāga (c. 480-540 C.E.), Dharmakīrti (c. 6th-7th CE), Śāntarakṣita (8th CE), Kamalaśīla (8th CE), and others, and then followed by non-dualist Vedāntins like Śaṅkara (8th-9th CE) and further developed by Śaivas like Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta.

The book clearly demonstrates the author's understanding of the original texts he is using and the philosophical purport that they exhibit. And it must be added that he has begun a significantly careful discourse in detail not only about the importance of Bhartṛhari, whom we have shamelessly ignored for too long, but also how he has played a significant role in the evolution of later philosophical systems in South Asia. This has been remarkably achieved by not only identifying the relevant portions in Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, on the one hand, but also locating the relevant portions of the texts and presenting the corresponding theses of the interlocutors like Bhartṛhari and Helārāja on another, while also presenting their translations in the appendix of the book. The book should be lauded for these reasons alone.

The first chapter of the book maps a historical context of the tradition known as Pratyabhijñā ("Recognition") and highlights the significance not only of Bhartṛhari but also of Buddhist Pramāṇavāda (roughly, the tradition of "epistemology") in the philosophical evolution of the Pratyabhijñā. The second chapter is an excellent summary of the background of the Buddhist doctrine of non-self from the early Buddhist sources and from Mark Siderits (2007), contextualizing the problem vis-à-vis Pratyabhijñā, though a deeper engagement with Pramāṇavāda would have been desirable. The third chapter begins evaluating the core issue of self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) as a moot philosophical problem between the Buddhists and the Śaivas, one in which memory is a fundamental point of dispute. This chapter also introduces Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Towards the conclusion, however, I am not sure what exactly Ferrante means by "private" when he says "Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta were explicitly saying that consciousness has a purely private, phenomenal dimension" (p. 82). (Also see pp. 7, 30, 42, 43, 46, 84.) For them, consciousness is subjective, phenomenal, but universal and not "private." The fourth chapter evaluates self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) with respect to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on the basis of Paul Williams (1998) and further moves on to contextualize the problem for Bhartṛhari and Pratyabhijñā. The fifth chapter is the core of the book, investigating the linguistic nature of consciousness according to Bhartṛhari and the Pratyabhijñā appropriation thereof. In the relatively shorter chapter six, by comparing qualia with camatkāra (a difficultto-translate term literally meaning 'wonderment') and camatkāra with vimarśa, Ferrante explains "how the belief in qualia (camatkāra) can coexist with a higher-order theory of consciousness (vimarśa)" (p. 87). The final, seventh, chapter moves towards making general comparisons and contrasts, arguing that "Utpaladeva's philosophy is best understood as a form...